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The European Union (EU) has long strived to act collectively in the face of international challenges 
such as poverty, hunger and state fragility beyond its borders. While the EU member states and 
institutions seek coherent responses to these challenges, they also have partly competing agendas. 
Yet there has been increasing agreement on collective action. To understand this agreement, this 
thesis asks how policy professionals contribute to the advocacy of policy norms for collective action 
between the EU institutions and the member states. The research analyses policy processes in EU 
development cooperation since the early 2000s. In development cooperation the EU’s effectiveness 
has been particularly contested because of the combination of competing ideas about the EU’s role 
and about how to achieve effective and sustainable development. The research finds that, while 
formal decisions about collective action remain in the hands of member states, transnational 
networks of policy professionals in the EU institutions, member state bureaucracies and civil society 
contribute to shaping the terms of debate regarding the EU’s role in effective development 
cooperation. These network interactions, which form around institutional decision-making centres, 
transcend the organisational boundaries of member state bureaucracies, EU institutions and civil 
society organisations. These findings fill a gap in our understanding of how EU norms governing 
collective external action are advocated as existing research has tended to focus on how institutional 
structure facilitate state coordination. By concentrating on the cases of Germany and the United 
Kingdom and their engagement with the EU institutions, the research revises existing, dominant views 
on norm advocacy in EU external action: It links the previously little related concepts of norm advocacy 
and discursive networks to analyse the agency and scope of policy professionals in the advocacy of 
EU policy norms; and it provides new empirical insights into the role of these policy professionals for 
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The European Union (EU)1 and its role in the world have long been disputed at various political levels 
as well as in academic writing. Research on the EU’s international action has attracted attention as 
both capacities and expectations have grown and mutually reinforced each other (Hill, 1993). 
Expectations are based on the collective capacity of the EU as a whole and have grown with 
institutional reforms intended to employ this capacity. As ‘hard’ integration – in the sense of creating 
institutions that claim jurisdiction over existing national structures (see Haas, 1958) – has remained 
limited (with the exception of trade), observers have concentrated on the EU’s efforts to overcoming 
collective action problems under existing institutional provisions and their reforms (e.g., Bodenstein, 
et al., 2017; Dijkstra and Vanhoonacker, 2017; Henökl and Trondal, 2015; Niemann and Bretherton, 
2013). 
European governance in the field of external action is characterised by differentiated 
institutional structures that combine supra-, transnational and intergovernmental elements. Despite 
institutional reforms, disappointment about what is considered inconsistent and ineffective external 
action of the EU has prevailed. As hopes for cohesive and effective EU external action have remained 
unfulfilled, it led to questions about whether (external) effectiveness should be considered the 
yardstick for assessing the EU’s actions (Bickerton, 2011). Such concerns highlight the process 
dimension of politically integrating Europe against resistance, mostly from within member states (see 
Majone, 2014). Effectiveness as a functional driver of integration stands in competition with a logic of 
diversity (see Hoffmann, 1966).2 This tension places a strong emphasis on the dynamics of internal 
                                                          
1 Following the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1992, the EU is defined as the totality of its 
constituent member states and the supranational institutions which they created. The latter formed the 
European Community (EC), which, de jure, ceased to exist with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 
December 2009. 
2 In a nutshell, Stanley Hoffmann (1966) argues that the obstacles to integration primarily lie in the differences 
in member states’ ‘national situations’, which consist of domestic politics and institutional systems, and the 
external identities and interests determined by geography and history. He sustains that interaction among 
member states on issues of relations with the international system exacerbate these tensions and reproduce 
the differences. That is what he calls the ‘logic of diversity’, which contests the functional ‘logic of integration’, 
subsuming the attraction of the regional integrationist forces. 
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contestation. While this emphasis may be bemoaned (Keuleers, et al., 2016), given the contestation 
and the absence of a hierarchical institutional order, it is surprising that there is any agreement on 
collective action. In other words, it is puzzling that a system which allegedly provides little incentive 
for collective action, continues to produce common policy norms. Yet it remains largely unclear how. 
This puzzle points to a gap in our understanding of how EU norms governing collective 
external action are advocated. To fill this gap, this research examines the role of policy professionals. 
While these actors have very limited individual power over either policy coordination or formal 
agreements between the member states, they are involved in those processes leading to common 
policy norms. This thesis therefore asks the following research question: 
How do policy professionals contribute to the advocacy of policy norms for collective action 
between the EU institutions and the member states? 
As processes of norm advocacy presuppose and precede collective action, answering this question 
adds to our understanding of collective EU action and the obstacles to it, in particular, how and to 
what extent the agency of policy professional contributes towards common EU external action. 
Norm advocacy for collective action is endemic where hard rules and institutions are missing. 
Attention regarding this kind of ‘informal’ policy-making has predominantly focused on member state 
representatives and their interactions (Björkdahl, 2008; Chelotti, 2016a; Cross, 2011; Elgström, 2000; 
2017; Mérand, et al., 2011). The focus on dedicated state representatives has also found its way into 
European integration theory as ‘new intergovernmentalism’ (Bickerton, et al., 2014). However, this 
focus is surprising given that a wider range of policy professionals seems relevant at the formulation 
and advocacy stage, which transcends the boundaries of member states (Bugdahn, 2008; Carbone, 
2007; Chou and Riddervold, 2015; Riddervold, 2016; Wolff, 2015). Thus, it seems insufficient to 
concentrate on the negotiations between member state representatives. While they are responsible 
for the endorsement of EU policy norms – in the sense that every agreement goes through their hands 
– a multitude of professionals potentially contributes to a policy norm. Is there evidence that 
professionals beyond the more prominent networks of dedicated member state representatives 
contribute to finding agreement? And if so, how and in what ways do they contribute? What is the 
nature of this contribution and under what conditions does it become effective? 
Norm advocacy through such a wide group of actors, who not all engage directly, provides a 
methodological challenge. The research looks at those processes that lead to the advocacy of policy 
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norms at the EU level between a multitude of professionals from EU institutions, member state 
governments and bureaucracies, and non-state and civil society organisations. It therefore 
concentrates on the competition over meaning, which underpins those policy norms that are aimed 
at improving the effectiveness of the EU’s collective action in external relations, and which deeply 
reaches into the working-level interactions of issue professionals. This involves looking at the 
discursive actions and interactions of these policy professionals, both public and non-public, which 
collectively shape discourses on EU effectiveness. Competition over how effectiveness justifies 
collective action has been at the heart of EU external policy-making. Looking at such discourse 
construction dynamics means broadening the focus on the transnational policy process, which deals 
with the construction of international policy norms (Henriksen and Seabrooke, 2016; Stone, 2013; 
Stone and Ladi, 2015; Wiener, 2014). It is based on the participation of wider groups of actors, state 
and non-state, external and internal, subject to an ambiguous institutional environment that is not 
directly congruent with organisational structures. Therefore, the research disaggregates 
organisational units, especially member states and EU institutions, to understand their multiple and 
at times contradicting contributions. 
Empirically, the research focuses on a policy sector which is at the heart of EU external action 
but has often been left to specialists: international development cooperation. Governance in 
European development cooperation is a case where agreement on ‘soft’ common policy norms for 
the EU and its member states exists in place of ‘hard’ integration. Collective action in EU development 
cooperation has been an enduring question because the institutional structure provides it with a 
complex challenge (Bodenstein, et al., 2017; European Think Tanks Group (ETTG), 2014; Gänzle, et al., 
2012; Orbie and Carbone, 2016). While common institutional structures for policy-making exist since 
the late 1950s, member state policies have been legally independent. As a result of this so called 
‘parallel competence’, collective action faces institutional and legal obstacles, which have made 
Europeanisation difficult (Bretherton, 2013; Orbie and Carbone, 2016). Despite this legal separation, 
EU institutions and member states are part of institutional structures and have taken obligations both 
inside the EU and outside, which brings them together but also puts partly competing expectations 
on them. Since Maastricht, attention has been devoted to improving the effectiveness of EU 
development cooperation by focusing on the coordination between the policies of the EU institutions 
and the member states. Reforms have not overcome problems of collective action, and yet the 
creation of and the agreement on common norms have repeatedly increased hopes among observers 
(e.g., Carbone, 2008a; Gänzle, et al., 2012). Thus, this research investigates empirically how the EU 
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agrees on common policy norms in development cooperation, and how and on what grounds 
agreement shifts. 
For the case of development cooperation, I show how competition over effectiveness has 
been a key driver of common action of EU institutions and member states, and institutional 
innovations. The effectiveness of, and the conditions for, effective development cooperation have 
been central in debates of international development (see Riddell, 2007). The effectiveness of aid (or 
its lack thereof) became a strong concern after the end of the Cold War (Burnside and Dollar, 2000), 
which was considered to emancipate the provision of aid from political ties. Yet what makes EU 
development cooperation more effective is not evident but highly contested due to different 
priorities, benchmarks, ‘measurements’ etc. This contestation is a constant process of formulation 
and reformulation, interpretation and reinterpretation, which happens simultaneously to and as part 
of the policy process. It involves competition between stakeholders for concrete policies based on 
interests and identities, and within institutional structures, which are themselves elusive and in 
constant flux. What makes debates on effective EU development cooperation so contentious is the 
combination of, on the one hand, ambiguity and uncertainty about the effectiveness of development 
cooperation (e.g., Bigsten and Tengstam, 2015; Riddell, 2007; Sjöstedt, 2013; Sjöstedt and Sundström, 
2017) and, on the other hand, the lack of a consensus over what role the EU (and its institutions) 
should have in international development. Moreover, debates on the EU’s effectiveness in 
development cooperation are built on multiple underlying and related discussions. These debates 
include, for instance, the purpose of aid, the goal of development, the relationship of development 
cooperation with other policy areas, the effectiveness and role of the EU in the world, and the function 
of European integration. 
While debates about effectiveness in development cooperation exist outside the EU, EU 
actors compete over how these principles fit with the question of an added value of EU integration. 
Effectiveness is used in the competition for advancing (or contesting) interests and ideas of actors, 
such as promoting more and stronger common EU structures, by justifying propositions based on the 
contribution to (EU) effectiveness. Therefore, any understanding of effective EU development 
cooperation must be seen as the result of political competition between actors. Such understandings 
are not simply established by individual actors but as a form of collective agency. This agency is the 
result of actors’ dynamic interactions through which meaning is constituted (see Wiener, 2008; 2014). 
This interactive process is based on multiple, complex and possibly competing ‘real-world’ 
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interdependences, which are structured by networks. Different parts of such a network become active 
depending on their contribution to the discursive competition of relevant actors. 
EU development cooperation is treated as a case study of external action. This thesis follows 
processes of finding and maintaining agreement on collective action over a longer period. The benefit 
of the case study approach is that it generates qualitative insights into the dynamism of how actors 
compete over the EU’s international action. It illustrates mechanisms and dynamics of how actors 
engage and connect with each other, provide arguments and support, and circumvent formal 
structures. Looking at a longer period shows how these actors react to changes in the international 
environment and of the institutional relations to which they both contribute and are subjected. Which 
arguments matter for norm advocacy is limited by the discursive environment that is itself set through 
the interactions of numerous actors (see Diez, 2014). These interactions are not sufficiently 
represented when looking exclusively at the EU level. Hence, the presented approach suggests 
broadening the focus of analysis to include a wider range of actors and their network relationships. In 
this thesis, I look at the effects of interdependences at the transnational and national levels for 
discourse coordination, and what affects them. This perspective suggests how decisions on external 
action are based on the participation of wider discursive networks beyond the institutional decision-
making centre. The research thus contributes to the debates about EU policy coordination in the 
international arena, the institutionalisation of policy-making practices, and processes of, as well as 
obstacles to, common European external action. 
The contribution of this research is twofold. First, it generates new insights on the agency of 
policy professionals in EU development cooperation and discusses them in relation to existing 
research on norm advocacy processes in the EU. Second, it provides an analytical-methodological tool 
for understanding such processes in EU external relations by drawing on existing insights in global and 
transnational governance, which has not been done systematically before. The aim of this research is 
to add to the limited institutionalist perspective that has become so dominant in this area. The 
remainder of this introduction (1) circumscribes the wider framework in which this thesis is situated 
and clarifies the key concepts, norm advocacy, institutions and policy networks; (2) outlines the 
research design, methodology, methods and related caveats; (3) introduces the case study of EU 
development cooperation and the related discourse on effectiveness; and (4) provides a brief outline 
of the subsequent chapters. 
 
FEDERATING EU DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION? 
6 
Conceptual framework 
Agreeing on standards of behaviour, codes of practice or policy norms for external action, which apply 
to the EU and its member states, is not the same as ‘traditional’ law-making with its highly 
institutionalised rules and processes. Institutional structures of external action have remained 
ambiguous and are in constant flux; the system changes continuously while agreement is pursued. 
Institutional order has thus little to say about the process of norm advocacy. This section addresses 
open conceptual questions regarding this ‘informal’ process: What are policy norms and how do they 
matter? What does ‘policy-making’ mean if not law-making and how can it be conceptualised? How 
do actors participate in these informal policy-making and norm advocacy processes? How do 
institutions affect informal policy-making and participation of actors? How does the level of analysis 
matter? While several of these questions will be dealt with in greater detail in chapter 1, this section 
provides some working definitions of the most important concepts and offers a critical reading of their 
relationships to each other. In particular, it summarises the critique of institutionalist, state-centric 
approaches in norm advocacy research in the field of EU external action and foreign policy, which is 
advanced in this thesis, and introduces an alternative approach. 
International or regional policy norms set standards for the appropriate behaviour of state 
actors (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Wiener, 2008). Policy norms are understood as formulations 
intended to inform political procedures and guide policy practices (Wiener, 2008, p. 67). In terms of 
terminology, there is some ambiguity between norms, principles and policies. While often defined 
differently, they are sometimes used interchangeably. For instance, Antje Wiener (2008) presents a 
typology of norms that range from highly generalisable fundamental norms, to mid-level organising 
principles and finally specific standardised procedures or practices. What is relevant for all these types 
of norms is that they are understood as collective expectations about appropriate behaviour in 
international politics (Florini, 1996; Katzenstein, 1996b, p. 5). The understanding of norms for the 
purpose of this thesis is concerned with more specific policy norms (or principles) that consist of 
codified, common expectations and understandings to enable collective action in international 
politics. 
Talking about policy norms requires a different understanding and conception of ‘policy-
making’. Dynamics of contestation lie at the heart of any policy process. The policy process can be 
understood as a struggle about agreeing on common policy norms. Processes regarding the 
contestation and coordination of policy norms have been prominent in international governance 
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research (Djelic and Quack, 2010; Henriksen and Seabrooke, 2016; Slaughter, 2004; Stone and Ladi, 
2015) and also in research on EU external action (e.g., Björkdahl, 2008; Elgström, 2000; 2017). In the 
transnational context the institutional environment is more ambiguous than in the national context. 
The process of norm advocacy is thus understood as an informal process in the sense that formal, 
institutionalised and binding mechanisms for the participation and power of actors are less conclusive 
or even missing. Consequently, the results of such processes are standards of good – or ‘normal’ – 
behaviour rather than legally codified and enforceable norms. However, if institutional structures are 
less decisive in structuring these ‘informal’ policy processes, the question arises what else matters for 
norm advocacy in transnational governance. 
Due to the institutional ambiguity and uncertainty, observers have tended to approach norm 
advocacy in transnational governance through networks, often between states and state 
representatives, i.e., inter- or transgovernmental networks (e.g., Eberlein and Newman, 2008; 
Hobolth and Martinsen, 2013; Slaughter and Hale, 2010). The network approach copes with varying 
degrees of institutionalisation, ranging from the national context, where it gained prominence (Marsh 
and Rhodes, 1992b), to more densely institutionalised international systems, such as the EU (Jordan 
and Schout, 2006; Peterson and Bomberg, 1999), to the global level (Slaughter, 2004; Stone, 2013; 
Stone and Ladi, 2015). Research on networks in the EU context highlight the relative institutional 
ambiguity and uncertainty in specific policy areas, e.g., in environmental policy (Andonova and Tuta, 
2014; Jordan and Schout, 2006). While such ambiguity and uncertainty has justified a focus on states 
and their interactions when it comes to ‘norm negotiations’ (see Elgström, 2000), with institutional 
ambiguity also comes a widening of the range of actors beyond state representatives who seek to 
participate in norm advocacy (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Slaughter, 2004; Stone, 2013). 
While all these actors are part of a densely institutionalised international environment, which 
shapes their relative position, available resources and access to formal decision-making centres, the 
process is more competitive than organisational structure suggests. Thus, the primary value of a 
network-oriented approach is that it copes with processes that are more ‘independent’ of institutional 
or organisational structures. In the (new) institutionalist tradition, institutional structures shape policy 
outputs in that they constrain and constitute the choices of actors (Hall and Taylor, 1996). This 
function becomes less conclusive where structures are more ambiguous and/or adjust in the process, 
for example, as a result of policy processes (see Schmidt, 2010). Institutional structures matter for 
norm advocacy but, in contrast to institutionalist approaches, they are understood to provide the 
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nodal point, an institutionalised decision centre, around which policy professionals gather to shape 
policy norms (see chapter 1). Networks are less tied to organisational boundaries provided by 
institutions, states and organisations more generally. Transnational organising is dominated by 
competition and coordination within professional networks (Djelic and Quack, 2010; Henriksen and 
Seabrooke, 2016; Stone, 2013; 2015; Stone and Maxwell, 2005). Thereby, networks on the 
organisational level (between organisations) are not simply a more abstract version of networks of 
issue professionals, but networks of issue professionals have distinct dynamics (Henriksen and 
Seabrooke, 2016). Thus, a concentration on lower analytical levels helps to identify agency in 
networks. It suggests moving beyond the highly aggregate organisational boundaries of states and EU 
institutions to concentrate on more issue-specific, professional units and their agency in networks. 
This suggests that a central element for network research in transnational governance seems to be 
the level of analysis (see Peterson and Bomberg, 1999). 
In the area of EU external action, much attention has been devoted to the intergovernmental 
formulation and coordination practice of state actors (Chelotti, 2016a; Cross, 2011; Elgström, 2017; 
Kuus, 2014; Mérand, et al., 2011). This focus has provided deep insights into practices of ‘norm 
negotiations’ between few, relatively homogenous diplomats and member state representatives. 
However, while EU foreign and security policy, and diplomacy are traditionally dominated by member 
state diplomats, a wider range of national state but also non-state and EU institutional actors become 
involved and exert influence (Calcara, 2017; Chou and Riddervold, 2015; Riddervold, 2016; Tocci, 
2016; Wilkinson, et al., 2017). This is even more so in areas such as trade and commercial policy, 
environmental policy and climate mitigation, international migration, and humanitarian aid and 
development cooperation where there is predominantly professional engagement. Generally, there 
is a bureaucratic core; around this core there are public and private development agencies and 
consultancies, both more general and specialised; then there are private NGOs, churches, foundations 
and philanthropists. In the EU, coordination and networks form among and between these primary 
groups, e.g., bureaucracies, NGOs, implementing agencies, and so on. 
As an empirical phenomenon, we observe repeated, stable interactions and shared identities 
of policy professionals who not only engage across organisational but also national boundaries and 
become a constituent part of global governance (Djelic and Quack, 2010; Finnemore, 1996; 
Katzenstein, 1996a; Stone, 2013; Zürn and Checkel, 2005). Policy professionals come across each 
other, meet and share their ideas inevitably in international organisations and on the ground in third 
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countries where they engage with the same interlocutors. Due to the absence of a predominantly 
national focus, it has been suggested that these policy professionals have a particularly strong sense 
of shared identity which transcends organisational and national boundaries (Stone, 2013; Stone and 
Maxwell, 2005). These policy professionals also change their affiliations from member state 
bureaucracies to EU institutions, e.g., as seconded national experts (see Murdoch, et al., 2016), or 
between think tanks and bureaucracies (as was the case for several of the interviewees in this study). 
As Jan Beyers (2005) suggests, the multiple embeddedness of member state representatives, 
including in the domestic context, means that they are part of different networks, and face different 
incentives and normative orientations on different levels. The national context of elite orientation 
matters because this is where many actors have their primary networks, see their career prospects, 
and have been professionally and personally formed. Nevertheless, they are also capable of adjusting 
their orientation to different contexts (Murdoch, et al., 2016). 
As the complex interactions between professionals suggests, a concentration on a network 
between professionals as an institutionalised group necessarily omits their participation and 
interlinkage in the wider structure. In his seminal work, Mark Granovetter (1973) remarked that most 
network analyses deal with strong ties that form small, well-defined groups. This corresponds to the 
focus in much network-oriented analysis of norm advocacy on well-defined (sub-)networks, which are 
often defined by institutional structures, such as member state representatives in the Council working 
groups (Elgström, 2017). Granovetter (1973) suggested, instead, looking at interactions between 
groups to analyse segments of social structure that are not easily defined by well-circumscribed 
groups but reveal relevant interdependences. Interactions between organisations can thus be 
understood in terms of such weak links between members of well-defined (sub-)networks. In every-
day policy-making institutional, government and non-governmental actors engage regularly across 
organisational boundaries in various networks and share common identities as policy professionals. 
This has also effects on how they engage, which is often based on technical knowledge and expertise 
(Howorth, 2004; Stone, 2004; 2013; Stone and Maxwell, 2005; Zwolski, 2014). With few exceptions 
(e.g., Wolff, 2015), research on EU norm advocacy in external action has hardly conceptualised the 
agency of policy professionals as situated in a dynamic network that crosses organisational 
boundaries. Doing this requires moving to a meso level of analysis that places the various links and 
sub-networks between policy professionals within a wider network. 
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In a nutshell, the conceptual critique presented in this research refers to the institutionalist 
and state-centric approaches in norm advocacy research in the field of EU external action and foreign 
policy. Network-oriented approaches to analysing norm advocacy have often concentrated on 
interactions between members of a primary group of professionals, especially member state 
representatives in the Council, but also well-defined advocacy networks etc. While these approaches 
have produced great insights into the practice of interactions between policy professionals, they 
necessarily omit the wider interdependences and network interactions of these professionals. Yet 
these wider interactions matter for norm advocacy given that more actors outside the institutional 
structure seek to shape policy norms. Instead, this research seeks to capture the nature of norm 
advocacy more widely, including a wider range of actors and their relations, especially within the 
domestic arena and transnational actors, and therefore moves to a meso level of analysis. While 
moving to such a level of analysis means that (sociological) questions of personal interaction or 
communication matter less, instead, structural and discursive elements move into focus. The 
contribution of this perspective is that it identifies the agency of policy professionals who have been 
less visible within the EU institutional structure. 
 
Research design and methodology 
Norm advocacy through a wide group of actors, who not all engage directly, provides a 
methodological challenge as it cannot be easily studied as practices and direct discursive interactions 
between an identifiable, well-defined group of actors, such as norm advocacy processes among state 
representatives in the Council (e.g., Cross, 2011; Elgström, 2000; 2017). For this reason, this research 
adopts an in-depth case study approach which follows the advocacy of norms for collective EU 
development cooperation over a longer period. In particular, it looks at individual policy tools 
advanced at the EU level that have aimed at policy approximation in the EU. As norm advocacy cannot 
be easily studied in a wider, less cohesive network, this research looks at actors’ discursive actions, 
both public and those in less public settings where professionals directly engage with each other. 
While the case study approach offers deep insights into an empirical phenomenon, it comes 
with limitations on the theoretical implications of findings. Yet the goal of this research is not to make 
a wider theoretical claim to the functioning of policy-making (in the positivist sense). The main 
contribution is to develop and apply an analytical-methodological approach for analysing processes 
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on which institutionalised decision-making is based. A research design that follows logically from the 
conceptual framework targets the collective agency behind policy norms at the analytical meso-level 
below the organisational level (see Henriksen and Seabrooke, 2016). It focuses on those actors and 
their networks responsible for the substantive formulation and coordination of individual policies and 
policy practices. Such an approach responds to the gap that the institutionalist tradition of 
understanding transnational policy-making along organisational lines has created, and thus needs to 
break up both states and EU institutions as monolithic actors and look beyond the interactions of top-
level executives. 
There are two primary methodological challenges involved. The first challenge involves 
capturing the process of policy norm construction, the second is identifying the participating actors. 
First, researching the coordination of (soft) norms has both ontological and epistemological 
implications. Ontologically, this research assumes that norms exist and these norms guide policy 
practice. This follows from social constructivist premises about the function of norms in the 
international arena (see Wiener, 2008; 2016). Epistemologically, the challenge is how to get hold of 
this seemingly elusive process. Contestation of norms becomes visible in every-day (inter-)actions. 
Central to the contestation is discourse, which is the principle channel for contestation. It involves 
expressing and promoting alternatives, arguing against propositions, avoiding certain narratives etc. 
While I look at how actors use discursive ‘acts’, i.e., means of language and speech acts (how they 
connect ‘a’ to ‘b’), the thesis does not provide a discourse analysis as such. The main part of the 
analysis deals with how formulations ‘move’ between actors. This approach focuses less on how 
formulations highlight, reframe, challenge or ignore certain aspects, such as specific narratives, 
concepts or arguments, but on how actors practically promote their interpretations. 
Second, how does one identify relevant actors and network relationships? While attention for 
policy professionals may be conceptually justified, moving away from the aggregate organisational 
level to an analytical mid-level means that there is a multitude of individuals involved who potentially 
contribute to an organisational position. Other approaches rely on state representatives, such high-
level executives (e.g., government ministers), who are often equated with the state they represent. 
In terms of agency, they matter because they play an important role for political prioritisation and 
will. Thus, while they are important to understand priorities of their organisations, and interest and 
norm negotiation among each other, following from the conceptual framework, my concern is with 
those officials who engage with each other on a frequent basis to work on coordinating substantive 
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positions. Such coordination in the EU has been found to take place largely at the working level 
(Chelotti, 2016a; Riddervold, 2016). Therefore, I focus on mid-level officials who are policy specialists 
and engage with each other on substantive grounds. While this means that they are firmly part of 
their respective organisational hierarchies, they are the officials who control the subject matter in a 
way that allows for coordination. 
Despite the potentially large number of professionals that comes with such an approach, it is 
only specific groups of actors that take part in formulating, coordinating and advocating a position on 
a certain issue while most other professionals hardly actively engage. These officials do not formulate 
policies in a vacuum, but formulations are a result of their coordination efforts. Therefore, I focus on 
the (professional) networks of these issue professionals, i.e., ‘at home’ in their own organisations 
(e.g., EU and national bureaucracies), and with colleagues working on the same subject and like-
minded allies. There are overlaps between these (sub-)networks and drawing the (imaginary) 
boundaries of and between them is a challenge. I concentrate on EU and national links, ties and 
interactions in the sector for engaging with each other to get a better idea of support structures in 
networks. These interactions are related to the formal organisational structure, but they are not 
identical. It includes the formal and informal support structures of policy professionals, understanding 
the hierarchies that they report to, intra-organisation coordination mechanisms and relations with 
external actors. 
This approach requires a closer look not only at the EU’s organisation but at the organisation 
of member states for engaging within the EU. Therefore, I look at two national contexts in detail: 
Germany and Britain. This concentration serves to illustrate the wider conceptual point about 
transnational policy processes. Yet, while this selection is only covering a part of the picture, it is not 
arbitrary. It is exemplary. Although Germany is a founding member while Britain joined the European 
Community (EC) later, the influence of both countries on EU development cooperation has been 
significant. Both countries have a long tradition in development, and they are among the world’s 
largest and most influential development actors. While France long dominated EC/EU development 
policy, Germany and Britain became the strongest actors arguing for change. However, they have 
received only little attention compared to France’s constituent impact on EU development 
cooperation (Claeys, 2004; Dimier, 2014) – possibly with the exception of Britain’s accession (see 
chapter 2). While outspoken German and British advocacy seems obvious with respect to their size, 
financial contribution, international presence etc., it was not inevitable, given Germany’s avoidance 
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of political conflict and Britain’s reluctance to engage at the European level. Yet, despite their 
individual weight, they did not seek to challenge and change EU development policy through political 
top-down pressure alone but through multiple network interactions. 
There is evidently much that distinguishes the two countries, which is a useful to illustrate the 
different functions of domestic institutions and international networks, preceding discourses and 
experiences, and integration with the EU. Thus, how actors in these two member states have affected 
the EU’s role conception in development cooperation differs greatly, which turns them into valuable 
case studies. Germany is a relevant case due to its propensity to seek consensus and the circumstance 
that both the EU and development cooperation have been part of its post-war ‘civilian power’ image 
(Maull, 1990). Britain and its engagement in the EU, in contrast, had been strongly driven by 
perceptions of public opinion, ultimately reflected in the decision to leave the EU following a 
referendum in June 2016. Not tending towards consensus, British actors have not only been prepared 
to ‘go it alone’ but also see themselves as global leaders in international cooperation, which has 
always offered alternatives to the EU (Ireton, 2013; see also Smith, 2017). Nevertheless, Britain has 
been active in EU development cooperation. Britain also has a different organisation of domestic 
interest mediation, which favours transnational societal engagement, whereas Germany traditionally 
seeks to affiliate societal interests closely. Yet this study does not offer a formal, structured 
comparison between the two cases. Instead, they serve as illustrations, which highlight how different 
interdependences of actors affect their engagement in the EU. 
To get a sense of organisational priorities, (thematic) traditions, dominant discourse etc., on 
the one hand, and negotiation and advocacy positions, on the other hand, I draw on available texts. 
Such text is not taken as an authoritative interpretation of policy shifts (see Wiener, 2008) but rather 
as part of the competition over the interpretation. Sources of text include official documentation, 
such as documents of the European Commission (e.g., Communications, Staff Working 
Papers/Documents, reports, press releases, public speeches), resolutions of the European Parliament, 
official documents and press releases of the Council and the EEAS, official documentation from the 
member states, the OECD-DAC peer reviews of members’ development programmes etc. I also draw 
on a myriad of reports, blog posts and press statements of non-state actors, especially non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), development advocacy groups and networks, and specialised 
think tanks and their networks, such as the European Think Tank Group (ETTG). These texts serve 
different functions. They range from advocating marginalised positions, over establishing and 
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supporting national standpoints to codifying a European norm. As much as these documents are part 
of, and constitute, discursive competition, they are themselves the result of competition. 
To understand how these documents become part of discursive competition, and what 
competition underlies them, I draw on interviews where possible. The disaggregation to the meso 
level is also reflected in the selection and designation of interviews. The empirical research is 
complemented by insights from interviews with policy specialists in Brussels, Bonn/Berlin and London 
to capture the views of policy professionals inside and outside government who work on the outlined 
policies or follow politics as (expert) observers. Several rounds of semi-structured interviews were 
conducted between March 2015 and November 2016 (see Annex for details). They included officials 
in the Commission’s bureaucracy responsible for development cooperation, and officials and civil 
servants in the EEAS in Brussels; civil servants in national aid and development cooperation 
administrations, especially national ministries for development cooperation or departments for 
development cooperation; and representatives from NGO networks both on a national and European 
level, development-oriented think tanks, researchers and consultants. The interviews were conducted 
in a ‘semi’ standardised form, using open-ended questions, which gave the respondents latitude in 
defining their terms, giving their own account and introducing their own notions of relevance. 
Following Lewis Dexter (1970), the eagerness to let the interviewees indicate what the problem, the 
question and the situation was according to them was necessary given that it was a central aim of the 
research to understand the specialists’ way of defining and justifying policy problems, solutions and 
arguments to promote their views. This is expected to point to underlying conflicts of and between 
publications, official documents, reports etc., which are expected to represent a collective idea or 
preference of a certain organisation, despite conflicting views. 
The employed categories (see Annex) are necessarily ‘wider’ than the analytical focus in order 
to maintain anonymity and clarity, but the interviews are therefore disaggregated according to place, 
i.e., Brussels, London and Bonn, to present the context in which these organisations and their 
members ‘usually’ operate. This disaggregation allows us to account for conflicting ideas and 
preferences within one organisation or between different representatives of one ‘type’ of 
organisation. This is also what guided the selection of interviews whose main functions were a) to put 
choices (and non-choices) for public formulations into context and b) shed light on the interactions, 
networks and power of actors. These interviews were then interpreted based on interview protocols 
regarding professional networks, discourses on EU coordination and effectiveness, and the role of 
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other professionals in the policy process. In addition to these formal interviews, the research findings 
have been triangulated by several verbal and written follow-ups, informal discussions, personal 
communications, exchanges of correspondence with various policy professionals and observers, and 
non-participant observations in relevant conferences and events, such as the European Development 
Days (EDD) in Brussels in 2015 and 2017. 
Regarding the choice of participants, there are some caveats involved. First, this research 
concentrates on the European ‘side’ of the network. This is primarily because I was interested in what 
is at the core of intra-EU relations between the EU and member state levels. While aid effectiveness 
has been a donor-dominated discourse and EU donors make up a significant part of this, there is also 
agency of other actors, e.g., the ACP Secretariat, governments of individual third countries, and non-
European civil society. Their interactions do not only affect the overall discourse, but extra-European 
actors are also part of the discursive networks. However, their agency in discursive networks varies 
depending on the discourse. With respect to aid effectiveness their voice was often marginalised (yet 
it slightly increased with the turn to development effectiveness and the SDGs). Second, as outlined 
above, within the EU ‘side’ of the network, this research concentrates on only two EU member states, 
Germany and Britain. While these countries have been decisive regarding the discussed case (i.e., the 
dominant discourse on effectiveness), actors in other member states have also played a role, e.g., in 
France and the Netherlands, which will be acknowledged. However, this analysis concentrates on 
what I identified as the primary actors in these networks. 
Finally, there is a caveat regarding actors’ preferences. The research looks at actors’ choices 
of supporting or contesting certain policy formulations. These decisions do not necessarily reveal their 
‘true’ preferences as actors also act strategically to achieve a certain objective. Nevertheless, what 
formulations actors choose to disseminate (or not) tells us something about their collective 
preferences of and ideas about the EU’s role for effective development cooperation, which are 
otherwise not directly observable. Thus, from an epistemological perspective, this requires an 
interpretivist approach towards texts and speech acts. Embarking on such an approach means 
acknowledging that there are limits to the generalisability of findings. It also implies recognising that 
academic ‘observers’ are equally part of the social world and contribute to its construction. Thus, 
there is an important dynamic component. While I seek to pin down the structure of actors’ 
interactions, the networks and power relations within and between clusters of actors are subject to 
competing institutional interdependencies and thus in constant flux. 
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Development cooperation 
This research looks at the empirical case of development cooperation and follows the EU’s efforts for 
improving collective action in this area that has formally been a Community competence only since 
Maastricht. The empirical analysis serves to substantiate the outlined criticism of a concentration on 
inter- and transgovernmental coordination processes. While EU development cooperation could be 
regarded as an ‘easy case’ (e.g., ambiguous institutional environment; low political prominence; wide 
range of stakeholders, including advocacy and knowledge actors; and the formal role of EU institutions 
in facilitating collective action), it a) helps to refine the conceptual framework and generates some 
more general perspectives on EU external action; and b) creates new insights into this specific policy 
area as it has hardly been approached in this way before. 
On the most basic level, development cooperation describes jointly-agreed efforts, mainly 
between countries, with the purpose of bringing about economic and social development. 
Traditionally, this has meant the provision of aid in the form of grants, concessional loans and 
technical assistance from ‘rich’ countries in the North to ‘poor’ countries in the Global South. 
Development cooperation has become increasingly global and multidimensional as growing numbers 
of different kinds of actors identify more factors required for development and different rationales 
for cooperation (Riddell, 2007). This makes development cooperation not only a complex but an 
inherently political task (Carothers and de Gramont, 2013). This task goes beyond the narrow 
understanding of development aid, defined by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as Official Development Assistance 
(ODA). It encompasses external and internal policies in areas such as trade and finance, foreign and 
security policy, agriculture and fisheries, environment and climate change, migration etc. The 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which were agreed by the members of the United Nations 
(UN) in December 2015 define international development as a universal task, which seeks to 
overcome the distinction between ‘donors’ and ‘recipients’. 
However, despite popular criticism (e.g., Moyo, 2009), aid and development cooperation 
continue to play a prominent role in the promotion of international development (see UN, 2015), and 
particularly (Western) Europeans have defended its continued importance (e.g., BMZ, 2017b; 
European Commission, 2016a). The EU’s role in development cooperation is complex and a result of 
the parallel advancement of development cooperation and European integration after the Second 
World War (see chapter 2). This parallel advancement has meant that European integration and 
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development cooperation became closely intertwined and development cooperation became part of 
the ‘idea’ of Europe (Holland and Doidge, 2012, p. 246). As a result, when speaking of European 
development cooperation, it usually means one of three things: (1) the development cooperation 
policies of European countries; (2) the cooperation policies of the EU institutions; or (3) the collective 
action of EU member states and institutions in international development. It is this collective action 
which is the primary subject of this research. 
EU member states conduct development cooperation with third countries based on their 
national political commitments and legal obligations. This cooperation became more standardised 
through the OECD-DAC, founded in 1961 with the purpose of providing not just a degree of 
standardisation but also oversight of the multitude of cooperation policies of Western Europe, the 
USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.3 These countries have conducted both bilateral and 
multilateral development cooperation. While the former describes the cooperation between two 
countries based on contractual agreements for financial and technical assistance, the latter describes 
their (financial) engagement within international organisations, institutions and funds. Despite long-
term interactions with third countries, in ad hoc fora and international organisations such as the UN, 
the World Bank, the OECD-DAC and the EU, national differences have persisted. There have been 
particularly pronounced cleavages between the three largest EU member states, France, Germany 
and Britain, due to the close geopolitical linkages of development cooperation in these countries; the 
Scandinavian countries, which have traditionally prioritised social development and poverty 
eradication in their external action; and the member states in the Mediterranean and in Central and 
Eastern Europe, which have been or still are recipients of financial transfers. 
In addition, the EU conducts its own development cooperation, which has been funded 
through a formally voluntary, extra-budgetary fund, the European Development Fund (EDF), and from 
the EU budget, for the period of this research, mainly through the Development Cooperation 
Instrument (DCI). The EDF has been subject to slightly different rules than then budget-funded polices. 
However, both funds have been administered and implemented by the European Commission. With 
the Treaty on European Union (TEU), signed in Maastricht in 1992, the EU was formally given 
competence in development cooperation in parallel to member states’ development policies 
                                                          
3 Ireland completed the accession process to the OECD-DAC in 1985, Spain in 1991, Luxembourg in 1992, Greece 
in 1999, South Korea in 2010, Iceland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Slovenia in 2013, and Hungary 
in 2016. 
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(Hoebink, 2004c; Holland, 2002). Legally, development cooperation is different from other shared 
competences such as environment or energy (TFEU Art. 4) in that the EU’s competence to carry out 
activities and conduct a common policy cannot result in member states being prevented from 
exercising theirs (at the time of writing the only other being the areas of research, technological 
development and space). Since the Lisbon Treaty reforming the TEU, which entered into force on 1 
December 2009, the Commission shares parts of its task with the EU’s diplomatic service, the 
European External Action Service (EEAS), which has come with a more explicit blending of 
development cooperation with foreign policy and a shift in institutional and working habits. 
This institutional set-up is a challenge for collective action. The question is whether it is fit for 
overcoming grown fragmentation of external action (Bodenstein, et al., 2017; European Think Tanks 
Group (ETTG), 2014). Fragmentation refers to the growing, scattered presence of increasingly 
heterogeneous types of actors with partly competing goals, modalities and instruments (see 
Klingebiel, et al., 2016b). In other words, there are more actors beyond states engaged in international 
development cooperation, and these actors have different approaches and priorities guiding their 
engagement. Such heterogeneity, which includes the diversity between EU member states, for 
example, following the various membership enlargements, has been considered to reduce the 
effectiveness of development cooperation (Bigsten and Tengstam, 2015; Klingebiel, et al., 2016a; 
Klingebiel, et al., 2017). This reasoning has underpinned much of the institutional innovations in EU 
policy for collective action in development cooperation. The Maastricht Treaty not only established 
an EU competence but also assigned the Commission a role in promoting coordination, 
complementarity and coherence – the so-called Maastricht ‘Cs’ (Hoebink, 2004a). This was reiterated 
in the Lisbon Treaty. Yet the EU’s acquis communautaire in development cooperation that followed 
from this mostly consists of a range of policy norms in the form of recommendations for the member 
states to be transposed and applied in their national development cooperation policies. These are 
usually the outcome of Commission proposals, e.g., through so-called Communications, which 
become part of Council Conclusions that endorse or qualify them. While these documents are not 
legally binding, they provide a point of reference, especially for Commission policy. 
This kind of common policy-making to deal with mutual interdependences has significantly 
increased since Maastricht and was reinforced after Lisbon (see Furness and Vollmer, 2013; Gänzle, 
et al., 2012; Orbie, 2008). In the early/mid-2000s, joint policy-making had an effect in the form of EU-
wide policy norms for coordination and the approximation of policies in the EU, which created much 
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enthusiasm among observers (Carbone, 2008a). As a result, common policies have become 
increasingly promoted in the EU, even though national implementation – or ‘Europeanisation’ – has 
remained deficient (Bretherton, 2013; Krüger and Steingass, 2018; Orbie and Carbone, 2016). Thus, 
increased collective action and common policy-making in development cooperation have not 
overcome fragmentation within the system of European development cooperation. Observers have 
continually concentrated on how institutional reforms and innovations are suitable to overcome 
obstacles to member state coordination and policy approximation in development cooperation 
(Bodenstein, et al., 2017; Furness and Gänzle, 2017; Orbie and Carbone, 2016). One of the main 
perceived shortcomings of EU collective action is the lack of hierarchy; despite common policies, 
fragmentation remained or even increased after major reform steps (e.g., CONCORD, 2012; Council 
of the European Union, 2009; European Commission, 2011e; Klingebiel, et al., 2014; Mackie, 2013; 
Moe Fejerskov and Keijzer, 2013). Most accounts thereby focus on the institutional structure, 
especially the incentive structure for collective action and find missing incentives for actors both on 
EU side and in member states to follow coordination policy norms (Carbone and Quartapelle, 2016; 
Koch, et al., 2017; Koch and Molenaers, 2016; Krüger and Steingass, 2018). 
What a focus on the EU institutional structure and its impact on member states misses is the 
dynamic process of how norms for common EU development cooperation have been constructed and 
advocated, which potentially involves agency of actors that is not directly visible in this structure. 
Otherwise, it remains puzzling how a system that – apparently – provides little incentive for collective 
action, has produced norms for collective action whereas institutional reforms have hardly overcome 
shortcomings of EU collective action in development cooperation. This suggests that the institutional 
order only provides limited insights into the pursuit of common development cooperation in the EU. 
The inability to overcome obstacles for collective action points to a fundamental issue with common 
norms, namely, their deeply contested nature despite formal agreement between EU institutions and 
member states. That is why it is important to look beyond formal agreements at the process of 
competition over and coordinating norms for collective action in EU development cooperation. 
 
Outline of the thesis 
This last part provides a brief overview of the individual chapters. The first chapter sets out a 
conceptual framework for analysing the role of policy professionals in EU norm advocacy based on 
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transnational policy-making, networks and discourse construction. The chapter advances an agency-
oriented framework for processes of discursive construction of and competition over policy norms. 
These processes take place around the decision-making centres that are constituted by the EU’s 
institutional structure (nodes). What is distinct about this approach is that institutions as 
determinants for policy-making move to the background. Instead, the focus is on collective agency 
through network interactions. This makes visible the agency of policy professionals who have hardly 
any role in the EU’s institutional structure. Networks are understood as arenas of mutual 
interdependence where actors structure discourse to legitimise their preferences both cognitively and 
normatively through multiple interactions in bureaucratic coordination and in public communication. 
The framework establishes how and under what conditions their agency matters in the transnational 
governance of institutionalised international systems. While individuals and groups at the centre of 
EU policy construction seek solutions for overcoming collective action problems among themselves 
and control the policy discourse on the EU level, they interact with actors across organisational 
boundaries to enhance their power of policy norms. 
The second chapter introduces the debate about norm advocacy in international cooperation 
at the transnational level. It chronologically traces the role of European integration in development 
cooperation for member states and EU institutions. The integration of development cooperation has 
incrementally evolved within a complex institutionalised system with multiple levels and centres. The 
European transnational level became relevant for international cooperation at the beginning of the 
European integration process as French negotiators sought to upload their priorities to the European 
level. This became the origin of a transnational centre of supranational bureaucrats to which other 
state and non-state actors from the EC, partner countries and beyond became attracted and sought 
to shape and challenge it. It is not the purpose of this chapter to review the entire history of the 
integration of development cooperation in Europe. The chapter particularly concentrates on the 
emergence of norms for collective action and outlines the concurrent expansion of policy 
professionals and their interlinkages in the transnational arena. This reveals wider patterns of the 
construction of policy norm over time, especially on what grounds different actors in Europe stipulate 
the construction of common policies and institutional inventions in development cooperation. As a 
second objective, the chapter introduces those structures and actors that become relevant in the 
subsequent analytical chapters. 
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The aim of the third chapter is to look for evidence of how, in what ways and under what 
conditions policy professionals have contributed to norm advocacy for collective action at the 
transnational level. The chapter looks in detail at the discursive competition over the EU’s role for 
effective development cooperation. The EU’s role for effective development cooperation has become 
subject to competition between various actors, especially EU institutions and member states, but also 
non-state actors, following the Maastricht Treaty. Especially the Commission regarded the 
international discourse on effectiveness as a driver for collective action in international development. 
As a result, the EU formulated and re-formulated policies, which aimed at enhancing the coordination 
and thus the effectiveness of European development cooperation, and which stood in conflict with 
the interests and identities of other actors. The chapter concentrates on initiatives for policy 
coordination between the early/mid-2000s and the mid-2010s and traces how professionals became 
engaged in norm advocacy through discursive coordination and competition. Discursive coordination 
and competition were expressed in articulations of common norms for effective EU development 
cooperation. This occurred under different internal and external developments, which affected the 
discursive environment in which contestation took place. Depending on the discursive and 
institutional context different professionals became relevant, and hence different ways of 
communicative action. The chapter shows how a transnational hub emerged around Commission 
officials to promote common policy norms. While this was initially more political, with increasing 
pressure from member states and, following Lisbon, from within the EU institutions, norm advocacy 
became more technical and coordinative. Instead, discursive shifts in the EU and internationally, 
opened windows of opportunities for actors to contest these policy norms and promote competing 
ones. 
The fourth and fifth chapters look at Germany and the United Kingdom, respectively, and 
analyse the participation of national professionals in and responses to EU policy initiatives. The fourth 
chapter opens with a discussion about professionals based within the German national arena. The aim 
of the chapter is to understand how the transnational agency of policy professionals is affected by the 
national arena in Germany. The chapter therefore looks at the domestic institutional structures and 
discourses of which these professionals are part. In particular, the final part of the chapter 
concentrates on the role of professionals in Germany regarding initiatives for policy coordination at 
the EU level since approximately 2007. This chapter seeks to understand in what ways state and non-
state professionals participate, how their participation matters for transnational norm advocacy and 
what affects their participation, especially national discourses, practices and institutional structures. 
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It shows how these professionals supported the advocacy of coordination through capacity-building 
and in networks at the European level. This support was based on political commitments to 
implementing aid effectiveness principles but also due to a general conviction for enhancing the 
efficiency of global governance. The EU represented a channel for German policy professionals to 
pursue these arguments, which were rooted in a national ambition for a ‘global structural policy’. 
German officials engaged actively where norm advocacy was more coordinative and bureaucratic. Yet 
the fragmented aid administration was a challenge where coordination was more communicative. 
In the case of Britain, it was puzzling how the country had become so active in EU 
development cooperation despite its general reluctance to engage in the EU more comprehensively. 
The fifth chapter is structured analogous to the previous chapter. It follows development policy 
professionals who participate in EU norm advocacy in the British arena of institutional structures and 
discourses of which they are part. Before the EU referendum of 2016, British professionals were 
proactive in contributing to EU development policy norms. The chapter concentrates on how British 
policy professionals used the window of opportunity to promote nationally relevant norms of 
accountability and transparency. While British officials were ambivalent about policy harmonisation 
in the EU, even when it was widely accepted as an international aid effectiveness principle, they did 
not block a compromise on EU joint programming but only refrained from promoting it nationally. 
Instead, the chapter shows how a wider international discursive network on transparency, which 
officials helped to build, supported their arguments in the EU to establish a results framework against 
oppositions. To avoid the stigma of looking ‘awkward’, they also used expertise and capacity-building 
on the EU level to promote it. The key finding is that a central channel for British participation was a 
wider societal network, which meant that norm advocacy occurred simultaneously at multiple 
institutional hubs with a strong communicative dimension rather than a concentration on 
bureaucratic, intra-EU discursive coordination. This norm advocacy, however, did not change the 
overall political attitude towards an EU’s role in development cooperation, which remained defensive. 
The final part of the thesis summarises the empirical findings, addresses their implications 
and outlines the wider contribution to learning in the fields of EU governance in external action and 
beyond. It addresses the ‘so what’ question, which follows from the theory-guided empirical analysis 
presented in this thesis. This includes conceptual reflections on the role of networks, in particular, 
when and how they matter in institutionalised international communities such as European 
development cooperation. In this way, the research not only adds new empirical insights to the study 
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of EU development policy-making, but it also connects conceptual insights from transnational 
governance and policy-making to the study of the EU’s role in the world, which were previously 
unconnected. This has filled a gap in our knowledge about EU collective action in that it has made 
visible the (collective) agency of professionals who are not directly represented by the EU institutional 
structure and yet play a key role in EU norm advocacy. This final part ends with an outlook on the role 
of shifts in development cooperation, EU governance and European integration, especially Brexit, 
which is highly relevant given that British actors played an important role in the contestation of norms 










Originally, the ‘European project’ was not primarily driven by an external purpose, let alone a mission 
for global development. However, the entanglement of European integration with processes within 
the wider international system has expanded through a widening trade agenda, the enlargement of 
membership, externalities of internal policies, such as the common commercial and agricultural 
policy, and the advancement a common foreign and security policy. As a result, Europe’s role in the 
world has become an extremely popular area of research, strongly motivated by the question of what 
drives the EU’s quest for collective action (see Keuleers, et al., 2016). Therein, the role of internal 
institutional dynamics has taken a predominate position (Bickerton, 2011; Dijkstra and Vanhoonacker, 
2017; Menon, 2011; Smith, 2004). 
This chapter seeks to reassess the debates about internal institutional dynamics – and thus 
the perceived benefits of institutional reform – by taking a step back and reflect on how institutions 
fit in the wider process of competition over policies, their formulation and advocacy. This requires 
broadening the analytical focus by moving away from the EU level to consider a wider range of actors 
at the transnational and national level beyond those who are responsible for the ultimate decision-
making. While these actors play a predominant role in the institutional design of EU external action, 
their norm advocacy and negotiations depend in various ways on the participation of other 
professionals across state and non-state organisations. The aim of this chapter is to sketch out an 
analytical framework for understanding policy construction and contestation that is relevant for the 
EU’s international role. Thus, the chapter assesses tools for understanding how actors construct and 
compete over the purpose of EU external relations and proposes how to link them to establish a 
coherent framework. In the first section (I), the chapter briefly conceptualises the policy process in 
EU external action and outlines different sources of contestation over the EU’s role. This sets the scene 
for the subsequent theoretical and analytical discussions. 
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The second section (II) starts from the premises of (new) institutionalism. It then suggests 
going beyond institutional constraints for understanding actors’ mutual construction of EU external 
policies. From a theoretically perspective, this chapter is founded on two basic premises, which will 
be discussed at greater detail in the second section: discourses frame or structure what actors can 
argue (Hajer, 1993), and the interactions of actors contribute to discourse formation (Habermas, 
1984). Thus, justifications behind the promotion of competing policy norms are related to existing 
discourses. In turn, the outcome of this competition contributes to the wider discourse. 
Understanding this outcome requires looking at the interactions of participating actors, i.e., their 
actions, reactions and relative power in context, but also what is the purpose of their interactions. 
These factors affect the extent to which their interactions contribute to the wider discourse or lead 
to a consensus on policy and the EU’s role at the EU level. In all this, competition about the EU’s role 
is not generally direct but occurs through competition over policy norms, e.g., on the merit of policy 
coordination in the EU. 
In the third section (III), the chapter offers an agency-oriented framework, which 
conceptualises power as part of interdependences within network relationships with partly conflicting 
demands on actors. This departs from institutionalism in the sense that it understands institutional 
structures as means that empower actors in the process of policy contestation. Due to the complex 
interdependences in EU development cooperation, various actors engage in policy construction and 
contestation through advocacy, consultation, implementation, evaluation etc. This provides the 
grounds for understanding interdependence in terms of a transnational discursive network. 
Transnational networks of European development policy communities have received little attention, 
even though scholarship on policy networks and network governance has been burgeoning in EU 
studies for some time (Peterson, 1995; Peterson and Bomberg, 1999). Networks matter in EU policy-
making in that they can bridge the gap between distinct political entities to construct common policies 
through joint policy formulation on which subsequent decisions are based. While much of the network 
governance in development cooperation can be subsumed under bureaucratic politics, considering 
their embeddedness in a wider transnational network becomes relevant when it affects power among 
bureaucratic actors, especially as the wider network affects the discursive environment in which 
bureaucratic politics take place. 
In this way, the chapter a) adds to the theoretical and conceptual understanding of EU policy 
processes that are embedded in a wider international context and b) offers a conceptual framework 
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for analysis for the subsequent empirical research. This framework draws on different theoretical and 
ontological approaches. Before turning to the theoretical foundations, the first section establishes 
some basic conceptual clarity. 
 
 
I EU policy-making and contestation 
 
The EU has established an international presence and ‘role’ over time. Besides trade and aid, its 
activities have increasingly included a political dimension, diplomacy, and security and military 
elements. While the EU’s external activities have grown, there is a highly asymmetric degree of 
integration between different foreign policy areas. As a result, the EU has become characterised by a 
‘variable and multidimensional presence’ in the international arena (Allen and Smith, 1990, p. 20), 
which has continued despite institutional reforms. This variable and multidimensional presence has 
occurred because member states have sought to ‘upload’ domestic preferences to the Community/EU 
level in the face of international challenges, but also as institutional actors offered solutions for 
collective responses. Concerning development cooperation, for instance, France sought to share the 
burden of its decolonisation, which turned into an international activity of the Community (see 
chapter 2). On this basis, the European Commission later promoted common policy norms and 
institutional inventions. The process of creating an international role has thus been incremental, 
which has motivated calls for and attempts at putting EU external action on more strategic basis 
(Biscop, 2016; Cornish and Edwards, 2005). 
As a result of integrating external policies, there has been common policy-making regarding 
the EU’s external policies between member states with the collaboration of the EU institutions. This 
common policy-making has also led to the advocacy of common policy norms that apply to the EU 
and its member states with the aim of strengthening collective action and improving the EU’s 
collective capacity. Consequently, policy-making and norm advocacy process at the EU level have 
received significant attention. Due to the limited supranationalisation, member state government 
representatives have been identified to dominate policy-making and norm advocacy processes in EU 
external action (Bickerton, et al., 2011; Elgström, 2017; Mérand, et al., 2011). For example, practices 
between state representatives came into focus of academic attention, paying specific attention to 
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professional norms that make them more capable of overcoming problems of collective action in 
negotiations with each other (Chelotti, 2016a; Cross, 2011; Elgström, 2017; Kuus, 2014). While this 
perspective disaggregates organisational structures to the individual actors, it often continues to 
understand transnational processes in intergovernmental terms along organisational lines. 
However, the EU constitutes a historically grown, multi-sector and multi-level system of 
policy-making, which is characterised by a multitude of actors, a large degree of differentiation, 
multiple centres and a reluctance to coordinate authoritatively by legislation. EU external policy-
making, in particular, is characterised by high levels of fragmentation, uncertainty and multiple 
centres due to the varying participation of a range of actors in different but related policy areas, for 
example, trade, development cooperation, foreign and security policy (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014; 
Smith, 2014). In this context, public policies are agreed on and delivered by different and, at times, 
autonomous types of actors via hybrid arrangements. Even where actors, such as the EU institutions, 
lack formal decision-making competence, they seek to engage in the process of policy formulation as 
formulations at early stages become important determinants of eventual EU policy outcomes (Chou 
and Riddervold, 2015; Peterson, 1995; Riddervold, 2016). Areas of shared or parallel competences in 
the EU, which are characterised by high levels of fragmentation and uncertainty, such as development 
cooperation, do not provide for centralised policy-making; neither do they offer a single arena for 
political competition. Instead, actors compete for support in multiple arenas across the EU, member 
states and the international level. 
Formulating policies and policy instruments happens as actors seek to remake political reality 
‘but without necessarily building on a consensus of the participating actors as to the “why” and “what 
for”’ (Voß and Simons, 2014, p. 742). This is even more so when different ‘types’ of actors engage in 
this process, e.g., bureaucrats, civil society and businesses. However, even actors who are or have 
become very similar, such as member state representatives in the Council of the EU, are likely to have 
different expectations. As Voß and Simons (2014, p. 742) put it:  
even when actors deal with the ‘same’ kinds of things, hook up to the ‘same’ infrastructure, handle the 
‘same’ kind of information, participate in the ‘same’ meetings, and interact with the ‘same’ 
organisations, they may still do so for different reasons, with different understandings of what they do 
and why they do it, and also with different expectations as to what constitutes a successful outcome of 
their engagement. Actors may remain embedded in particular worlds of scientific research, advocacy, 
party politics, administration, consulting, or business, and they may remain adversaries in terms of 
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classical lines of political conflict, such as public versus private, environment versus economy – yet still 
become members of a constituency whose joint work brings the instrument into existence. 
Thus, actors may achieve agreement on individual policies, but they have very different 
understandings of their purpose. Such understandings are likely to be affected by actors’ prior 
attitudes towards and experience in the EU, and their (potentially) competing embeddedness outside, 
especially on the national level (Beyers, 2005). 
Competing embeddedness and interdependences point to the relevance of wider political and 
discursive processes beyond EU decision-making. These political processes consist of competition 
over meaning of policy problems and their solutions. Such competition over meaning becomes 
evident in the member states. Even when there is agreement on common policy norms, member state 
policies ‘at home’ often tend to deviate significantly from these agreements. The question of 
compliance to European policy norms or principles has been lingering, especially where the EU seeks 
to enhance coordination without supranationalisation or (regulatory) harmonisation (e.g., Andonova 
and Tuta, 2014; Carbone and Quartapelle, 2016; Krüger and Steingass, 2018). As a result, the concept 
of ‘Europeanisation’ has received significant attention when trying to understand the incremental 
approximation of formally independent policies – or the resistance to it despite functional pressures 
or overlapping interests. In his seminal contribution, Robert Ladrech (1994) defines ‘Europeanisation’ 
as the process in which political dynamics of the Community become part of the organisational logic 
of national politics. Regarding development cooperation, while there has been some convergence of 
national policies (Furness and Olsen, 2016; Olsen, 2013), the literature suggests that adaptation of 
national policies to the EU is generally limited or ‘shallow’ (Bretherton, 2013; Lightfoot and Szent-
Iványi, 2014; Orbie and Carbone, 2016). There have been suggestions as to why this is the case, which 
point to incompatible incentives along the path from decision-making in Brussels to implementation 
by the member states in the field (Carbone, 2013a; Delputte and Orbie, 2014), or limited links of 
national constituencies to EU norms (Carbone and Quartapelle, 2016; Krüger and Steingass, 2018). 
Despite persistent national differences, there has been substantive EU-level agreement on 
common policy norms and institutional inventions. Subsequent treaty changes have put the EU’s 
international role increasingly at the centre of attention. This role has come to be seen as a driver for 
European integration in the 21st century (Bickerton, 2011; Bickerton, et al., 2011; Keohane, et al., 
2014). Such conceptual reflections coincide with the growing realisation among European elites that 
the changing global conditions require joined-up international action if Europe wants to continue to 
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play a significant role in the future (e.g., Biscop and Andersson, 2008; European Think Tanks Group 
(ETTG), 2014). In development cooperation, there have been increasing agreements on ‘all-EU’ 
policies since the Maastricht Treaty, which created some optimism among observers (Carbone, 2008a; 
Gänzle, et al., 2012). The Lisbon Treaty reforms further increased optimism regarding the EU capacity 
for collective action (Duke, 2012; Edwards, 2013; Niemann and Bretherton, 2013; Smith, 2013b). 
‘Europeanisation’ processes have led to an alignment of domestic institutional practices and 
structures, especially of national executives whose engagement has become tuned towards 
constructive, depoliticised mutual interactions (Bickerton, 2012; Ladrech, 2010). Thus, while effects 
in terms of national policy approximation seem to be mixed, the increasing ability of actors to engage 
in and with ‘Europe’ may have resulted in a more efficient ‘uploading’ of national preferences in EU 
policy-making process and enhanced the capacity for achieving agreement on common policies on 
the supranational level. 
As a consequence, member states should not be perceived as monolithic when considering 
competition over meaning-making. Instead, different actors in member states are subject to partly 
competing demands and discourses as they engage in wider circles of actors who play a role for and 
participate in the policy process. This dependence on partly competing demands also affects the 
competition over the EU’s role in development cooperation and in promoting collective action, which 
is not self-evident. The role that the EU as an organisation and EU institutional actors should play in 
particular policies is far from straight forward. On the one hand, there are competing ideas about the 
effectiveness of collective action compared to the separate, independent engagement of member 
states (see Hoffmann, 1966; Macaj and Nicolaïdis, 2014). Stanley Hoffmann (1966) understood this as 
a contest between a logic of integration and a logic of diversity. On the other hand, while the EU is 
exceptional in its scope, policy norms are simultaneously constructed on a global level and in 
competing international fora. These engagements are not fully distinct or independent from 
interactions in the EU. Instead, even in development cooperation alone, there is a significant overlap 
(see, for example, Farrell, 2012; Holland, 2008; Verschaeve and Orbie, 2018). EU member states are 
also members of other relevant international organisations, such as the OECD-DAC, the World Bank 
and the UN, which discuss and set standards also in international development. Thus, different 
centres of political and discursive competition may offer different solutions. 
As a result, contestation of common policy norms in the EU is based on diverging views of 
participating actors as to the ‘why’ and ‘what for’, which persists despite achieving agreement and 
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improving the structures for achieving agreement. What affects the ‘why’ and ‘what for’ of common 
policy norms will depend on actors’ contexts, their ideational ‘baggage’, their networks and 
hierarchies, and professional formation and incentives, which are shaped within multiple 
independences and interactions. 
 
 
II Institutions, discourse and agency 
 
Institutionalist approaches, which gained popularity in global governance research thanks to the 
seminal work by James March and Johan Olsen (1989; 1998), have arguably come to dominate EU 
research (Pollack, 2009). As, with the so called ‘governance turn’, attention moved away from 
processes of integration to policy processes, institutional structures emerged as the preeminent 
explanatory factor for understanding policies in that they constrain or alternatively constitute the 
behaviour of actors. While the EU’s densely-institutionalised structure certainly influences actors and 
their behaviour, this chapter suggests that seeing European institutional structures as the dominant 
factor behind EU policies somewhat misrepresents the role of these institutions for how they affect 
the interactions of actors, which is due to the dominant focus on interactions within the decision-
making centres. This misrepresentation is especially the case where institutionalisation and common 
policy-making in the EU are only one form of interdependence to which policy-makers are subjected. 
Instead, EU institutions, member states and civil society actors are also subject to various 
interdependences on the national and international level, which add to the competing demands 
imposed on these actors and offer rival solutions. 
This section sets out the theoretical foundations for a framework of how common policies are 
constructed and contested in the EU. It departs from traditional (new) institutionalist accounts of EU 
decision-making to understand how actors promote certain policies to win support in situations of 
overlapping interdependences. Thereby, the section compiles various critiques of dominant 
institutionalist approaches to policy-making and shows how these approaches benefit a state-centric 
perspective on EU external action because they leave little space for the contribution of actors who 
are not formally involved. The first part of this section briefly discusses the contribution of 
institutionalist approaches to EU policy-making. The discussion highlights the relevance of institutions 
INSTITUTIONS, DISCOURSES, NETWORKS 
31 
when it comes to structuring collective behaviour around decision-making processes. However, going 
beyond decision-making, which is dominated by member states, towards wider processes of norm 
advocacy means a) challenging what is a contribution to policy-making and b) rethinking agency 
outside of institutionalist limits. Taking social constructivist insights into account, this section turns to 





Understanding European policy-making and policies as a function of the EU’s institutional framework 
received increasing attention with the accelerating institutionalisation of the EU and advances in 
International Relations scholarship (see Jupille and Caporaso, 1999). With the ‘rediscovering’ of 
institutionalism (March and Olsen, 1989) and its subsequent advancement came a diversification 
within the ‘institutionalist’ school of thought. While it had been originally dominated by a rational 
choice variant, proponents came to understand the institutional organisation of a polity as the 
principal factor structuring collective behaviour and generating outcomes (Hall and Taylor, 1996). This 
approach became generally known as historical institutionalism. The ‘structuralism’, which is implicit 
in the institutions of a polity, stands in contrast to the ‘functionalist’ explanations of institutional 
design, which had been proposed by rational choice approaches and regarded political outcomes as 
a response to the needs of the system. Hence, the focus of historical institutionalism has rested on 
the effects of institutions over time (Pierson, 1996; 2004). Proponents, most prominently Paul 
Pierson, have argued that institutional choices in the past became locked-in and thus constrain the 
choices of actors at later points in time, causing a logic of path dependence. In this way, the approach 
privileges (formal) structure over agency. 
Pierson (1996) has been among the most influential analysts who adopted institutionalism 
explicitly for the EU context when he presented a historical institutionalist account of the 
development of supranational governance in Europe. He argued that, over time, cumulative 
institutional effects of the EU’s organisation and rule‐making machinery reduced the capacities of 
national governments to control the course of integration. ‘Gaps’ between the preferences of 
member state governments, and subsequent institutions and policies, occur as policy environments 
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and/or governments change, while institutions remain more resistant to change. This resistance is 
supported where societal actors develop a vested interest in the continuation of specific policies. For 
instance, in his work, Pierson (1996) highlights the creation of multi‐dimensional relationships 
between societal actors and EU institutions, such as the European Court of Justice and the 
Commission, which lead to information asymmetries that benefit EU institutional actors vis‐a‐vis 
national governments. While his work explicitly focuses on the process of integration, institutional 
effects like ‘path dependence’ and ‘lock‐in’ have become increasingly popular when explaining EU 
policies and policy-making, including in EU development cooperation (Claeys, 2004; Dimier, 2006; 
2014). 
Both rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism are based on a highly 
restrictive set of assumptions about the nature of actors and institutions. Therein, actors follow a 
‘logic of consequences’ (March and Olsen, 1989; 1998). The constructivist turn (see Wendt, 1994; 
1999) has significantly added to the institutionalist debate, primarily in the form of sociological 
institutionalism. Institutions, broadly defined, are social structures, which provide agents with 
complex understandings of their interests and identities (Checkel, 1999; 2005; Egeberg, 1999). 
Therefore, actors tend to follow a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 1998, pp. 951-2). What 
is relevant for this discussion is the premise that human agents do not exist independently from their 
social environment with its collectively shared, intersubjectively constructed and reproduced systems 
of meaning-making (see Wendt, 1987). Instead, actors’ properties, i.e., interests, preferences and 
identities, are endogenously constructed through intersubjective interaction and not exogenously 
given (Wendt, 1994; 1999). In other words, structure and agent are mutually constitutive (Giddens, 
1984). This perspective places more emphasis on social norms, values and identity, the processes that 
affect them (e.g., socialisation), and their impact on the behaviour of agents. This perspective does 
not, however, preclude the role of interests. Instead, it emphasises that interests are not pre-given 
but rest on social norms, values and identity. 
These developments have affected thinking in virtually all areas of European policy. Following 
the Maastricht Treaty, new institutionalism in its various forms has arguably become the dominant 
approach to understanding the EU (Pollack, 2009, p. 125). This came with a shift in scholarly attention 
away from integration theory to governance – the so-called ‘governance turn’ (see Kohler-Koch and 
Rittberger, 2006). Looking at European policy-making through the lens of the EU’s formal and informal 
institutions, structures, rules and norms has been promising as it offered a way of understanding some 
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of the pressing questions of the time: How are states ‘tamed’ in the EU despite diverging interests, 
why do policies exist despite their lack of effectiveness or member states’ unwillingness to implement 
them, how do institutional actors have the capacity to influence policies, how can we understand 
unintended consequences of policies that diverge from their original purpose, etc. Given this range of 
questions, it is understandable that institutionalist approaches with their different emphases have 
become frequently adopted when seeking to explain EU policy responses, for example, during and 
after the Eurozone crisis (Verdun, 2015), with regard to enlargement (Sedelmeier, 2012), and when 
discussing foreign and security policy (Christiansen and Tonra, 2004; Menon, 2011; Smith, 2004). 
Institutional adjustments and innovations have continued especially in foreign policy. As a 
result, institutionalist debates continued after the implementation of Lisbon Treaty reforms, which 
gave much attention to the recalibration of institutional balances in the EU foreign policy machinery 
(Dijkstra and Vanhoonacker, 2017; Henökl and Trondal, 2015). However, while institutions have 
proved to be ‘sticky’ during these reforms in the sense that there has been resistance for them to be 
changed, the reforms and institutional shifts opened another chapter for institutionalist debates 
about how changes contribute to effective policies. 
 
Ideas, discourses, agency 
 
The constructivist turn has also led to rethinking EU foreign policy and understanding the origins of 
policies (Christiansen, et al., 1999; Christiansen and Tonra, 2004; Jørgensen, 1997). Although actors 
are constrained to some extent by existing institutions, norms and discourses, institutionalist 
approaches tend to overemphasise their roles as (exogenous) structures for rule-following, thereby 
limiting the role of actors in shaping and maintaining these institutions (Schmidt, 2008; 2010). 
Historical and sociological institutionalist approaches tend to understate the role of actors and agency 
because they lean towards the determinism that is inherent in structural approaches. In contrast, 
rational-choice institutionalist approaches ignore the role of norms, ideas and precedential beliefs. 
That ideas somehow matter in international politics has been commonly acknowledged also 
outside social constructivist scholarship (see Goldstein and Keohane, 1993). This leads to questions of 
how norms and ideas matter, and how they interact with institutional structures, especially in densely 
institutionalised international relations as in the EU. Based on social constructivist premises, ideas 
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contribute to the construction of the EU polity (Jachtenfuchs, et al., 1998) in that they can change or 
perpetuate institutional dynamics through discourse (Diez, 1999; 2001). Thus, whether formal 
institutions or informal norms shape who participates in decision-making, policies have always been 
shaped prior to formal decisions by constructing the ‘terms of the debate’. Of course, there are limits 
to actors’ construction of the terms of debate through existing discourses (Hajer, 1993), and actors 
do not have full control over their ideas as they can be misappropriated and misinterpreted in the 
process. However, under certain conditions, actors’ interactions contribute to defining the terms of 
debate and consequently to norms, policies, structures and institutions. 
Among social constructivist approaches, discourse analysis has been increasingly applied to 
understand how ideas and meanings are constructed in European foreign policy (Carta and Morin, 
2014a; 2014b; Diez, 1999; 2001; 2014; Jørgensen, 2015; Larsen, 2004). However, the term discourse 
itself is widely contested, which leads to different theoretical approaches and methods. Traditionally, 
discourses have largely been seen from a structuralist perspective, as frameworks enabling the 
construction of certain policies and the exclusion of others (Larsen, 2004; Wæver, 2002). In this sense, 
EU policy actors are constrained in their choices of potential action by previous discourses (on the EU 
level and otherwise). This structuralist approach to discourse has been criticised for overlooking the 
creation of meaning (see Diez, 1999; 2001). To avoid the ‘structuralist fallacy’, Thomas Diez (2001) 
highlights the intersubjective construction of meaning by actors through discourse. In his work, he 
suggests ways of including the analysis of intersubjective meaning-making in the study of institutional 
dynamics in the EU by focusing on discursive action of actors. Discursive action involves more than 
the content of discourse, i.e., its ideas, words or ‘text’, but it includes the context and processes in 
which this content is structured. Discourses can be understood to consist of articulatory practices that 
re-produce and re-shape the context which is constitutive for actors’ political articulations (Diez, 2014, 
p. 321). Thus, discourse formation becomes a cyclical process in which actors actively shape 
discourses through their interactions, but while they do so, they are subject to an existing discursive 
context. 
More specifically, Diez (2014) understands discourse formation as a struggle over what is 
acceptable as a policy and what kind of policies can be legitimately pursued. He emphasises that this 
struggle is about the limits of acceptable and meaningful EU policies. These limits are not set by 
structure as such, but setting them happens ‘through the enactment of the limits through a variety of 
actors in civil society, politics, the media, the arts and, not least, academia’ (Diez, 2014, p. 330). These 
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groups of actors ‘are not entirely separate from each other, but engage in transversal debates and 
struggles’ (Diez, 2014, p. 330; see also Jørgensen, 2015). Thus, the ‘enabling’ and ‘disabling’ of 
articulations is set in a continuous political struggle in meaning production between these actors, 
which cuts across actors, borders and institutions. 
There have been attempts at categorising actors’ articulatory practices to better understand 
their contribution to discourse formation. Vivien Schmidt (2008; 2010) argues that, in the process of 
discourse formation, actors use articulatory practices for coordinative purposes and to communicate 
policies to legitimise them in the public sphere. In the EU, actors engage both in a ‘coordinative’ 
discourse of elite policy construction at the EU level and a ‘communicative’ discourse with the wider 
public involving national level discussion, contestation and legitimisation. Following Schmidt (2010, p. 
3), the ‘coordinative discourse’ encompasses the actors that are immediately engaged in the 
construction of policy ideas through direct interactions. These are bureaucrats, government officials 
and other policy professionals. Individuals and groups at the centre of EU policy construction seek 
solutions for overcoming collective action problems among themselves and thereby largely control 
the policy discourse at the EU level. In this process, they compete over the underlying principles which 
structure policies and policy-making. This includes struggles about common procedural discourses, 
which cut across actors and institutions (Larsen, 2004). The process of elite policy construction is 
particularly relevant for compound polities, such as the EU (Schmidt, 2006). The ‘communicative 
discourse’ of actors’ articulating policies in the public sphere encompasses actors who bring ideas to 
the public for deliberation, and – often retrospectively – legitimise policies. These actors range from 
political leaders to individuals in parliaments and civil society. Thus, we can expect different spheres 
of communicative action with different forms or ‘styles’ of communication. 
Schmidt (2008; 2010) suggests ‘discursive institutionalism’ as a way of thinking about how 
agents promote ideas for changing or perpetuating institutional dynamics from within. Adding 
discourse to institution-building in this way allows us to shed light on processes of discursive 
construction of EU external policy by actors within the Brussels-based institutional context (see 
Schmidt, 2012). A discourse becomes institutionalised through the reiterative, communicative 
interactions of actors who reproduce the discourse to some extent. At the same time, actors partly 
retain freedom to adjust their articulations to justify competing discourses. Thus, discursive 
institutionalism offers a way of understanding the interdependence between processes of discourse 
formation and the institutional structure. It is through discourse that practices and norms become 
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institutionalised, and these discourses are, in turn, reproduced and transformed in a given 
institutional context, which structures social interaction. 
According to this understanding, subjective interests, institutions and social norms are 
regarded as the background knowledge of agents (Schmidt, 2008). Agents challenge or perpetuate 
these existing norms and institutions by relying on what Schmidt (2008) calls ‘foreground discursive 
abilities’. This is based on a ‘logic of communication’ or a ‘logic of arguing’ (Risse, 2000). These 
concepts are largely derived from the concept of communicative action by Jürgen Habermas (1984; 
1985). Thus, actors structure a discourse to legitimise their ideas both cognitively and normatively by 
processes of argumentation, deliberation and persuasion, which is analytically distinct from strategic 
bargaining and rule-guided behaviour (Risse, 2000). 
Such interaction requires a degree of argumentative rationality, which assumes that interests, 
preferences and identity of agents are not completely fixed. It suggests that actors may be goal-
oriented but nevertheless susceptible to persuasion. Persuasion requires actors to share notions of 
validity of argumentative claims, such as ‘factual’ correctness, moral rightness, truthfulness and 
authenticity (Risse, 2000, pp. 9-10). However, where this is the case, debates tend to take place within 
a narrow understanding of what constitutes legitimate knowledge. As Rebecca Adler-Nissen (2014, p. 
86) finds, ‘We should avoid equating technocratic discourse with deliberation (in the Habermasian 
sense), as deliberation is never entirely free or unconstrained’. Thus, when looking at technocratic 
discourse, there does not need to be deliberation. At the same time, such discourse is not at simply a 
series of individual bargaining processes. While bargaining generally takes place in the EU context, for 
example about a text, and thus becomes part of discursive construction, the wider policy process 
cannot simply be reduced to a series of individual negotiations between clearly delimited negotiators 
with defined positions. Such a perspective overlooks the dynamism of discursive contestation. The 
positions of actors are subject to multiple interdependencies that are not limited to the ‘negotiation 
situation’. This view challenges both notions of persuasion and bargaining. On the one hand, pure 
deliberation is unlikely where actors have multiple obligations and role conceptions, depending on 
the (overlapping) structures for (political) organisation that they are part of at a certain point (see also 
Beyers, 2005; Murdoch, et al., 2016). On the other hand, actors’ positions are not stable but shift over 
time as the discursive context shifts. 
From this discussion on theorising competition over policy norms we assume that actors 
operate within both a discursive and an institutional context that affect their engagement. Following 
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Thomas Risse (2000), actors structure discourses by processes of argumentation with each other, 
which then constitutes the range and limits of mutually recognised formulations. Actors have space 
to act deliberately or even strategically, e.g., highlight, reframe, challenge or choose to ignore certain 
aspects within the wider discursive context, and create narratives in order to gain support among 
other relevant actors. Collectively, these acts affect the overall discursive context, usually on various 
levels simultaneously, but usually asymmetrically. This, in turn, reflects on the competition of actors, 
but ‘ownership’ over discourses is generally limited. Thus, the construction and contestation of policy 
norms is intersubjective and takes place within a dynamic context of collective understandings, which 
adjust dynamically, for instance, as a reaction to events or to changed arguments in competing 
centres. In contrast, institutions adjust more slowly so that their adjustment may be affected by 
different discursive dynamics. 
Having outlined the theoretical foundations of this thesis, the next section discusses how 
actors practically seek to gain support for and compete over norm advocacy. This part is less about 
how actors act discursively, i.e., through means of language and speech acts (the thesis does not offer 
a discourse analysis as such). Instead, it is about how actors interact with others to seek support, 
advice, advocacy and legitimacy for their formulations or qualify and challenge competing narratives, 
and what structures these interactions. 
 
 
III Framework for analysis 
 
The previous section pointed to the relevance of social interactions within institutional structures. 
Importantly, actors engage within competing structures of political organisation. This section takes a 
closer look at the interactions of actors at a disaggregated level, asks how they are structured, under 
what conditions they matter and how they matter. To understand policy-making and norm advocacy 
in situations of institutional interdependence, scholars have referred to networks, which have become 
a constitutive element of a ‘new world order’ (Slaughter, 2004), and European multi-level governance 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Peterson and Bomberg, 1999). While multi-level governance offers a 
heuristic of the entire system, the focus on networks contributes two things: identifying a locus of 
power within the wider system and conceptualising how actors relate to each other. This framework 
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follows the premise that networks at a disaggregated level are not identical to (networks at) the 
organisational level and thus help to understand norm advocacy in a way, which remains invisible at 
the structural level (see Henriksen and Seabrooke, 2016). 
Consequently, this section provides a framework for analysis that is based on the concept of 
networks in which policy professionals construct, challenge and advance discourses on policy norms 
through their interactions. Policy networks allow us to account for the multiple demands on actors 
that are a result of their various engagements on the international, European and national level. In 
this framework, institutional structures matter because they empower certain actors and their 
narratives, including but not limited to EU institutional actors, especially Commission officials. Since 
there has been little research on networks in EU development cooperation, with few exceptions 
(Elgström, 2017; Wolff, 2015), this section formulates expectations about how their functioning and 
interactions affect norm construction and contestation in European development cooperation. To do 
so, this section first looks at networks, what they are, their function, operation and their role in EU 
scholarship. Then, the section goes deeper into what shapes the functioning and operation of 
networks in different institutional contexts, especially how power is vested in networks, by looking at 





Networks as a concept of social interaction have been known for a long time. Their prominence in 
social enquiry goes back at least to Stanley Milgram’s The Small World Problem (1967), which 
discusses the path length for social networks of individuals in the United States. Policy networks found 
their way into the study of public policy through analyses of networks in national government. 
Therein, the comparative work by R. A. W. Rhodes and David Marsh on networks in British politics 
became very influential for understanding how networks in a particular policy area are structured to 
facilitate bargaining between stakeholders over policy design (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992b; Rhodes and 
Marsh, 1992). An important development was that networks were not only understood as social 
reality that needed to be analysed and understood (see Atkinson and Coleman, 1992). While all social 
interaction can be understood in terms of networks, networks were increasingly seen as a distinct 
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form of organisation for public policy. While there are overlaps, Tanja Börzel (1998, p. 255, emphasis 
in original) clarified:  
The interest intermediation school conceives policy networks as a generic concept which applies to all 
kinds of relations between public and private actors. For the governance school, on the contrary, policy 
networks only characterize a specific form of public-private interaction in public policy (governance), 
namely the one based on non-hierarchical co-ordination, opposed to hierarchy and market as two 
inherently distinct modes of governance. 
Hence, policy networks became a central characteristic of the so-called ‘governance turn’, which has 
been prominent in EU studies. Early on, the EU provided an ideal field of exploration for the study of 
network governance, which also contributed to the overall understanding of networks (Börzel, 1998; 
Peterson, 1995). However, advancing the study of networks was not confined to the EU and influential 
studies have come from other areas of international governance beyond state hierarchies (Keck and 
Sikkink, 1998; Slaughter, 2004; Stone, 2013). What is important for all these studies is that traditional 
actors such as states, international bureaucracies, civil society and even multinational corporations 
seek to put capacities into policy networks, which create new arenas of collective policy construction 
and allow non-traditional actors to become part of this process. 
A policy network describes a ‘cluster of actors, each of which has an interest, or “stake” in a 
given […] policy sector and the capacity to help determine policy success or failure’ (Peterson and 
Bomberg, 1999, p. 8). This description also points to the function of networks, namely, bringing 
together actors with a stake in a certain problem of collective action who have the capacity to 
overcome it. Thus, networks not only have an analytical but also a normative dimension, which means 
that they may be a desirable mode of interaction to ensure effective governance in certain situations 
(see Jordan and Schout, 2006). Analytically, observers have witnessed the formation of self-organising 
clusters in which actors have an incentive to negotiate collective agreements in situations of 
institutional fragmentation and high levels of uncertainty (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992b; Peterson, 1995; 
Rhodes, 1996; 1997). Typically, policy networks emerge around complex, resource- and knowledge-
intensive, often administrative, sector-specific policy problems. To understand policy coordination in 
situations of organisational interdependence and uncertainty, observers have argued that there is a 
benefit to analyse networks at the meso-level, i.e., inter-organisational rather than at the individual 
or systemic level (Henriksen and Seabrooke, 2016; Qvist, 2017). Thus, networks function as a 
governing structure beyond hierarchy for allocating resources and exercising control. 
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The main drawback of networks from a governance perspective is that their application is 
limited to a set of actors and they do not cover a wider system (see Börzel, 1998). Thus, most work 
on networks only draws on one particular set of actors, often self-delimited and identifiable by an 
acronym or informal group name, a website and/or even secretariat staff. As Mark Granovetter (1973) 
remarks in his seminal work, most network models focus implicitly on strong ties, thus confining their 
applicability to small, well-defined groups. However, one can understand competition over policy 
norms within a transnational policy community as a set of multiple network relations, which are 
usually covered by existing concepts, for example, bureaucratic politics (Bach, et al., 2016; Radaelli, 
1999), transnational policy networks (Kingah, et al., 2015), advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 1988; 1998), 
epistemic communities (Haas, 1992; Zito, 2001) etc. Some of these concepts overlap and the empirical 
delimitation of networks can be difficult, especially as the analytical focus widens to account for wider 
interactions between groups. However, understanding how different network relationships or 
clusters of different sets of actors interact with each other, and how these interactions across 
networks affects interactions and power within a specific cluster (see also Granovetter, 1973) is 
constituent of contestation within a multi-level and multi-centre system. Thus, widening the focus to 
relations between groups and to the analysis of larger segments of the social structure that are not 
easily defined in terms of primary groups seems beneficial to understand norm advocacy and policy 
formulation in complex, multi-centre institutional structures that involve multiple types of actors and 
their networks. 
The function of networks varies with the type of network. The type of network, in turn, 
depends on the structure in which networks form. Based on Rhodes’ work, there have been attempts 
to characterise types of policy networks depending on i) the relative stability of membership; ii) the 
network’s relative insularity; and iii) the strength of resource dependencies (Peterson, 1995, p. 77). 
As a result, there is a continuum from tightly integrated policy communities to loosely affiliated issue 
networks. While tightly integrated policy communities control policy formulation within a community 
of ‘insiders’ against ‘outsiders’, issue networks are more inclusive but also less stable and tend to form 
around ad hoc issues. Such networks have also been conceptualised as ‘advocacy coalitions’ (Sabatier, 
1988; 1998) or ‘advocacy networks’ (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). These terms suggest that networks 
embody both elements of structure and agency. In other words, networks can be conceived as a form 
of collective agency, which influence public policy through norm advocacy, as well as a structure 
within which social agents engage. Looking at the power or leverage of the collective agency of 
networks, networks have been used to understand the influence of actors outside of formal policy-
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making processes. In particular, this provides ways of understanding how societal actors achieve 
participation in the public policy-making process. 
Societal actors have been central to many network analyses because they have something to 
offer to actors in bureaucratic politics (see Kingah, et al., 2015). What distinguishes networks as a 
mode of governance from lobbying or advocacy coalitions is that they are mechanisms of political 
resource mobilisation where the capacity from policy formulation to implementation is widely 
dispersed among public and non-public actors. In other words, while lobbying is also based on 
interdependence between actors, there is less of a dichotomy between rule-makers and those 
affected who seek to influence specific rules. This influences the kind of ties that actors seek. In 
networks, actors have intrinsic incentives to form stronger and more permanent ties. Networks bring 
actors together and allow for effective communication, coordination and resource allocation outside 
of a hierarchical set of relationships. However, despite having intrinsic incentives, actors can also 
manipulate incentives. While networks are not the result of intentional design by members (Kahler, 
2009, p. 8), members shape the network and its structure by co-opting or excluding actors, providing 
information, sharing capacity etc. Access to transnational policy networks is partly contingent on 
whether information, knowledge and expertise generated and shared is a desired resource by those 
who control access. While bureaucratic actors tend to act as gatekeepers and managers of such a 
network (see below), at the same time, policy professionals with limited formal competence in civil 
society organisations (CSOs), such as foundations, charities and think tanks actively seek to get 
involved in policy construction whether as advocates or advisors (Bugdahn, 2008; Mezzetti and Ceschi, 
2015; Stone, 2004). 
While societal actors have often been conceptualised as constituent part of ‘advocacy 
networks’ (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), strict separations between advocacy and expertise are not always 
evident as limits are more fluid. For instance, some NGOs do not only function as advocacy actors but 
also qualify as ‘experts’. The role of societal actors varies as they range from mostly advocacy actors 
with little role as knowledge providers, e.g., campaigning groups, to highly specialised knowledge 
producers, e.g., research institutes. In most cases, societal actors blend these functions and it 
becomes difficult to differentiate their role as advocacy actor and knowledge provider. In any case, 
knowledge is not a neutral resource informing the policy process (see below) but subject to 
competition between professionals who seek to enhance their claims to expertise (see Sending, 
2015). Where these professionals lack formal competence, they seek to engage in the process of 
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policy formulation by providing statements, opinions and stakeholder views, which draw on networks 
that go beyond European policy professionals, e.g., local actors in third countries. Through sharing 
formulations, their interactions and engagement, societal actors have a way of transforming the terms 
of the debate (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p. 2). They play an important role in articulating, legitimising 
and promoting ideas of networks, serve as catalysts to construct consensual knowledge (Metz, 2015; 
Stone, 2013, p. 38), and thus function as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). For 
instance, Stone and Maxwell (2005) stress the role of networks between think tanks in proactively 
marketing ideas and promoting institutional mechanisms for engaging with knowledge actors. 
Scholars have argued that network interactions are particular because they are often based 
on technical knowledge and expertise (Howorth, 2004; Stone, 2004; 2013; Stone and Maxwell, 2005; 
Zwolski, 2014). Much of the legitimacy of network interactions and exchanges ‘resides in claims to 
superior technical expertise and/or to increased effectiveness of service provision’ (Marsh and 
Rhodes, 1992a, p. 265). The power and leverage of transnational networks is thus also based on the 
degree of professionalisation, which contributes to the diffusion and legitimisation of policy ideas 
across different organisations and against other organisational pressure that shapes behaviour 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 152). To keep control over policy formulation, actors seek to overcome 
and pre-empt (external) opposition by looking for technical solutions, thus framing problems in a 
technical way (Peterson, 1995, p. 79). This requires members to be experts. As policy ‘experts’ who 
share similar formative backgrounds, specialised knowledge and a common causal understanding, 
and who are confronted with situations of uncertainty, they tend to identify and bond with each other 
(Qvist, 2017; Stone, 2013; Stone and Maxwell, 2005). They share the goal of overcoming problems of 
collective action among themselves and seek to depoliticise and shield the policy process from 
outsiders. Thus, transnational networks may substantiate a managerial policy discourse (Metz, 2015; 
Wolff, 2015). 
Peter Haas (1992) described the role of a particularly coherent type of network of 
professionals based on mutually recognised expert knowledge and its influence on policy-making. 
These so-called ‘epistemic communities’ are particular in that, although their members have different 
institutional and national affiliations, they tend to share cognitive and normative ideas about a 
common policy enterprise and thus engage on this basis with a focus on problem-solving. For 
example, Mai'a Cross (2011) observes particularly close networks of policy professionals, which are 
characterised by largely horizontal, argumentative and consensual interactions. Such an approach 
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tends to stress actors’ professional norms for engaging with each other, e.g., consensus-seeking, 
deliberation etc. However, the difficulty with epistemic communities for the understanding of the 
functioning of policy networks is that, while these communities might well exist for circumscribed 
networks of very similar actors, it is analytically difficult to identify and delimit such a community in 
more complex networks of actors with different goals. Instead, while members of networks tend to 
be ‘policy experts’ in the sense that they have knowledge of the policy area and share an interest in 
overcoming problems of collective action, they possibly have very different ideas, interests and 
preferences for the outcome of their interactions (Voß and Simons, 2014, p. 742). These differences 
are not necessarily reconcilable through expert deliberation due to fundamentally diverging goals 
behind the participation of different actors. 
Different institutional environments provide for different distributions of tasks between types 
of actors and different degrees of homogeneity, which not only affects the collective agency of the 
network but also its ‘inner workings’. The discussion of the form and function of policy networks has 
already hinted at their operation. In their work on transnational networks in international politics, 
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998, p. 8) define the working of networks as a mode of social 
interaction that is ‘characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication 
and exchange’. Börzel (1998, p. 255) similarly highlights the horizontal, i.e., ‘non-hierarchical co-
ordination’ as a distinctive quality of networks as mode of governance. Importantly, the horizontal 
pattern of interaction is an ideal case that serves as a boundary condition for networks as a mode of 
governance. The functioning of networks is based on the premise that actors have an incentive to 
coordinate, organise and develop stable relations to maximise the mediation of their interests and 
beliefs and allocate relevant resources such as funds, expertise and advocacy to facilitate policy-
making. Hence, non-public actors strive to participate in these networks while this enables public 
policy actors to gain access to resources and expertise to overcome collective action problems. Due 
to the nature of exchange, which is the basis for engagement in networks, and which is based on 
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Power and (inter-)dependence 
 
Policy networks are (i) structures for allocating material and ideational resources; (ii) a medium for 
the diffusion of information, expertise and argumentation; and (iii) they increase the political leverage 
of policy advocates. In this context, the availability of resources, information asymmetries, and actors’ 
other relationships and networks become relevant. To understand the functioning of networks thus 
requires taking account of power that is vested in networks. That power is inherently situational, and 
therefore dynamic and potentially unstable, is what makes it such a central concept for understanding 
networks (Knoke, 1990, p. 2). Access and participation in networks are not entirely based on legal or 
formal power and competences. This stands in contrast to fixed sets of power relationships, which 
are intrinsic to hierarchies. While networks are generally non-hierarchical, power asymmetries play 
an important role as network participants develop dependences through their participation. As 
networks are subject to institutional structures, while institutions do not authoritatively structure 
engagement, they empower actors. 
Thus, while power is a central element of networks, it is not immediately evident. In addition, 
it is neither symmetric nor homogenous. Policy networks have different centres of gravity, are 
interspersed with power asymmetries and sub-networks. Power within a network therefore ‘depends 
on [the] structural position in a field of connections to other agents as well as actor capability or 
attributes’ (Kahler, 2009, p. 3). These capabilities or attributes can be conceptualised as resources. 
Resources, in a wider sense, range from the abilities of individuals to persuade others and enhance 
the legitimacy of arguments in the eyes of third actors, to more structural resources, such as access 
to expertise and control over funds. For instance, Andreas Dür and Dirk De Bièvre (2007) argue for the 
case of EU trade policy that although NGOs have gained access to policy-makers, their influence is 
small as they do not dispose of resources with which they can threaten or enhance political actors’ 
chances of re-election or re-appointment. Thus, different resources are required by different actors 
to participate in the policy process. This lays the grounds for exchange, which constitutes network 
interactions and creates (inter)dependences (see Metz, 2015). Such resource interdependence 
becomes a defining element of network relations and determines the relative power of different 
actors at a certain point, which is not necessarily equivalent to their formal competences, immediately 
evident or stable over time. 
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As suggested earlier, advice, argumentation and advocacy are key resources for actors in 
institutions of transnational policy-making, especially technical knowledge and expertise. However, 
expertise is not self-evident and can have different functions for the interactions of actors. Expertise 
may be the basis of argumentative persuasion between actors who share causal beliefs, notions of 
validity and common policy goals as members of ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas, 1992; Zito, 2001). 
This has been observed, for instance, for interactions among member state representatives in Brussels 
(Cross, 2011). Crucially, however, persuasion of actors, as in epistemic communities, is not necessary 
for expertise to matter. Several observers have highlighted bureaucratic expert authority in 
transnational governance (Boswell, 2009; Chou and Riddervold, 2015; Hobolth and Martinsen, 2013; 
Nay, 2012; Radaelli, 1999; Riddervold, 2016; Zwolski, 2014). Bureaucratic actors can ‘capitalise on 
policy-oriented information and knowledge to strengthen their influence within their own 
environment’ (Nay, 2012, p. 53). This becomes more likely as they have control over significant human 
and financial resources to generate information, and pool and control access to it. 
Among bureaucratic actors, transnational bureaucracies such as the Commission play a crucial 
role as knowledge hubs, providers of expertise and capacity, network manager and policy 
entrepreneurs because of their position within the multi-level administrative system (Egeberg and 
Trondal, 2009; 2011; Hobolth and Martinsen, 2013). Therein, expertise is an important resource to 
substantiate and signal bureaucratic authority. As Claudio Radaelli (1999, p. 767) remarks, ‘Knowledge 
enters the policy process in combination with interests, never alone.’ Transnational administrations 
are not simply technocratic actors. They have an interest in actively engaging with problems of 
collective action and structuring a policy field (Boswell, 2009; Hartlapp, et al., 2014) and therefore 
seek to pursue ‘de-politicization’ strategies (Kassim and Le Galès, 2010; Lascoumes and Le Galès, 
2007; Wolff, 2015). Transnational bureaucratic actors with some degree of autonomous control over 
human and financial resources thus seek to involve (external) actors that provide relevant expertise 
and contribute to managerial discourses. This turns bureaucratic actors into policy entrepreneurs. It 
has been suggested that the Commission can shape policies even in policy areas that are dominated 
by member states when it is ‘at the table’ and its bureaucratic expert authority is recognised by others 
(Chou and Riddervold, 2015; Riddervold, 2016; Zwolski, 2014). 
For expertise to be recognised by others in the policy process and to translate into 
bureaucratic authority, it needs to carry authoritative weight. This is based on the premise that 
expertise is not merely informing rational policy objectives but used for political argumentation (see 
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Boswell, 2009; Sending, 2015). Actors therefore seek to demonstrate the relevance of expertise and 
its operational usefulness in the policy process, which also depends on ‘packaging’ and framing (Court 
and Young, 2005; Metz, 2015). For expertise, this implies that it matters who says it and how it is said, 
e.g., whether policy-makers can ‘use’ the information in their day-to-day activities. This expectation 
of expertise remains largely instrumental. That means it is different from that expectation 
characterising epistemic communities, which is formative. However, the formative function of 
expertise matters beyond narrow epistemic networks and communities. Expertise is not neutral but 
subject to contested social process by which certain knowledge claims come to be considered 
authoritative (see Kuus, 2014; Sending, 2015). A variety of ‘knowledge actors’, who are operating 
across governance fields and levels, seek to supply expertise in various forms while simultaneously 
promoting their own claims to be issue experts. This process highlights the discursive, and formative, 
component of expertise (Stone, 2013, p. 50). Thus, relevant knowledge and policy-oriented expertise 
are not merely resources that can be ‘exchanged’ for funds, organisational support, access etc., which 
(external) experts and policy professionals require to perform their tasks and participate in the policy 
process. These interactions also construct the discursive frame by which certain knowledge claims 
come to be considered authoritative. 
The various societal actors that are potentially involved, from multinational corporations, and 
large, recognised and globally-active NGOs, to state-funded think tanks, individual consultants, and 
small, independent charities, have different needs and offer different capacities. For example, 
coordinative and technical ‘behind-closed-door’ engagement between officials enhances the role of 
‘tailored’, expedient expertise of researchers and consultants while enhancing politicisation and 
transparency puts individual, well-recognised NGOs in a more powerful position to offer their 
networks for norm advocacy. The changing demands of the interactions between bureaucratic actors 
may, therefore, not only affect how these actors engage with societal actors but also impact on the 









The EU’s external policy-making occurs within a highly complex institutional set-up in which different 
types of actors at different levels and in multiple centres coordinate policies. While eventual EU 
decisions are subject to the political gatekeeping by designated member state officials, norm advocacy 
is based on the participation of actors within a wider transnational network. To understand this wider 
policy process, this chapter has proposed an analytical framework of ‘discursive networks’. This 
framework understands the engagement of various actors in terms of discursive competition over 
meaning-making. This discursive competition happens within a space whose structure is not as readily 
visible as the formal institutional structures of the EU. Instead, this space is constructed by the 




 Discourses Networks 
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Figure 1. Triangular relationship between institutions, discourses and networks 
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Theoretically, the chapter has built on insights from (new) institutionalism, discourse theory 
and network analysis (see figure 1). It has put forward an agency-oriented approach, suggesting that 
actors act within an institutional and a discursive context which they shape through their mutual 
interactions. That institutions matter has been emphasised repeatedly. This chapter has suggested 
that institutions constitute decision-making nodes around which networks work. In other words, 
institutional structures determine where decisions are made, who makes them and under what 
conditions, and who is affected. As a result, they also affect the power of actors in the network that 
forms around them, i.e., their competence, resources, relative position, access etc. While institutions 
structure much of the decision-making, these decisions are based on the discursive competition of 
wider network interactions around these nodes. This competition takes place in a specific discursive 
context, which generally limits the range of mutually recognised formulations. Yet it leaves actors 
space to act deliberately and strategically within this context, e.g., to highlight, reframe, challenge or 
ignore certain aspects. Compared to institutional structures, discourses are more responsive to events 
and other developments. Actors structure discourses by processes of argumentation to win support. 
While their discursive actions do not necessarily reveal their ‘true’ preferences, they provide an 
indication about actors’ collective preferences of and ideas about the EU’s role, which are otherwise 
not directly observable. Thus, we expect that actors adjust their arguments, formulations and 
narratives to promote a certain policy norm as a reaction to a shifting discursive environment. At the 
same time, such an agency-focused understanding of discourse presumes that discourses shift with 
actors’ collective choices. We expect, therefore, that collective discursive actions affect the wider 
discursive environment. However, it needs to be born in mind that this study only looks at a subset of 
actors so that wider effects are likely to be affected by other groups. 
Argumentation and discursive competition occur through social interactions. These 
interactions are based on mutual interdependences of various network relationships. Networks have 
been ubiquitous in EU policy-making, but their conceptualisation and functions differ. Networks form 
where institutional structures do not fully constrain interactions and actors choose to interact to 
mediate their interests and beliefs. The understanding that is put forward here focuses on the 
discursive function of network interactions. At the same time, they are based on real-world 
interdependences, which can be understood in terms of resource dependence that affect 
intersubjective power relations. These resources are capacities that actors need to engage effectively 
in discursive competition and to win support among other actors. Thus, it is expected that actors will 
adjust their ties and relations to gain relevant capacities for discursive competition. Specifically, this 
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chapter has highlighted the role of expertise for discursive competition and the role of knowledge for 
the relationship between different actors. How expert claims become authoritative is itself part of 
this formative contestation. It is expected that adjustments within a primary group of bureaucratic 
politics will not only affect their networks with societal actors but also the workings of networks 
among societal actors when engaging with transnational bureaucracies. This conceptualisation of 
relations makes ‘discursive networks’ analytically useful. As such, ‘discursive networks’ are not limited 
to the restrictive assumptions of networks as a governance mode, but the conceptualisation goes 
beyond simple (structural) social network analysis. 
The subsequent empirical chapters therefore look at how actors ‘act’ discursively, i.e., how 
they connect policy problems to solutions in the form of common policy norms through means of 
language and speech acts. To understand the power of policy professionals in discursive networks, it 
is helpful to map them within the institutional context and against each other. Then, the empirical 
analysis turns to how these actors interact to disseminate their arguments and formulations to win 
support. The empirical parts of this thesis look in detail at how professionals seek to further their 
preferences and ideas through their interactions with other professionals within the institutional 
context of EU development cooperation and how this affects the wider discursive environment in 










Europe’s reputation in the world – for better or for worse – has strongly depended on its efforts in 
development cooperation. It was primarily France, which brought development to the Community 
‘table’, while Germany reluctantly agreed. Britain was then presented with a fait accompli, which it 
quickly sought to change. Thus, much of the competition over a common European development 
cooperation was a reaction to France’s engagement. As development cooperation became one of the 
first international tasks of the Community, competition over its international role through 
development cooperation has been relevant for defining patterns of common policy, even though 
trade and security have dominated the debates at many points. From the beginning, the struggles 
over reactions to international processes and challenges have also included the question of what 
‘Community Europe’ could or should add. Therefore, this chapter traces how debates and discourse 
over common policies at the European level, in contrast to different national contexts (see chapters 
4 and 5), have advanced over time and have become translated into common policies and institutions. 
By doing so, the chapter seeks to answer how norms for common action in development cooperation 
have evolved and on what grounds they have been contested among various policy professionals 
across EU member states, institutions and civil society in Europe. 
Arguably, the ‘European project’ was not driven by an external purpose. Likewise, close 
observers have understood common development cooperation to be driven primarily by internal 
processes and advancements (Dimier, 2014; Grilli, 1993; Holland, 2002). This chapter sets out to see 
these internal processes and advancements in terms of discursive competitions over the function of 
collective European action in international development. In this way I also take account of external 
processes as they become part of the discursive competition processes within the EC/EU. Thus, while 
this chapter provides a historical account of ‘European’ development cooperation, it is not its purpose 
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to (re)produce a comprehensive history of the integration of development cooperation in Europe.4 
Instead, this chapter reproduces those aspects that are relevant to understanding on what 
argumentative grounds different actors have pursued or obstructed certain forms of common 
European action in development cooperation. The chapter also introduces the relevant actors, their 
power within the institutional system, their networks and interactions, and other factors that have 
shaped their preferences. While member states have been the primary arenas for contestation and 
promotion of appropriate ‘solutions’ to international processes (see chapters 4 and 5), with the 
increasing institutionalisation at the European level, institutional actors became more actively 
involved. In addition, civil society organisations and corporations in member states have not only 
contributed to debates ‘at home’ but also at the European level. Finally, the engagement with third 
countries’ governmental elites and civil society has shaped the arguments of European actors. 
The first section (I) of this chapter traces the origins and early debates about a European 
dimension in development cooperation. This period covers the political struggles prior to the Treaty 
of Rome, the ‘communitarisation’ of French association, and British accession to the European 
Economic Community (EEC). This time was defined by decolonisation, and the European dimension 
became a way of dealing with the simultaneous developments of European market integration and 
colonial disintegration. The result was what some observers have called a ‘model’ of international 
cooperation, situated between the US-dominated World Bank and the post-colonial, ‘clientelist’ 
member state policies (see Arts and Dickson, 2004; Ravenhill, 1985). The second section (II) traces the 
developments from the early 1990s onwards. Maastricht did not only provide the EU with 
competence in development cooperation, it also provided the institutional foundations for further 
growth into a fully-fledged foreign policy actor. The section shows how the wider discourse on 
effectiveness in international development provided a window of opportunity for actors to promote 
policy norms that had been less feasible otherwise. Effectiveness as a driver of an EU role thus 
emerged comparatively late, although concerns about the effects of development cooperation had 
been around for much longer. Yet, as Sven Grimm (2008, p. 3) notes, what constitutes aid 
                                                          
4 There are several comprehensive accounts of the historical evolution of common development cooperation in 
Europe. Enzo Grilli (1993) traces the integration process prior to the Treaty of Maastricht. Especially for the early 
period leading to and following Britain’s accession, see Carol Cosgrove Twitchett (1978; 1981) and Marjorie 
Lister (1988). Martin Holland (2002) and the edited volumes by Paul Hoebink (2004b) and Karen Arts and Anne 
Dickson (2004) cover the evolution since Maastricht. In an updated version to the 2002 volume, Martin Holland 
and Mathew Doidge (2012) also consider the Lisbon Treaty reforms. For a highly-detailed perspective on the 
institutional shifts in the EU’s supranational aid bureaucracy, see Veronique Dimier (2014). 
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effectiveness is far from technocratic, but it is ‘at the heart of development policy’. The third section 
(III) traces the diversification of the competition over ‘effectiveness’ following the empowering of 
foreign and security policy communities in the EU, especially since Lisbon. 
 
 
I Europe’s role in the world 
 
At the beginning of the European integration process, the original Six had to (re-)consider their own 
roles in the world. Promoting a ‘common’ development cooperation policy, initially in the form of the 
association of (former) French and Belgium colonies to the Common Market, was a way especially for 
France of dealing with its declining empire. The role of the EEC in this was originally defined by the 
French negotiators, but soon thereafter officials from the new institutions and other member states 
began to challenge this role on various grounds. While the ‘globalists’ in Germany and the Netherlands 
pushed for reducing international barriers to trade and were anxious about any colonial stigma, the 
newly arrived EU officials began to develop their own priorities and arguments. Thus, what started as 
a policy that was closely intertwined with French policy became increasingly separate and distinct. 
Subsequent rounds of enlargement further contributed to this, but especially Britain’s accession 
foreshadowed the opening of the debate of the common endeavour. 
While the distinctiveness of the common international cooperation policy from the member 
states was increasingly presented as a ‘selling point’ and even a model for the rest, the joint 
endeavour also established a clear separation from member state policies. Several member states 
became comfortable with this situation as it allowed them to pursue different objectives through the 
Community and through their bilateral policies. The first part of this section concentrates on the 
earliest phase of contestation over a common policy in development cooperation to set out the initial 
discourse surrounding the common policy and the precedents to which actors subsequently reacted. 
The second part shows on what grounds the Community policy advanced separately from the member 
states, which created the discursive precedents, but also actors’ capacities, e.g., resources, knowledge 
and networks, that shaped later contestation. 
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Communitarisation of decolonisation 
 
In the post-war order of Europe, the orientation of the European project became less clear after the 
defeat of the European Political Community (EPC) and the European Defence Community (EDC) (see, 
for example, Mahant, 2004; Parsons, 2014). While for most of the original Six this meant taking a 
generally inward-looking, exclusively economic and Eurocentric focus, from a French perspective it 
was argued that any continental integration process had to include the country’s overseas territories. 
The inclusion of cooperation with third countries, which were dependencies of member states, 
reflected the concerns of the imperial member states, primarily France and, to a lesser degree, 
Belgium. It was in the context of the late colonial period, after the Second World War, that 
cooperation with these countries was introduced, originally in terms of a policy of association of 
member states’ colonial dependencies in Africa (see Betts, 2005). While international development 
was not on the agenda of most negotiators, especially not in the Netherlands and Germany, the 
prospect of decolonisation paired with the French conviction that they would loosen their grip only 
incrementally meant that there was no way around the topic – even if that meant deferring it to the 
end of negotiations. French negotiators insisted on including association in the negotiations leading 
to the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and successfully managed to ‘multilateralise’ France’s policy towards 
Africa through strategic issue-linking. This set the precedent of further processes of development 
cooperation in Europe. The initial definition and scope of a European cooperation policy was crucial 
because it determined the structure and mind-set of collective action to which actors subsequently 
responded. 
The French idea of a role for Europe in the world was already present in Schuman’s declaration 
of 1950, which outlined the imperative of passing on the benefits of European integration to the 
development of the African continent.5 However, prior to the Treaty of Rome, the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) did not contain any provisions, let alone Community structures, for 
Schuman’s vision of a contribution of European integration to development outside the Community. 
Nevertheless, the issue remained salient among French negotiators in the subsequent negotiations of 
political integration in Europe (Cosgrove Twitchett, 1978, pp. 5-6). When France failed to secure 
                                                          
5 For an English language version of Robert Schuman’s speech made in the salon de l’Horloge at the French 
Foreign Ministry on 9 May 1950 see, for example, The Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance de l'Europe (CVCE), 
available at: https://www.cvce.eu/ [retrieved 13 September 2018]. 
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parliamentary consent for the EDC and the six members of the ECSC abandoned the scheme for a 
political community (EPC), the issue of integrating development cooperation, and in fact all external 
relations, disappeared from the rehabilitated agenda of European integration, the so-called rélance 
européenne, which began with the Messina Conference in 1955. However, ‘Europeanising’ association 
re-emerged swiftly after changes in French coalition politics, i.e., a shift in government to the centre-
left, in early 1956. When the foreign ministers of the Six met in Venice in May 1956 to consider the 
Spaak Report, the French government under Prime Minister Guy Mollet requested the association of 
France’s overseas colonies and territories with the proposed EEC (Cosgrove Twitchett, 1978, p. 8; 
Parsons, 2014, pp. 128-9). 
It was integration-minded French political elites who regarded the Europeanisation of 
association as a mechanism for managing France’s colonial legacy by spreading the economic benefits 
from market integration. They pursued this against significant domestic opposition, but they could 
build their arguments on support from (Francophone) African elites (Cosgrove Twitchett, 1978, pp. 9-
10; Parsons, 2014, p. 130). The French request has been conventionally explained by political, 
commercial and financial considerations to stabilise the declining empire, especially given French 
demands for financial burden-sharing with the other European countries (see also Dimier, 2014; Grilli, 
1993; Lister, 1988). Indeed, it seems that France was torn between economic reasons for pushing for 
European continental integration, and political and identity motives that prevented it from 
abandoning Africa (Claeys, 2004). Hence, market integration in Europe, which was an imperative 
against the background of post-war economic recovery, required a functional compromise for 
France’s overseas territories with which it shared a common market. At the same time, France’s post-
war developmentalist colonialism proved to be extremely costly and hardly sustainable (Claeys, 2004, 
p. 120). Hence, opening formerly closed overseas markets in the process of European market 
integration would require compensation payments from other European Community members. 
While not unchallenged among French elites (Parsons, 2014, p. 130), in 1956, French 
negotiators understood European integration in the spirit of the Schuman declaration as a 
contribution to the creation of a Eur-African Community, which had been central to French post-war 
identity and interests: Investing considerable efforts and resources to build colonial economies and 
to integrate, educate and ‘civilise’ the colonial subjects constituted the basis of France’s 
understanding of its commitment to the development of the African continent (Cooper, 2010, p. 12; 
Garavini, 2012, p. 45). This was ideationally based on the policy of association. The policy advocated 
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decentralisation and devolving autonomy, building on the retention of native institutions and it was 
guided by ‘the geographic and ethnic characteristics and the state of social development of the 
particular region’ (Betts, 2005, p. 106). Thus, through the changes of colonial policy during the post-
war colonial period, association became a policy of development cooperation. Frederick Cooper 
(2010, p. 9) argues that 
With hindsight, one can find concepts and projects that can be aggregated into a long-term history of 
‘development’: assertions of civilizing missions, claims to be exercising trusteeship, the building of 
railroads, hospitals and schools, all of which were sometimes subsumed under a rhetoric of European-
directed progress. 
He continues that this original, European colonial understanding of development resembles an 
‘implicit version of modernization theory that had developed among French and British bureaucracies 
well before it was systematized by American social scientists’ (Cooper, 2010, p. 14). Thus, the French 
policy of association was built on a particular understanding of development, namely, i) development 
as a state responsibly; ii) development as a mutually beneficial/reciprocal process; and iii) 
development as a discriminatory policy, i.e., only where mutual interest, identities and benefits exist. 
Accordingly, this understanding assigned specific tasks to (development) cooperation, which proved 
to be highly persistent, even after decolonisation. 
This mind-set of an imperative national relationship with Africa constituted the ideational 
basis of French post-war colonial policy that French negotiators wanted to preserve when pushing for 
a European ‘Africa policy’. Crucially, this perspective assigned a precise ‘task’ for the European level. 
In contrast, suspicion and opposition to the French attempt to ‘upload’ this kind of external policy was 
particularly high in Germany and the Netherlands. Both countries opposed the integration of 
association into the proposed EEC. First, they opposed it based on commercial and financial grounds 
as they rejected a discriminatory regional trade regime and were not prepared to subsidise French 
colonial policy (Grilli, 1993). French negotiators demanded the creation of a common fund in exchange 
for opening the formerly closed markets in Africa – the origin of the European Development Fund 
(EDF) – to share the burden of France’s development assistance. In Germany, in particular, efforts had 
only begun to develop own aid and development programmes with a relatively small budget and 
officials wanted to stay clear of any allegation of colonialism (see chapter 4; also White, 1965). 
However, both the Germans and the Dutch negotiators gave the issue initially low priority and 
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underestimated French insistence, especially after having conceded much in the area of internal 
economic arrangements, especially agriculture (Cosgrove Twitchett, 1978, p. 11). 
French negotiators around Mollet presented the argument of association as an ‘extremely’ 
constructive compromise. Yet it did not suffice to convince either the Germans or the Dutch (Dimier, 
2014, pp. 12-3). Thus, association of overseas territories remained the single last unresolved issue of 
the EEC negotiations. Eventually, French negotiators, only joined by Belgium, successfully convinced 
the Germans and Dutch to accept association by making it a pre-condition to France entering the EEC. 
Despite their strong personal preference for a Community approach to inter-European relations, the 
French negotiators threatened the entire enterprise by demanding the inclusion of association 
(Dimier, 2014, p. 13; Parsons, 2014, p. 130). Having already experienced the uncertainty of French 
approval for European integration in the case of the EDC, the high costs of a non-agreement and the 
overriding concern in Germany of Franco-German reconciliation turned the issue into high politics. 
The German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer conceded to French pressure – much against unified 
German resistance – when France assured that association would not impinge on the political 
development of overseas territories (when decolonisation became seen as increasingly inevitable), 
and special but minor guarantees in the area of trade and the right of establishment were made 
(Cosgrove Twitchett, 1978, p. 14; Dimier, 2014, p. 13). Eventually, the German and Dutch desire for 
advancing towards integration within the Community overshadowed their reluctance to association. 
The final compromise was made between Prime Minister Mollet and Chancellor Adenauer in 
early 1957 and the Treaty establishing the EEC was signed in Rome on 25 March of the same year. 
Part IV of the Treaty outlined the basic principles of association and an Implementing Convention, 
which included the details of the commercial and aid dimension, was attached. Although the inclusion 
of association into the European integration project was not framed in terms of development policy 
and the common fund remained formally separate, the association regime of the Treaty of Rome 
nevertheless constituted the forerunner of the common development cooperation. It represented a 
mechanism for promoting the transformation of a set of colonial ties into a multilateral set of 
relationships while preserving and continuing its basic features (Cosgrove Twitchett, 1978, p. 17; Grilli, 
1993, p. 1; Lister, 1988, pp. 10-3). Crucially, it added a third party, the EEC and its institutions, to an 
essentially French colonial/post-colonial policy. This not only established a complex tripartite 
relationship between the EEC, France and the francophone African states (Rempe, 2011), it also 
created a new set of actors who would develop diverging perspectives and autonomous resources. 
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Contestation over the EEC’s association continued after the Treaty of Rome, but it was 
complemented by additional actors from the EEC bureaucracy. While French officials saw the 
emerging common policy increasingly as a way of dealing with the pains of decolonisation, it was 
nothing with which the other member states wanted to be associated. Hence, the bureaucratic 
mission of the EEC in the lead-in to decolonisation needed to be acceptable both to the other member 
states and their common constituency, i.e., the African governing elites. It is in this way that the EEC 
Commission did not simply reproduce French policy but sought a contribution of its own and tried to 
avoid duplication by developing new ideas and activities (Cosgrove Twitchett, 1978, pp. 27, 36-41; 
Rempe, 2011, pp. 11-2). Although the EEC’s policy built on colonial legacies and relied predominantly 
on French expertise, manpower and networks (Dimier, 2006; 2014), over time, the Commission gained 
increasing autonomy from France. This was buttressed by the input from development technocrats 
from other member states, especially the Netherlands, and motivated by the determination of the 
German and Dutch governments to avoid the stigma of neo-colonialism. A key element of this 
autonomy was what later became the Commission delegations (since 2009, EU delegations), which 
provided the new organisation with independent representation and resources from the field (see 
below). This allowed for a discourse to emerge that saw Europe’s role as a mediator between post-
colonial national policies and a technocratic international bureaucracy, which was built on the 
justification of ‘being different’. 
From the mid-1950s onwards, the prospect of the inevitable decolonisation of Africa became 
common wisdom in Europe (Grilli, 1993, p. 6). The independence movements in Africa in the late 
1950s/early 1960s provided an opportunity for revising the European policy of association. While not 
having been consulted in the establishment of the association policy (Dimier, 2014, p. 14; Lister, 1988, 
p. 14), many of the newly independent states wished to keep their association status with the EEC, 
including its commercial and aid provisions, as they remained largely dependent on their former 
métropoles. This was despite opposition from movements such as Pan-Africanism. Thus, the 
Commission’s policy survived decolonisation as the new local African leaders accepted the EEC’s policy 
as a continuing relationship in the post-colonial era. A main reason for this were the strong personal 
ties and networks of primarily French, high-ranking Commission officials with African leaders and local 
authorities through which the Commission could strengthen its role as a development actor in the 
region that was independent of the member states (Cosgrove Twitchett, 1978, p. 35; Dimier, 2014, 
pp. 53-5). This became the backdrop against which other member state governments and officials in 
the Commission started to understand the Community’s purpose in development cooperation. 
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Community development cooperation evolved in parallel with member states’ constructions 
of development cooperation, which were mostly in reaction to the establishment of the OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 1960 (see also chapter 4). Over time, member states 
developed their own separate, distinctive national development policies based on their national policy 
priorities. Germany and the Netherlands assumed a globalist position with a broader perspective of 
development cooperation, which embodied their own policy norms, including their geopolitical and 
developmental concerns, and did not adapt to the regionalist Community-level development agenda 
(Grilli, 1993, pp. 59-60). 
Although decolonisation and constitutional turmoil had changed the foundation of French 
policy towards the former colonies, ‘For Paris, […] the end of its colonial empire had not signified the 
weakening of its politics of national prestige, in favour of common European cooperation with the 
developing world’ (Garavini, 2012, p. 49). However, the French grip on European policy was gradually 
reduced, which challenged the dominance on French development policy discourse at the European 
level. On the one hand, the Dutch and German demands for a globalist European development policy 
were reinforced when the negotiations with Britain for EEC membership in 1961/62 required thinking 
about how association with the Commonwealth might take place. The issues of independence of 
former African colonies and the prospect of accommodating Commonwealth countries required a 
new association agreement.6 On the other hand, the EEC Commission developed a degree of 
autonomy. The EDF, attached to and staffed by the Commission, represented a major innovation as it 
was sufficiently distinct from existing bilateral and multilateral aid institutions through its institutional 
entrenchment in the EEC Commission. Its aid procedures drew not only on French but also on more 
rigid and technocratic Dutch aid practices. This led to clashes with former French colonial 
administrators (Cosgrove Twitchett, 1978, p. 33; Rempe, 2011, p. 11). In the early 1960s, the 
Commission started to challenge French practice and proposed to untie EDF aid, which followed 
parallel discussion on the same topic in the DAC (Dimier, 2014, p. 64). The influence of European but 
especially French enterprises had been strong. While the untying of aid was rejected at that point, the 
Commission instead sought to increase control and oversight. Originally, it was forced to use experts 
and consultancy firms in the control of projects (which were sometimes even implemented by these 
firms in the first place). However, by the mid-1960s, the Commission had eventually established a 
                                                          
6 The association agreements are the Yaoundé Conventions I-II (1964-1975), Lomé Conventions I-IV-bis (1975-
2000), and the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and its revisions (2000-2020). The first Yaoundé Convention 
was concluded on 20 July 1963. 
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‘territorial delegation of control’ for EDF-funded projects by setting up a firm under Belgium law, 
which would become the delegations of the Commission (Dimier, 2014, pp. 74-5). Thus, the 
Commission has long relied heavily on technical consultants, which historically formed the basis of its 
delegations, later EU delegations. Institutional decision-makers depend on people and organisations 
who implement and oversee policies and require this input where administrative capacity is limited. 
The Dutch and German antipathy to association gave way to acquiescence as France 
continued to give association a high priority in dealings with the EEC (Cosgrove Twitchett, 1978, p. 
116) although their own national development policies advanced largely independent of it. However, 
the British bid to join the EEC refuelled the debate between ‘regionalists’ and ‘globalists’ (Garavini, 
2012, p. 152). Thus, the future of association became a contested topic during the (unsuccessful) 
British membership negotiations. This resulted in (interim) conventions, first the Lagos Convention of 
1966, which never came into force, and the Arusha Convention of 1969. It became evident that Britain 
was on the side of the ‘globalists’, promoting liberal trade principles, but it also pushed for non-
reciprocity of trade relations (Dimier, 2014, p. 81), making trade a more active means of development 
cooperation. This conflicted with the French system, which was designed to keep a closed market for 
its own firms shielded from competition and barriers to its commercial interests. On aid, Britain 
demanded more rational, impartial and transparent methods and suggested above all ‘programming’ 
based on needs, suggesting that poverty should be made the guiding principle for aid allocation (see 
chapter 5). This insistence was also motivated by getting as much out of the EDF for the 
Commonwealth countries as Britain contributed to the common fund. The Commission (1971) also 
took a position in the debate between the ‘regional’ view of France and the ‘global’ view, which was 
dominant in the Netherlands and Germany, when it asserted that existing development policy 
measures did not keep up with the Community’s growing international importance. 
 
‘Model’ of (global) cooperation? 
 
In their edited volume, Arts and Dickson (2004) capture the transition of European development 
cooperation from about 1975 to 1990 in their subtitle From model to symbol. While they and their 
contributors argue that this shift was largely incremental, a view that has been widely shared (Dimier, 
2014; Grilli, 1993), there had been crucial turning points, which offered windows of opportunity for 
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challenging the justification of Community policy. According to the former Director-General for 
Development Dieter Frisch (2008, p. 18), ‘benevolent paternalism was followed by a rather freer 
approach (It’s your money!) which gave way in turn to a more demanding approach.’ Some observers 
bemoaned that the unique European ‘model’ of international development was subsequently 
undermined by the Community’s alignment to World Bank policy rationales of effectiveness and 
conditionality (Brown, 2000; 2004). However, the justification for a Community policy, which was 
pushed forward by the Commission and partly supported by Britain in the early 1970s, was already 
aligned to global policies of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Bank. 
Instead, several member states began to challenge the justification of EU-level development 
cooperation due to its lack of effectiveness. While individual policies in practice often continued (see 
Ravenhill, 1985), the transition towards a global, developmental policy was desired by the ‘globalists’, 
including the British, and supported by the Commission, which began to see this policy almost as a 
foreign policy equivalent (Frisch, 2008). 
The first turning point in the justification of Community policy, away from a paternalist or 
client-based policy narrative, came in the late 1960s. According to Giuliano Garavini (2012), the 
turning point in development thinking was in 1968, which was characterised by shifts both at the 
international and at societal level. Among societal movements, there was a widespread perception 
that association and cooperation policies were based on Western economic imperialism. This was 
followed by events on the international level in the early 1970s. Following the oil embargo of the Arab 
members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) between October 1973 and 
March 1974, developing countries, through the non-alignment movement in the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), asserted their position with a proposal for a New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) (Garavini, 2012, p. 61). In this Cold War climate of ‘Third World 
nationalism’ and the non-alignment movement, the Community was forced to renegotiate its 
association policy as the prospect of British accession to the EC moved closer after the departure of 
Charles de Gaulle as France’s president. It had already been clear through the 1960s that with British 
accession, the established association regime would become untenable. Thus, a compromise had to 
be found as Britain joined the ‘globalist camp’. 
The gap that existed especially between Britain and France was used by Commission officials 
to promote their own narrative (Dimier, 2014, p. 105). After the oil and financial crisis, and de Gaulle’s 
brakes on integration, the Commission policy was ‘branded as a means to build, or rather, rescue 
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Europe’ (Dimier, 2014, p. 110). What became Lomé I was promoted as a Community policy, which 
explicitly differed from that of the member states and was unique in the world: It was poverty-
oriented as advocated by the World Bank, non-reciprocal as encouraged by the GATT, and included 
instruments such as the STABEX price stabilisation mechanism explicitly supported by partner 
countries through UNCTAD. While, in practice, changes were more limited than this radical narrative 
shift suggests, and cooperation policies may well have long continued to have a ‘clientelist’ 
connotation (Ravenhill, 1985), the Community drew its justification from principles of best practice at 
the international level, including demands from developing countries. To promote such a discourse, 
the Commission needed both Francophone and Anglophone African states to join forces and 
overcome the colonial partition. Hence, as in previous times, the Commission used its networks both 
in Brussels and among African elites, supported in part by British civil servants, and encouraged the 
elites in the associates to negotiate as a group (Cosgrove Twitchett, 1978, p. 79). 
The result was the first Lomé Convention in 1975 with the newly established group of (sub-
Saharan) African, Caribbean and Pacific states, the so-called ACP group. Lomé I became symbolic of a 
genuine, ‘more coherent, rational and ambitious policy of cooperation between Europe and the 
developing world’ (Frisch, 2008, p. 13) despite many continuities. However, this Community approach 
created its own dilemma. A notionally ‘freer’ approach of non-involvement became quickly politicised 
and drew public opposition. On the one hand, it drew opposition from the European Parliament (EP) 
and NGOs over the ‘Faustian bargain’ in the case of massive human rights abuses, such as those by Idi 
Amin of Uganda (Dimier, 2014, pp. 112-3). While prominent cases led to individual sanctions, it did 
not come with a systematic shift in either policy or narrative. There was a first attempt of the 
Commission to include a reference to human rights in Lomé II, which was based on a proposal by the 
British Labour government, but it was quickly abandoned (Arts, 2000, p. 99). Many member states 
seemed to be comfortable with a situation in which they could maintain relations with countries 
through the Community that they could not maintain through bilateral relations due to hostile public 
opinion. On the other hand, the Community approach drew criticism over the lack of consideration 
for effectiveness, efficiency and evaluation. Efficiency became the main argument of those who 
criticised Community development cooperation from the early 1980s onwards, such as the British 
government after the Conservatives returned to power with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s 
concern for ‘value for money’ (Dimier, 2014, p. 142). This was also supported by other Community 
institutions, especially the EP and the European Court of Auditors (van Reisen, 1999, p. 105). 
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Public concerns over human rights were therefore complemented by growing concerns over 
the effectiveness of cooperation. According to Frisch (2008, p. 18), the turning point came around 
Lomé III, and the reason was a growing international concern for effectiveness, based on the 
observation that official development aid in general, and the project approach in particular, did not 
produce the expected results. Development policy norms shifted at the global level in favour of 
conditionality and general multilateral trade liberalisation, devised in and spread from the Bretton 
Woods institutions to improve aid effectiveness (Brown, 2000; Dickson, 2004; Hilpold, 2002; Ravenhill, 
1985, p. 42). Several European member states supported this shift. In Britain, Germany and the 
Netherlands there had already been an adjustment to the dominant discourse in favour of promoting 
more rigorous, standardised evaluation practices. While this was presented as ‘depoliticising’ 
cooperation, the Commission and more regionalist-oriented member states highlighted the ‘a-
political’ nature of Community development cooperation to conserve a narrative of Lomé as a 
benevolent and unconditional ‘model’ of North-South relations (Arts, 2004; Dimier, 2006; Frisch, 
2008; Grilli, 1993, p. 37). 
The perceived resulting sluggishness of adaptation to changing external circumstances led to 
frustration and suspicion among more globalist-minded member states, i.e., Britain, the Netherlands, 
Germany and Denmark. Instead, these countries looked to bilateral and other multilateral channels 
to deal with external development cooperation challenges such as the African economic and debt 
crisis (Grilli, 1993, p. 39). Thus, the shift in Community policy narrative came eventually with Lomé IV 
and the end of the Cold War when efficiency, as promoted primarily from within the World Bank, 
came to the heart of European policy. 
 
 
II Between efficiency and effectiveness 
 
The end of the Cold War was not only a significant event in world history. It also offered the 
opportunity for fundamentally changing the basis of development cooperation: It allowed donors to 
reconsider the grounds of aid-giving as they were absolved from the political considerations of the 
Cold War. This also played a role for international institutions, which were eager to present rationales 
for aid that seemed less politically-motivated and more ‘objective’ (see, for example, World Bank, 
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1992). Simultaneously, European integration went through major changes, which culminated in the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1992. As a result, development cooperation became de jure a 
Community competence. Competences were ‘shared’ between the level of the Community and the 
member states. This meant that a single EU structure for delivering aid and development cooperation 
through the supranational Community level was created in parallel to the national development 
policies of the member states. These changes opened a window of opportunity for re-evaluating the 
EU’s role in development cooperation vis-à-vis the member states. While especially the in the 
Commission, joined by France, officials understood these changes as a chance to expand the EU’s role 
in terms of coordination, other actors, especially in Britain, but also in Denmark and, after the 1995 
enlargement, in Sweden raised efficiency concerns that challenged the Community’s operation in 
development cooperation. This section thus traces how Community development cooperation 
evolved after Maastricht, paying attention to the role of various actors who subsequently joined the 
debate. 
 
Efficiency and new public management 
 
Political conditions were formally introduced in all Community development policies from the early 
1990s onwards, but their introduction had been foreshadowed in the 1980s. The Northern 
enlargement (Sweden, Finland and Austria) in combination with the end of the Cold War buttressed 
this shift towards the political aim of conditionality in Lomé IV, notably respect for human rights, 
democracy and ‘good governance’. Officials in Spain and later in Austria saw this as an opportunity of 
reallocating financial resources to Latin America and Eastern Europe, respectively. Sweden had long 
implemented such policies domestically. There was also support for these political elements within 
the Commission. The increasing pressure to introduce ‘political’ elements in the Community’s 
development policy came with calls for standardising cooperation, i.e., putting it on ‘objective’, 
measurable and rational criteria (Brown, 2004, pp. 28-9). This effectiveness narrative emerged as the 
dominant international justification for development cooperation from the early 1990s onwards. The 
focus on wider conditions was in line with international discourses, especially from the World Bank 
(1992), which based its legitimacy and bureaucratic authority on significant research and network 
capacities, including recruiting and co-opting its critiques in NGOs and top-tier universities. In 
comparison, there had only been sporadic attempts by officials to involve external experts and 
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academics in the Community (Dimier, 2014, pp. 151-3). Thus, adjusting to these international 
standards represented a further step towards ‘rationalisation’ of the EC bureaucracy. Almost 
paradoxically, the introduction of political conditions was presented as depoliticising Community 
cooperation. 
While the EU began to act more openly as a political actor through forms of cooperation that 
were introduced in Maastricht, i.e., the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the justification 
of the EU’s role in development became increasingly dependent on managing policies effectively. 
Against the background of increasing demands for effectiveness, the Commission promoted 
coordination and complementarity as a contribution to the effectiveness of European development 
policy due to the incrementally grown, fragmentary relationship between the Community and its 
member states:  
From a Community point of view, collaboration between the European institutions and the Member 
States on the design, monitoring and thrust of their operations, which is increasingly seen as a sine qua 
non of effectiveness, has not been close enough to give Community ODA the image of a concerted, 
consistent and efficient policy. (European Commission, 1992, p. 7, emphasis in original) 
The Maastricht Treaty, for the first time, institutionalised an EU role through a Community mandate 
to ensure complementarity of development cooperation within the EU, and the Commission was 
assigned to promote coordination (Hoebink, 2004a; Loquai, 1996). While it was the Dutch who had 
pushed for the introduction of these provisions into the Treaty, as part of the so-called ‘Maastricht 
Cs’, complementarity, coordination and coherence (Hoebink, 2004a, p. 2), it was primarily a coalition 
of Commission officials, joined by France, who promoted coordination. The Maastricht provisions and 
the new Community competences tempted the Commission to strive to promote ‘a sort of functional 
integration’ (Carbone, 2013a, p. 345) by suggesting the transition towards a single policy by 2000 
(European Commission, 1992). French officials joined the Commission in its support for coordination 
as they saw the need for strengthening a particular European vision on development issues in 
opposition to some of the existing Bretton Woods policies, particularly in the field (Hoebink, 2004a, 
p. 6). However, this was met with suspicion in several member states, which remained unwilling to 
cede control over their national policies, potentially (again) to the domination of France (Holland, 
2002, p. 172; Orbie, 2012, p. 26). Outside these bureaucratic circles only few observers initially picked 
up these provisions, more prominently the European Centre for Development Policy Management 
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(ECDPM) (e.g., Loquai, 1996), a Maastricht-based think tank, which has continuously emphasised its 
distinctive (African-)European focal point in contrast to other European development think tanks. 
Hence, in practice, the Commission’s enthusiasm was quickly exhausted when it became 
evident that its arguments for integration based on effectiveness could not convince member states. 
In the post-Maastricht climate of increasing suspicion of the Commission, the general willingness of 
member states of pooling competence, resources and authority centrally with the Commission in 
Brussels was limited. Instead, a majority of member states stressed the importance and autonomy of 
bilateral development policy from an increasingly dysfunctional Commission policy (Holland, 2002, p. 
172), which became the target of criticism based on a lack of efficiency and effectiveness of its own 
policies. Criticism came from within the EU institutions (European Court of Auditors, 1997), other 
international organisations (OECD, 1998), and member states. Especially British actors were 
particularly outspoken (International Development Committee, 2000; Short, 2000, see also chapter 
5). The argument was that the Commission was struggling to manage its own policy. Programming 
was criticised as slow, aid disbursement lagging, and monitoring insufficient. In this situation, 
coordination would remain out of question as long as the Commission had not brought its own house 
in order. A patchwork of hardly-coordinated European policies remained and the resulting layering of 
objectives and procedures horizontally between policy areas and vertically with and among member 
states left the Commission struggling with the complex task of fulfilling its overburdening role 
(Dearden, 2003, pp. 106-7). 
Within this patchwork, the justification of a distinct Community policy became increasingly 
contested as especially British political elites sought to answer to their constituency what the value-
added of Community policy was. In effect, however, much of the criticism towards the Commission 
was geared towards its inefficiency and cumbersome management practices that led to a significant 
backlog of outstanding commitments (see, for example, International Development Committee, 
2000). This was at odds with a general conviction inside the Commission to be seen as a potent policy 
entrepreneur:  
Adjustment in the implementation of developing policy is also required at the operational level with a 
view to increasing the effectiveness of aid. This would be done by streamlining aid instruments, 
promoting sector-wide approaches, increasing decentralisation and devolution of responsibilities, and 
seeking complementarity with the Member States and other donors. To do this the Commission intends 
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to further strengthen its efforts in coordinating its activities with Member States. (European 
Commission, 2000, p. 6) 
As a reaction to its own aid coordination crisis, this initially required demonstrating the ability to 
reform its own aid management. Consequently (and as part of the general reaction to the failure of 
the Santer Commission), the Commission embraced the new management narrative and embarked 
on a bureaucratic reform process to maintain its bureaucratic authority (Levy, 2006), also in 
development cooperation (Dearden, 2003; Grimm, 2006; 2008). Following this reform, the 
Commission’s aid bureaucracy – since 2001 DG Development and Relations with ACP States (DG Dev), 
and EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AIDCO) – emerged as a central actor and policy entrepreneur in 
development cooperation. The 2000 reforms also came with so-called ‘deconcentration’ by which the 
delegations were given more autonomy in the programming process to reduce bureaucratic 
processes, which were seen as slow, cumbersome and ineffective (Dearden, 2003; 2008). However, 
increasing pressures to introduce audit, evaluation and accounting measures simultaneously reduced 
the autonomy of the delegations (Dimier, 2014, pp. 205-6). Nevertheless, these managerial reforms 
seemed sufficient to reassure also more critical member states, including Britain and Germany (see 
chapters 4 and 5). 
 
‘Federating’ development policy 
 
The UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of 2000 heralded a discursive surge of effectiveness 
in contrast to the narrower concept of managerial efficiency. With the goals’ clear focus on defined, 
measurable outcomes, they were not primarily about efficient management but about the 
effectiveness of aid, i.e., the extent to which aid contributes to achieving these targets. The MDGs 
focused on extreme poverty and basic service provision. This narrow focus on poverty eradication 
brought back ‘need’ as a relevant criterion for aid allocation. However, the previous reallocation of 
resources to Latin America and Eastern Europe, and to the support for democratisation, were unfit 
for the shorter-term view of the MDGs. Instead, Europe’s main recipients by then were less poor 
countries closer to ‘home’. Thus, as there was hardly more money available, the urgency and clear 
sense of direction that came with the MDGs offered an opportunity of promoting coordination by the 
EU in the interest of aid effectiveness and eventually led member states to accept and even promote 
coordination initiatives of the Community. Thus, from the early 2000s onwards, even the traditionally 
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more critical member states expressed more sympathy for the Commission’s initiatives of increasing 
coordination and institutionalising measures for increasing aid effectiveness (see chapter 3). 
In this context, the Commission drew on wider societal support, their public contribution and 
endorsement, and inclusive network interactions. Already in its overarching 2000 Communication the 
Commission suggested that  
In elaborating the present statement, the Commission has benefited from comments and suggestions 
made by stakeholders in civil society, multilateral development agencies, NGOs, private sector, during 
a preliminary consultation process. (European Commission, 2000, p. 5) 
In contrast to other member states, such as Britain, the Commission did not have a domestic 
constituency on whom it could rely for political support. While the European Parliament was seen by 
staff in the Commission as an ally (Hoebink, 2004b, p. 50), it was still eager to increase its own 
institutional power. Moreover, the standardisation and professionalisation of development 
cooperation had subsequently eroded the capacity of Commission officials to maintain their personal 
networks with African political elites (Dimier, 2014, p. 161; see above). It is in that time that networks 
of actors shifted as more actors sought to become involved. It was only from the early/mid-2000 that 
the Commission’s bureaucracy was able to incentivise and strengthen a transnational network on 
whose expertise, legitimacy and advocacy it could subsequently draw. 
The EU institutions had engaged with Civil Society Organisation (CSOs) since the 1970s 
through participatory policy frameworks and support schemes which focused on their participation in 
Community programming. The Commission only started a systematic, structured engagement 
following the Communication on the participation of non-state actors in EC Development Policy 
(European Commission, 2002). Subsequently, when the original NGO-EU Liaison Committee7 was 
dissolved after some controversy in January 2003 (Carbone, 2008b, p. 245), DG Dev established a new 
umbrella organisation, the Confederation of European NGOs for Relief and Development (CONCORD). 
Its purpose was to provide a more structured access to and engagement of CSOs, e.g., through the 
Commission’s system of expert groups (since 2005), ensure EU-level civil society representation and 
avoid duplicating efforts, and to become a hub of policy networks from the member states. The 
Commission has since supported CONCORD financially and institutionally. At the same time, 
                                                          
7 Established in 1975 and usually known by its French acronym, CLONG, it represented European NGOs, grouped 
in national platforms, before EU institutions (see Carbone, 2008b). 
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CONCORD is the principal public ‘watchdog’ for European development cooperation, including the 
Commission, the delegations and the member states. It names and shames what it considers to be 
problematic in the EU’s development cooperation and related policies (especially with regard to 
coherence). Other input came from think tanks and researchers. Again, most organisations and 
association had been around for some time at that point. ECDPM, for example, had been founded in 
1986 but became more involved. One example of the increasing public expert engagement was the 
series Studies in European Development Co-operation Evaluation, which was commissioned by the 
combined evaluation bureaus of the European Commission and several EU member states (Hoebink, 
2004c). 
In the years following the UN Millennium Declaration, the Commission’s initiatives linking 
donor coordination to enhancing effectiveness (see chapter 3) became recognised as a major 
achievement (Carbone, 2007; 2008a; Grimm, 2006; 2008; Orbie and Versluys, 2007; 2008). It received 
global momentum when it became an integral part of the global discourse in the early/mid-2000s. 
This happened because the international community began debating the means of achieving the 
MDGs with a focus on donor governance. Following the first UN Financing for Development 
conference in Monterrey, Mexico, in 2002, the donor community represented in the OECD-DAC 
dominated the debate. Concerns about overcoming aid fragmentation initially dominated in the 
subsequent OECD’s series of High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness. The international agenda started 
off with a general consensus on principles for aid effectiveness, especially harmonisation, outlined in 
a declaration in Rome in 2003. The Commission, itself a member of the DAC, learnt to play a crucial 
role in these international deliberations because it was able to facilitate pre-coordination of member 
states positions (Carbone, 2007; Holland, 2008). Following the Commission’s initiative in 2004, 
member states agreed to establish an Ad Hoc Working Party on Harmonisation in order to translate 
the Monterrey Consensus into practice (Council of the European Union, 2004c). The outcome of this 
Working Party was the EU’s coordinated position for the Second High Level Forum (HLF), which took 
place in Paris in late February/early March 2005 (Council of the European Union, 2004b). The outcome 
of this meeting, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, reflects much EU input (Carbone, 2007; 
Holland, 2008). The Paris Declaration established a roadmap to improve the quality of aid and its 
impact on development. It established several principles of aid effectiveness, i.e., ownership of 
developing countries over their own strategies for poverty reduction, alignment of donors with local 
systems, harmonisation of donor policies, focus on results, and mutual accountability between donors 
and partners. 
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Within the discursive environment of aid effectiveness, the ‘European Consensus on 
Development’ (European Parliament, et al., 2006) became the first instance whereby member states 
agreed on common development policy norms for all European development policies (Carbone, 2007, 
p. 56). The agreement constituted a political commitment to align all development policies within the 
EU to a ‘common vision’ without full delegation of policy authority to the supranational level 
(Carbone, 2010; Orbie, 2012, p. 20). This largely declaratory ‘vision’ was complemented by an 
operational ‘aid effectiveness package’, consisting of a set of Commission Communication (European 
Commission, 2006a; 2006b; 2006c). On the one hand, this package was intended to improve EU-level 
aid delivery. On the other hand, it promoted a common framework for the programming of aid with 
the member states, including joint programming, to operationalise the Paris principles on aid 
effectiveness, especially ‘harmonisation’ and ‘alignment’. The key elements of this package were the 
harmonisation of procedures between donors, coordination of policies, alignment with partner 
countries’ multiannual programming cycles, and synchronisation of member states and Commission 
multiannual programming processes. It was in this way that the EU came to be seen as a ‘federator’ 
of European development cooperation (OECD, 2007, p. 12), which also became widely shared and 
promoted among researchers and NGOs in Europe (e.g., Corre, 2009; Orbie and Versluys, 2007). 
However, such a ‘federating role’, as the OECD’s peer review first called it (2007, p. 12), where 
aid policy approximation occurs through flexible, voluntary and decentralised initiatives (Carbone, 
2007, p. 31; 2008a; OECD, 2012, p. 22), became quickly challenged. While member states’ scepticism 
towards each other and the common institutions increased during the economic and financial crisis, 
it was the role of development cooperation in the EU’s external action which was mostly up for 
contestation. Coordination of development cooperation was one way of keeping Europe’s influence 
alive locally and on the international level. Yet, simultaneously, among EU member states, 
institutional actors and observers there were calls for institutions that represented a real foreign 
policy of the EU (Biscop and Andersson, 2008). Thus, development cooperation did not need to be the 
Union’s quasi foreign policy. While there had been attempts at coordination of foreign policy since 
1970 (see Pijpers, et al., 1988), the EU’s role in the world continued to be heavily driven by 
development cooperation. Yet foreign and security concerns increasingly overshadowed 
development cooperation within the EU’s institutions. This was enhanced by the seeming reduction 
of development cooperation to objective management operations and the reluctance of subsequent 
development commissioners. Instead, issues of political salience, which became openly debated in 
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increasingly sophisticated institutional arenas, began to overshadow contestation about the EU’s role 
in the world. 
 
 
III Security, impact and comprehensiveness 
 
With the increasing prominence of an explicit foreign and security policy, and since 1999, defence 
policy, the effectiveness of the EU’s role in the world through development cooperation has become 
fundamentally challenged. After Maastricht, a comprehensive European foreign policy remained a 
long-term vision. The EU’s external action consisted of its commercial policy, Council decisions such 
as sanctions, and Commission-driven cooperation in developing countries. Supranational 
competence, common funds, and representation on the ground and at the international level lay with 
the Commission. The frustration over Europe’s failures in conflicts in the Balkans during the 1990s 
empowered a policy community of European security actors pushing for a strategically oriented 
mobilisation of the EU’s external capacities (Cornish and Edwards, 2001; 2005; Edwards, 2006; 
Matlary, 2006; Meyer, 2006; Whitman and Haastrup, 2013). 
Security cooperation, for instance, in areas of crisis management and peacekeeping, had 
emerged outside the EU framework and was formally incorporated only in the late 1990s. This brought 
new European actors to the foreground when the 1999 Cologne Council appointed Javier Solana as 
the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy to help advance both the CFSP and, 
in particular, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Not much later, international terrorism 
and concerns over fragile states meant that member states began to share an urgency of security 
cooperation, which convinced them to promote stronger security overtones in Community policy. 
Solana’s European Security Strategy (ESS) made this clear when it stated that ‘Security is a 
precondition for development’ (2003, p. 2), heralding a discourse of ‘securitisation of development’ 
(Bergmann, 2018; Grimm, 2014; Keukeleire and Raube, 2013; Youngs, 2008). Thereafter, proponents 
pushed development cooperation as a means of enhancing European security through supporting 
fragile states (Council of the European Union, 2007b; 2008; European Commission, 2003; European 
Council, 2003). Failing and fragile states came to be perceived as breeding grounds for terrorism and 
other security threats to Europe. From Afghanistan/Pakistan the focus soon spread to the area 
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stretching from West Africa over Mali and the Central African Republic to the Horn of Africa/East 
Africa (Bagoyoko and Gibert, 2009; Olsen, 2015; Orbie and Del Biondo, 2015). 
While this form of ‘securitisation’ was challenged by the Commission, Commission officials 
themselves advanced security on the EU agenda. Development professionals in the Commission also 
pushed the link to security cooperation and sought to ‘frame’ security aspects as a component of its 
development cooperation (Sicurelli, 2008). Under Louis Michel, Commissioner for Development and 
Humanitarian Aid from 2004 to 2009, the Commission’s discourse on development cooperation 
became more political to preserve and possibly expand its autonomy in strategic policy-making. 
Especially in Africa, the EU attained additional policy options, including on security-related matters, 
but compartmentalisation persisted (Carbone, 2013b; 2013e; Olsen, 2008; Sicurelli, 2010). Sub-
Saharan Africa emerged as the focal point for its engagement. The African Peace Facility (APF) became 
symbolic of the Commission’s ambition (Carbone, 2013e). Funded by Commission-administered 
funds, the APF was established in 2004 and constitutes the main source of funding to support the 
efforts of the African Union (AU) and African Regional Economic Communities around peace and 
security. Consecutive policy proposals on an EU Africa policy (European Commission, 2005a) and an 
EU policy on fragile states (European Commission, 2007b) stressed the role of development for 
security, pushing to mainstream development in all EU external action, and improving coordination 
and coherence with the member states. 
That the Commission was ‘losing’ this discursive competition became clear with Lisbon. Failing 
or fragile states and the potential threat that they pose became the current topic, a discourse to which 
the Commission had also contributed. Subsequently, effectiveness has become understood among 
the top levels of the EU institutions as the EU’s impact in third countries (see chapter 3), which was 
to be achieved by better management and alignment of all its external means. Lisbon was the attempt 
to put a managerial fix to the way in which these means were aligned within the EU’s institutional 
system. The reforms of the Lisbon Treaty came with changes in the management structures and in 
the set-up of actors at the institutional core, especially the emergence of new actors with 
responsibility for development cooperation, i.e., the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) and a diplomatic service, the 
European External Action Service (EEAS). The Lisbon reforms meant that tasks previously exclusively 
FEDERATING EU DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION? 
72 
undertaken by the Commission were now shared.8 This situation required increasing contacts 
between Commission and EEAS staff. Especially at the beginning, there was a strong sense that 
information flows and coordination were hampered by rigid structures, inflexibility and bureaucratic 
rivalry between the two institutions, dominated by a ‘silo mentality’ to protect their own interests 
(Furness, 2012; Koenig, 2011). The EEAS capacity at a working level,9 both in terms of in-depth 
knowledge and human resources responsible for coordinating development cooperation was limited 
and required prioritisation, leaving the lead on development questions to the Commission. However, 
DG DEVCO – and its predecessors – had hardly been a cohesive actor (Carbone, 2007; Dimier, 2014). 
There have also been tensions both vertically between the working and political levels, and 
horizontally, which led to silos that were not overcome with Lisbon (Interviews DEVCO#1, #5; EP#5). 
Lisbon maintained the primacy of poverty eradication in its relations with developing 
countries. However, the EU’s subsequent efforts at increasing coherence of the EU’s (external) action 
by aligning all policy instruments at the EU’s disposal to overarching objectives were driven strongly 
by the HR/VP and the EEAS who pushed it in parallel to the Commission’s competing interpretations 
(Faria, 2014; Furness and Gänzle, 2017). At the highest political levels, observers thus perceived 
‘jealousies’ between the institutions, especially as the profile of the EEAS on development increased 
under Federica Mogherini while keeping a foreign policy orientation (Interviews DEVCO#1; EEAS#3; 
EP#4; PREP#1). In contrast, in some areas ‘the EEAS and the new DG DevCo have started to build a 
pragmatic working relationship’ (Furness, 2013, p. 123). The Lisbon Treaty made coordination 
between the EU member states and the institutions a legal obligation and the reallocation of 
competence from the Commission to the EEAS was aimed at integrating development cooperation 
into a more comprehensive EU foreign policy system. The institutional reforms further empowered 
                                                          
8 The Council Decision of July 2010 provided the EEAS with competences in development cooperation by 
transferring developing country desks to the EEAS and giving it co-responsibilities for the first stages of the 
development programming process (Council of the European Union, 2010a). The head of the EEAS, Catherine 
Ashton, followed by Federica Mogherini in 2014, was given responsibility for ensuring coherence of the EU’s 
external action, including development cooperation. Nevertheless, the Development Commissioner Andris 
Piebalgs (2010-2014) and since 2014 Neven Mimica, maintained overall responsibility of development 
cooperation. This involves setting EU development goals and priorities, ensuring that the EU delivers on its aid 
commitments, and working with national governments to make the EU’s development cooperation more 
effective. Managing the implementation of the EU’s external aid instruments, financed by the EU budget and 
the European Development Fund (EDF), remained within the responsibility of the Commission’s DG DEVCO. DG 
DEVCO has also remained responsible for fostering coordination between the EU and its member states and 
ensures the external representation of the EU in development cooperation (Directorate-General for 
International Cooperation and Development, 2015). 
9 The unit “Development Cooperation Coordination - VI.B.2” is responsible for EU development cooperation in 
the EEAS. It mirrors the tasks of DG DEVCO/A2. 
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those actors who wanted to see a stronger security focus. Some member states, particularly France, 
had already begun to promote security aspects in the EU’s relationship with developing countries on 
the political level, especially concerning the significance of tackling state fragility (Bagoyoko and 
Gibert, 2009, pp. 800-1; Olsen, 2015). However, immediately after Lisbon, HR/VP Catherine Ashton 
was preoccupied with setting up the EEAS, focused on CFSP and the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP), and left development cooperation largely aside in practice (Interview EEAS#4; Smith, 
2013b). At the same time, Commission President José Manuel Barroso sought to keep Commission 
competences untouched, including keeping the HR/VP out of development cooperation. 
In contrast, from 2014, the incoming HR/VP Federica Mogherini put more pressure on 
Commission policies, including through joint Communications (e.g., European Commission and High 
Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2015). Mogherini also 
had the support from the incoming Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker (2014, p. 3). 
Empowered in this way, EU institutional actors especially in the EEAS and other policy professionals 
in security think tanks such as the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) pushed jointly 
towards a discourse that challenged the pursuit of development cooperation for the sake of 
international development. As Nathalie Tocci from the EUISS remarked on the preparation process of 
the EU’s Global Strategy (EUGS) in 2016:  
The strategic planning division within the EEAS was a key asset in this process, as was the input of the 
top management of the EEAS. The EUISS played a critical role and was the natural hub to coordinate 
the public outreach and consultation dimension of the strategic reflection. (Tocci, 2016, p. 463) 
Simultaneously, Mogherini’s appointments of development experts to her cabinet, especially Felix 
Fernandez-Shaw, was seen to increase her credibility for shifting pressure on development 
cooperation away from particularistic Commission and member state interests to an institutional but 
securitised centre (Interviews DEVCO#1; EEAS#4; PREP#1). While the EU’s external policies had 
already been overtaken by the language of a ‘comprehensive approach’ (Council of the European 
Union, 2014a; European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, 2013), Federica Mogherini’s ‘Global Strategy’ (2016) made clear that 
Europe’s coherence in the form of an ‘integrated approach’ would define its effectiveness in the 
world. The EU’s Global Strategy, which Mogherini presented to the European Council on 28 June 2016, 
epitomised this discursive shift towards more strategic external action on the part of the EU. It has 
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been described as an instance of European ‘realpolitik’, which acknowledged the limits of the EU’s 
capabilities and the world’s intractability (Biscop, 2016). 
Mogherini prepared the EUGS to guide the EU’s global action, and to replace its predecessors, 
the ESS of 2003 and its Implementation Report of 2008 (Council of the European Union, 2008). The 
Global Strategy aimed at contributing to a joined-up EU external action in line with the spirit of the 
Lisbon Treaty by identifying and agreeing on a set of interests, priorities and goals as well as on the 
means to achieve them (Tocci, 2015). It was meant to provide the EU with the ability to make choices 
and prioritise in order to mobilise the instruments at its disposal (Mogherini, 2015b). In the strategic 
review of June 2015, which preceded the member states’ mandate for drafting the strategy 
(Mogherini, 2015a), the HR/VP had indicated her intention of ‘moving beyond a narrower “security” 
strategy and towards a broader “global” strategy that mobilised all the EU’s external action 
instruments’ (Tocci, 2015, p. 119). The strategic orientation presupposes a focus on protecting Europe 
and its citizens (Mogherini, 2015a; 2016). Mogherini’s push for a strategic orientation is a particularly 
significant instance of challenging the existing system of dependencies between policy areas, 
particularly EU development cooperation (while trade remained largely excluded). Against this 
background, the Commission suggested a new approach for a European development policy 
framework, replacing the European Consensus of 2006 (European Commission, 2016b). It sat between 
calls for challenging the guiding principles of European external action as identified in the Global 





The role of European integration in development cooperation has been contested from the very 
beginning. Drawing primarily on existing literature, this chapter has shown how policy norms for 
collective action have been advanced over time. Norm advocacy for collective European action in 
development cooperation goes back to the early days of integration. Initially, these norms reflected 
mainly French officials’ ideas of how collective action benefits – or even enables – the France’s 
participation in the Common market. However, early on, norm advocacy became a more contested 
process in which multiple actors competed over the purpose of collective action. Especially the newly 
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empowered Commission officials sought transnational support for their advocacy of a distinctive 
European cooperation policy. The result was a parallelism of European and national processes for 
norm construction guiding development cooperation. 
The transnational dimension of policy professionals and issue specialists has mattered 
because these professionals have been able to engage across different institutional and discursive 
contexts in joint norm advocacy. Despite the high politics at the beginning and occasional 
intergovernmental bargaining, international development remained a field for policy specialists who 
engaged with various non-state actors, consultancies and researchers, other international 
bureaucracies, and African elites. This suggests that competition and contestation of collective action 
in Europe has never occurred purely between states and their representatives but as part of a wider 
process in which the organisation of the transnational has mattered. What started as a policy closely 
intertwined with French views became increasingly separate, requiring its own justification. 
Competition over this policy was reinforced with British membership. Common European policy 
norms increasingly followed global norm advocacy, also due to pressure from within, especially from 
the British. As a result, the distinctiveness of the Community in development cooperation became 
substantially challenged. A growing awareness for and the dominance of a limited, efficiency-oriented 
understanding of effectiveness made a distinctive Community policy untenable in the eyes of several 
actors, especially in Britain, but also among other EU institutions. Initially, this became evident over 
expectations for standardising management procedures and enhancing efficiency of aid operations, 
which challenged the Community role represented by the Commission. 
The subsequent discussion over the EU’s added value led to a reformulation of the EU’s role 
as a venue for constructing common policy norms in development cooperation for the institutions 
and its member states. Global as well as internal shifts opened windows of opportunity for promoting 
norms for collective action that extended to the policies of the member states. The dominant driver 
for such all-EU norms was ‘effectiveness’. While especially British officials initially emphasised 
efficiency within the EU institutions, the Commission’s transnational norm advocacy shaped the global 
discourse on effectiveness in the early/mid-2000s with a focus on harmonisation. Shaping the 
discursive competition over the framing of effectiveness has been key as the framing offered a 
discursive justification for subsequent norm advocacy. The Commission tied common policy norms to 
the evolving international understanding on ‘effectiveness’ – which will be investigated more closely 
in the following chapter. However, that such a discursive frame is not stable but permanently subject 
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to contestation has been suggested in the last part of this chapter. This final part has shown how 
development cooperation became subsequently challenged from within European foreign and 
security policy communities. 
By tracing the evolution of Community/EU development cooperation, this chapter has 
concentrated on the discursive competition over the role of European integration in development 
cooperation at crucial turning points rather than just on processes. By doing so, the chapter has 
illustrated how the discursive context becomes relevant for understanding what policy norms can be 
promoted and how they are promoted. The chapter also showed how EU policy norms were based on 
the participation of wider networks of actors, from the uploading of French priorities, based on 
discursive links with Belgium, Commission officials and Francophone African elites, to the subsequent 
reactions from different policy communities and their respective networks. 
These illustrations have suggested that different discursive environments allow actors to 
capitalise on them by drawing on discursive networks when they can adjust their narratives and 
arguments accordingly. Thus, more than just the legitimacy of their arguments, different discursive 
environments affect the interactions within the wider network across EU institutions, member states 
and civil society. To understand which ties between primary groups can be ‘activated’, and what the 
role and power of groups has been at different points in time, this chapter also introduced the relevant 
actors, their capacities, networks etc. in EU development cooperation. The chapter has highlighted 
the centrality of the ability of member state administrators to ‘use’ domestic pressures, arguments 
and advocacy. France, most prominently at the beginning of the common development cooperation, 
and Britain during its membership bid and again around 2000 have pushed other member states and 
EU institutions to accept their narratives by using domestic ties in a discursive network, which 
enhances, legitimises and promotes preferred norms. As a result, their advocated norms have become 
accepted (and even defended by those who initially opposed them) as they were picked up by wider 
networks. The extent to which the Commission could similarly advance common policy norms thus 
also depended on involving other actors. 
Finally, having provided an overview covering the ‘lifespan’ of common development 
cooperation, the chapter has demonstrated how ‘effectiveness’ emerged as the dominant discourse 
in EU development cooperation around which subsequent policy and institutional reforms revolved. 
Therefore, the subsequent discussion will focus on policy discussions about the effectiveness of 
European development cooperation since the early 2000s. 
 
 






Since the early 2000s, the ‘effectiveness’ of aid and development cooperation has been one of the 
most strongly contested discourses in international development among aid providers. The EU, as 
outlined in the previous chapter, has actively participated in this global discursive construction. At the 
same time, the EU has advocated policy norms for collective EU action as its contribution to the 
international efforts. The goal of this chapter is to identify how, in what ways and under what 
conditions policy professionals have contributed to these policy norms for collective action at the level 
of the EU. The EU level is relevant because it constitutes the central, institutionalised hub for 
transnational interactions of European development policy professionals. Thus, the chapter adds to 
the overarching research question how these actors contribute to the advocacy of policy norms for 
collective action between the EU institutions and the member states. 
This chapter looks in detail at the time from the early 2000s to the mid-2010s. Centrally, in 
this time, the EU advocated policy coordination as a norm to enhance effective development 
cooperation in Europe. Coordination of aid policies and the approximation of development 
cooperation practices has long been a central theme for European policy-makers, as well as for 
observers in think tanks and academia (e.g., Carbone, 2013c; 2017; Corre, 2009; Delputte and Orbie, 
2014; Klingebiel, et al., 2013; Klingebiel, et al., 2017; Lehtinen, 2003; Loquai, 1996; Orbie, 2003; 
Steingass, 2015). It was the European Commission which brought up the issue as early as the 1970s 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1971; 1972), and again in 1992 (European Commission, 
1992) and the early 2000s (see also chapter 2). While member states had previously tended to discard 
EU initiatives that promoted policy coordination and approximation, proposals of the mid-2000s 
generated some enthusiasm, also among academic observers (e.g., Carbone, 2008a; Orbie and 
Versluys, 2007). These proposals were anchored in international aid/development effectiveness 
principles of their time, i.e., ownership, alignment, harmonisation, transparency and accountability. 
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They were advocated based on their contribution to enhancing aid effectiveness and shaped the 
international discourse on effective development cooperation. 
Since then, the EU has formulated and re-formulated common policies, such as budget 
support, division of labour, joint programming, and a results framework, which stood in conflict to the 
interests and identities of many of the actors involved. Yet EU actors have promoted these common 
policies even at unfavourable moments when suspicion among member states had grown following 
the financial crisis, institutional rivalry increased among EU institutions after the Lisbon Treaty (see 
chapter 2), and coordination became less relevant as an international aid effectiveness principle 
especially after 2011 (Keijzer and Lundsgaarde, 2016). Nevertheless, the Commission’s 
Communication on the revision of the ‘European Consensus on Development’ sought to keep the 
narrative alive:  
Given its broad policy scope, the objective of contributing to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda 
in developing countries can best be met through enhancing coordination of the development 
cooperation policies of the EU and its Member States. (European Commission, 2016b, p. 3) 
Thus, while coordination has persistently been advocated at the EU level, the environment, both 
institutionally and discursively, changed significantly. 
This chapter traces individual articulations of common policy norms for effective EU 
development cooperation. The purpose of this approach is twofold: First, it shows which actors 
participate in EU norm advocacy and how they promote certain formulations against competing 
narratives. Second, it shows how changing understandings of ‘effectiveness’ informed and benefitted 
competing arguments over policy norms at the EU level that aimed at policy approximation. The 
chapter thereby closely follows the efforts and interactions of Commission officials who facilitated 
the formulation of coordination initiatives, especially the EU’s proposed programme coordination 
(joint programming), across changing institutional and discursive environments. In three steps, this 
chapter looks at the processes of contestation of coordination. The first section (I) looks at how 
effectiveness and coordination became connected in the Commission’s development policy discourse. 
The second section (II) analyses how and on what grounds this discourse became challenged, which 
opened a window of opportunity for other EU policy norms. Against the background of these 
challenges, the third section (III) analyses how the Commission actively continued to promote and 
advance common policy norms for collective EU action. This last section draws mainly on the example 
of joint programming. 
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I Coordination and effectiveness 
 
The Commission had suggested enhancing the coordination of European development policies several 
times and it had justified these proposals with increasing the effectiveness of development 
cooperation (see chapter 2). The UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of 2000, which codified 
efforts from among donor countries in the OECD-DAC to establish a set of concrete development 
objectives that could be measured and monitored over time, provided another opportunity. The goals 
created an anchor both for donors to showcase progress due to their efforts but also for third 
countries and civil society to hold donors accountable and demand action. Despite high-level pledges, 
the conclusion of the MDGs was not followed by a significant increase in development aid to the 
reiteratively promised 0.7% of GNI as was considered the minimum necessary to achieve the targets 
set, but it reversed the declining trend of development aid during previous decades (Orbie, 2003, p. 
396). Yet another priority of the international community subsequently gained traction: improving 
the quality of aid. 
Following the conclusion of the MDGs, an international process was set in motion to mobilise 
the necessary resources. The first major step was the International Conference on Financing for 
Development, held in Monterrey, Mexico, in 2002. In preparation for this conference, on 14 March 
2002, the European Council in Barcelona made eight commitments on development cooperation. The 
first two of these so-called ‘Barcelona commitments’ were enhancing 1) aid quantity through 
increasing public spending on aid, and 2) aid quality through enhancing intra-EU coordination and 
harmonisation (European Commission, 2004b). On aid quality, the European Council in Barcelona 
pledged to ‘Improve aid effectiveness through closer coordination and harmonisation, and take 
concrete steps to this effect before 2004’ (European Commission, 2004b, p. 3). This was considered a 
remarkable step towards ‘more Europe’ in development cooperation (Orbie, 2003, p. 399). This 
commitment to coordination was reiterated by the Greek EU presidency at the first High Level Forum 
on Harmonisation in Rome in February 2003, which addressed international concerns about aid 
fragmentation. Based on the international agreements of Monterrey and Rome, which were shared 
by the member states, the Commission promoted EU-wide coordination as one way of translating the 
commitments into practice. While the Commission had limited leverage over aid amounts, EU-wide 
coordination became its preferred agenda by explicitly connecting EU coordination and 
harmonisation to aid effectiveness. The Commission used the annual monitoring report of the 
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Barcelona commitments to promote this agenda, starting in 2004 (European Commission, 2004b). 
While member states remained at the level of (political) commitments, it had previously been 
impossible to commit them to an explicit EU agenda on coordination in development cooperation. 
Member states remained sceptical of the Commission, but they agreed to pursue this agenda 
further. Following the Commission’s initiative, on 27 April 2004, the member states in the Council 
agreed to establish an Ad Hoc Working Party on Harmonisation (AHWPH) to examine the 
Commission’s recommendations in a report with a view to putting the Barcelona commitment on 
harmonisation into practice (Council of the European Union, 2004c). In November 2004, member 
states partly pushed back against the Commission because the AHWPH’s report, adopted by the 
Council, cautioned against duplicating (coordination) efforts at the EU level where there was ‘already 
a high level of consensus at international level’ (Council of the European Union, 2004b, p. 30). Some 
member states stressed the commitment to the quantity of aid, whereas others preferred to focus on 
quality because they could not (yet) commit to these targets (Carbone, 2007, pp. 70-2). Nevertheless, 
the report took most of the Commission proposals on board to prepare the EU’s input into the Second 
High Level Forum which took place in Paris in 2005. The Council reconfirmed that:  
in line with the Council's commitment made in Barcelona in 2002, and in view of the preparation of the 
High Level Forum II in Paris 2005, the intention and willingness to adopt and implement concrete 
initiatives to encourage further co-ordination, harmonisation and alignment. In this context, the 
Council welcomes the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Working Party on Harmonisation. (Council of 
the European Union, 2004a, p. 20) 
This was significant as it legitimised the Commission’s connection between coordination and aid 
effectiveness. In addition, the member states in the Council acknowledged the prospect of 
implementing concrete operational tools for coordination and harmonisation, for instance joint 
multiannual programming, and other tools and instruments such as pooled funding, and direct and 
sector budget support (Council of the European Union, 2004b). Achieving a common position and 
suggesting concrete initiatives was paramount since the outcome of this Working Party was to 
become the EU’s coordinated position for the Second High Level Forum (HLF) in Paris in 2005. This 
was important if the EU wanted to maintain its influence on the international discourse. 
Alongside the international, i.e., the OECD-DAC objectives of operationalising the Paris 
commitments of 2005, the Commission tabled its own proposal. Following the bureaucratic reforms 
of 2000, the role of the Commission in development had become divided into an operational arm 
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(EuropeAid) and a conceptual arm (DG Dev). DG Dev needed to show that it had an added value in 
promoting issues internationally and not just duplicating or copying existing discourse. Its own role 
therein was yet to be defined, potentially ranging from something like an NGO, to a kind of European 
think tank, or what some observers called ‘OECD-isation’ (Orbie and Versluys, 2008). The Commission 
further strengthened the discursive link between EU coordination and aid effectiveness. This link 
provided it with the legitimacy to seek to enhance its own role as long as it could make the case that 
it was best placed for this task while avoiding any duplication of efforts. To gain support, officials in 
DG Dev sought to establish a more structured involvement of NGOs and other stakeholders, first, 
through a broad, public civil society consultation. The Commission initiated its first-ever public 
consultation for development cooperation in 2005. The resulting document was the ‘Report on the 
public consultation on the future of EU Development Policy’ (European Commission, 2005b). Based 
on the contributions of development policy professionals and stakeholders in meetings and 
submissions, the Commission concluded that there were two views on its role. The first view was that 
of a delivery agent (‘donor’). The second view saw the Commission as ‘an analytical organ rather than 
a delivery agent, able to define the European approach to globalization and development, as well as 
a promoter of harmonization and coordination’ (European Commission, 2005b, p. 23). 
A large share of respondents suggested that officials in DG Dev should not be reduced to an 
institutional promoter of intra-EU coordination. The report highlighted that participating policy 
professionals went beyond this role, stating that there is ‘wide agreement (59%) on the role the 
Commission should play in pursuing a common EU platform for development policy, rather than limit 
itself only to coordination and harmonisation of EU aid’ (European Commission, 2005b, p. 21). 
Importantly, the Commission highlighted that contributors pointed out the relevance of expertise for 
being an effective advocator of policy norms:  
There is a need, according to these contributions, to strengthen analytical capacity in the Commission. 
The World Bank has analytical leadership even in sectors where the Commission has a comparative 
advantage (e.g., infrastructure). Knowledge in the World Bank matters at least as much as financial 
resources. The Commission needs to become a “think tank” and a “policy leader”, reflecting, inter alia, 
on the vast experience it has developed as a donor as well as a “catalyst for change”. (European 
Commission, 2005b, p. 23) 
Against this background, the Commission entitled its initiative ambitiously, but provisionally ‘Brussels 
Consensus’ (Grimm, 2006), based on a suggestion made during the consultation process (European 
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Commission, 2005b, p. 23), as a European response to the ‘Washington Consensus’ of the Bretton 
Woods institutions. 
Coordination had become seen as a basic requirement for aid effectiveness. In the 
subsequently negotiated ‘European Consensus on Development’ (European Parliament, et al., 2006), 
coordination became part and parcel of EU policy. At the very beginning of the text, the common 
European policy document stated that ‘Our efforts at coordination and harmonisation must 
contribute to increasing aid effectiveness’ (European Parliament, et al., 2006, p. 1). This perception 
was not only shared among European development policy officials but also among politicians (e.g., 
European Parliament, 2006, p. 8) and researchers (Ashoff, 2004; Warrener and Perkin, 2005, p. 1). In 
particular with regard to researchers, the Commission embarked on a more structured approach to 
engage with research institutions from 2007, which responded to the ambition of Commission officials 
to enhance their capacity in dealings with member state representatives. This led to the first European 
Report on Development (ERD) in 2009 (Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 2009). In this 
context, the Commission asked for a better organisation of European development policy think tanks 
and research institutes. As a consequence, a group of the leading European development think tanks 
formed a network, the European Think Tank Group (ETTG), which was intended to facilitate 
engagement for the Commission but also to improve the institutes’ eligibility to attract funding 
(Interviews CON#3; TT#1; Bayne, 2013).10 Similarly, the Commission’s ambition to enhance expert 
engagement became the basis for the annual European Development Days (EDD), an international 
forum for development policy professionals and experts, which the Commission has hosted since 
2006. To justify the creation of such an event, the Commission argued that  
There is at present no event or moment that symbolises the analytical contribution of the EU in the 
development arena, nor an event or a moment that gathers all EU actors. Most political parties, unions 
or organisation have a moment of “cohesion”, for prospective thinking such as ‘summer universities’ 
or “weeks of their core theme”. Such an event or moment could serve to develop intellectual dynamism 
and confrontation, and gather various community actors in a sense of collectiveness around a common 
agenda. 
                                                          
10 These think tanks were initially the British Overseas Development Institute (ODI), the German Development 
Institute (DIE), the Spanish FRIDE (Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior) and the 
Dutch ECDPM. FRIDE ceased its activities on 31 December 2015 due to economic reasons and dropped out of 
the network. It was subsequently replaced by the French Institute for Sustainable Development and 
International Relations (IDDRI). 
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Starting in 2006 and onwards, it is therefore proposed to create annual “European Development Days”, 
as part of the strengthening of our collective input and the effectiveness of our actions. (European 
Commission, 2006a, p. 11, emphasis in original) 
This justification suggests that there was an ambition within the Commission to support its analytical 
capacity to strengthen cohesion in Europe. 
Coordination to enhance the effectiveness of EU external assistance had become part of many 
development policy documents of the time that were published by the Commission (2004a; 2004b; 
2005b; 2006a; 2006c). This illustrates how the narrative dominated the discourse but also how the 
Commission sought to advance its understanding within this wider discourse. Although effectiveness 
was not explicitly defined in any of these documents, coordination was a major component of the 
Commission’s ‘aid effectiveness package’ of 2006 to operationalise the EU commitments on 
effectiveness. While aid effectiveness had been characterised in Paris by multiple principles, the 
Commission’s operationalisations focused strongly on donor coordination, an objective based on the 
OECD’s aid effectiveness principle of ‘harmonisation’. One of the documents deals explicitly with the 
aspect of coordination:  
The effectiveness of aid will also depend on other important factors such as division of labour, 
complementarity and harmonisation. Everything must be geared towards maximising the sharing of 
information between all concerned and complementarity with the activities of Member States, other 
donors and multilateral agencies. Where possible, coordination should take place in the partner 
country in question. (European Commission, 2006c, p. 7, emphasis in original) 
The European Consensus had already given a clear indication of how coordination was going to be 
achieved, namely ‘by working towards joint multiannual programming’ (European Parliament, et al., 
2006, p. 6). The document also reiterated the Maastricht provision that assigned the Commission a 
role for promoting coordination (European Parliament, et al., 2006, p. 9). 
In its own public formulations, the Commission reiterated the link between joint 
programming, coordination and aid effectiveness, especially in its aid effectiveness package:  
Joint programming is part of the international movement which it sets out to invigorate. Where moves 
are already being made to introduce joint programming, European joint programming should be able 
to merge into that process, giving it new impetus through coordination and a joint European vision. 
(European Commission, 2006c, p. 10) 
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While EU coordination through joint programming was initially delayed, the aid effectiveness package 
was followed by the (voluntary) EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy in 
2007 to make EU and member states aid and development cooperation more complementary 
(European Commission, 2007a). The Commission justified the Code of Conduct as a contribution to ‘a 
more effective and efficient Europe’ (European Commission, 2007a, p. 3). The proposition for the 
Code of Conduct was endorsed by the member states in the Council as the EU’s common contribution 
in the run-up to the Third OECD High Level Forum in Accra, Ghana, in September 2008 (Council of the 
European Union, 2007a). While the EU’s provisions on division of labour were entirely voluntary, the 
Council’s position went beyond the pure commitments of the previous agreements as it established 
an EU-specific general operational framework for the division of labour between all EU donors, 
including far-ranging provisions on information sharing. When progress on division of labour turned 
out limited, in 2008, it was Louis Michel, European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian 
Aid, who launched an initiative to fast track division of labour, supported by Germany (see chapter 4). 
In each country, one of the EU member states or the European Commission was supposed to 
volunteer to act as a lead and supporting facilitators at country level to promote the fast tracking. 
At that point, as this section has suggested, the Commission had firmly established a discourse 
on policy harmonisation for aid effectiveness in Europe and, based on this discourse, advocated initial 
all-EU norms. The Commission’s public engagement in development cooperation, for instance, 
through public online consultation, the European Development Days (EDD), and the European Report 
on Development (ERD), was supposed to create a European, transnational policy community and 
network of development professionals to support the implementation of this discourse through 
transnational advocacy of the jointly agreed policy norms for coordination. However, this ‘new 
season’ of EU development policy (Carbone, 2008a) was about to be tested. 
 
 
II Effectiveness at the crossroads 
 
The Commission maintained its position on coordination and Commission officials pushed policy 
initiatives that were developed in the aid effectiveness package, especially joint programming. Yet 
these initiatives were associated more strongly with cost efficiency and impact to win, or maintain, 
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the support of the member states. This was because the discursive environment had significantly 
changed. Member states had become increasingly sceptical of EU-level coordination for the sake of 
aid effectiveness. 
Several events between 2009 and 2011 had a strong influence on development cooperation 
in Europe. First, the consequences of the financial crisis encouraged member state governments to 
favour a discourse of accountability to which the Commission reacted with increasing reference to 
cost effectiveness and efficiency. Second, there was a perceived lack of effect of what the Commission 
was promoting as EU policies, such as budget support, in the wake of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’. As a 
reaction, the Commission began to stress the EU’s impact in third countries, which allowed for a wider 
inclusion of different objectives for change in these countries. Third, the global aid effectiveness 
fatigue made it more difficult to refer to the international discourse in EU norm advocacy. Thus, 
maintaining the focus on donor coordination meant a break with the global discourse. At the same 
time, the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009 significantly altered the 
institutional context in which Commission officials reacted to these discursive shifts. While Lisbon 
made effective coordination of aid programmes a legal obligation for the EU and its member states, 
it also meant that new foreign policy actors, i.e., the HR/VP and the EEAS engaged in the competition 
over the purpose of coordination. 
 
Crisis of EU coordination? 
 
After 2009, EU efforts to coordination aid were challenged. The financial and economic crisis, the 
‘Arab Spring’, and global aid effectiveness fatigue (Keijzer, 2011) led actors to undermine the 
discursive link between coordination and aid effectiveness. These events and shifts opened space for 
various actors to challenge the role of the EU and the Commission, development cooperation as a 
policy instrument, and the conception of effectiveness of external assistance. At the same time, the 
willingness to agree to common policy norms declined among member state officials. Reluctance to 
coordinate policy was not only due to a general scepticism among member states; by early 2011, the 
‘euroskepticism sparked by the euro crisis has become an epidemic’ with rising self-interest of 
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member states fraying EU spirit, as a German weekly remarked.11 The coordination enthusiasm among 
development professionals also begun to pale as the Commission’s continued advocacy and ambitions 
became increasingly dismantled as an integration agenda. 
 
Table 1. Percent change of net ODA from EU-DAC donors over the preceding year 
EU-DAC members 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
Austria 18.3 15.4 -3.8 0.7 6.1 -14.3 8.8 -31.2 -14.0 
Belgium 19.6 -7.8 3.3 -6.1 -13.0 -13.3 19.1 11.5 13.4 
Czech Republic 29.3 11.4 2.5 -4.7 
     
Denmark -7.6 0.8 1.6 3.8 -1.8 -2.4 4.3 4.2 0.3 
Finland -18.7 -5.7 12.5 3.5 -0.4 -4.3 6.9 13.1 6.7 
France 4.6 2.8 -9.2 -9.8 -1.6 -5.6 7.3 16.9 2.9 
Germany 36.1 25.9 12.0 3.0 -0.7 5.9 9.9 -12.0 5.7 
Greece 10.8 38.7 6.3 -7.7 -17.0 -39.3 -16.2 -12.0 26.9 
Hungary 0.5 
        
Ireland 11.9 1.9 -4.5 -1.9 -5.8 -3.1 -4.9 -18.9 6.4 
Italy 20.2 14.2 -2.9 13.4 -34.7 33.0 -1.5 -31.1 2.2 
Luxembourg 7.7 -1.2 -1.1 1.2 9.8 -5.4 -0.3 1.9 1.8 
Netherlands 13.1 24.4 1.6 -6.2 -6.6 -6.4 2.2 -4.5 4.8 
Poland 42.6 16.8 -8.3 8.6 
     
Portugal 8.9 -16.1 -14.9 -20.4 -13.1 -3.0 31.5 -15.7 21.1 
Slovak Republic 26.8 23.3 -5.1 2.4 
     
Slovenia 25.3 21.1 -0.3 -0.6 
     
Spain 192.3 1.5 -20.3 3,7 -49.7 -32.7 -5.9 -1.2 19.4 
Sweden -31.1 36.8 11.0 6.3 -3.4 10.5 -7.1 7.4 3.9 
United Kingdom 8.4 3.2 1.2 27.8 -2.2 -0.8 19.4 14.6 24.1 
Source: OECD (2009-2017) 'Net Official Development Assistance from DAC and Other Donors'. Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris, available at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/ [retrieved 13 
September 2018]. 
                                                          
11 Spiegel Online, ‘European Disunion: Rising Self-Interest Frays EU Spirit’, 13 May 2011, available at: 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/european-disunion-rising-self-interest-frays-eu-spirit-a-
762403.html [retrieved 13 September 2018]. 
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Especially at the beginning of the debt crisis in the second half of 2008 and 2009, its 
management took up much attention and resources and diverted any sense of urgency away from 
development cooperation. Thus, national implementation of the Commission’s attempts of enhancing 
coordination on aid effectiveness principles was delayed and often half-hearted. As Niels Keijzer 
(2011) suggests, the financial and economic crisis also lowered the level of ambition among member 
state governments to agree on common positions in development cooperation so that previous 
positions on aid effectiveness could not be reproduced. The crisis reduced not only the willingness of 
member states to make development cooperation a priority but also their willingness to coordinate 
with each other as suspicion increased. Even where the economic impact was less severe as in 
Germany (see chapter 4), member states retreated towards more inward-looking perspectives on 
bilateral development cooperation, mostly driven by national interests and priorities (Koch, et al., 
2011). In addition, the financial and economic crisis put pressure on the aid budgets of multiple 
member states and increased pressure for showcasing accountability of aid budgets against the 
background of domestic cuts (see table 1; Holland and Doidge, 2012, p. 186). 
Despite the ‘shock’ at the height of the economic crisis, which occupied most political 
attention, the Commission continued to hold up aid effectiveness as a central principle of EU 
development cooperation and insisted on further operationalising the overarching EU-wide 
agreements of the mid-2000s. In April 2009, still under the responsibility of Commissioner Louis 
Michel (2004-2009), as part of a comprehensive campaign to tackle old and new development 
challenges, the Commission adopted an Action Plan (European Commission, 2009a; 2009b). The aim 
was to promote the Commission’s effectiveness as a donor and to assess and monitor the progress 
made in implementing the Accra outcome document (Accra Agenda for Action) at both headquarters 
and delegation level. With this plan, the Commission also tried to set an example for the member 
states to recommit to the previously established ambitious collective implementation of effectiveness 
principles, especially all-EU division of labour arrangements. 
The Commission justified its insistence with reference to the adverse effects of the financial 
and economic crisis on developing countries:  
In these times of crisis, neither developed nor developing countries can afford to pay the high price of 
fragmentation and lack of coordination, as is currently the case. […] A coordinated EU effort on the 
basis of common priorities will enhance the short-term positive impact of our action and ensure its 
FEDERATING EU DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION? 
88 
long-term sustainability. (European Commission, 2009b, pp. 6-7; see also European Commission, 
2010a, p. 2) 
The Commission supported this claim by referring to the concrete monetary cost of ‘non-Europe’ in 
development. To make this argument for cost effectiveness, the directorate-general responsible for 
development cooperation commissioned an expert study (Carlsson, et al., 2009). A first study was 
published in October 2009 to support the Council in adopting the EU Operational Framework on Aid 
Effectiveness:  
The purpose of this study therefore is to identify and present costs (overheads) associated with 
ineffective, fragmented aid, as well as potential savings in such transaction costs from further 
implementing basic aid effectiveness principles into European (EU and Member States) development 
cooperation. (Carlsson, et al., 2009, p. iv) 
The study, however, also indicated that such costs did not only affect third countries but donors 
themselves. Thereby, the Commission reacted to what it perceived as the concerns of the member 
states over cost effectiveness and efficiency when it stated that  
We also have an obligation to our own citizens, the taxpayers, to ensure that their money is accountable 
and used transparently. When society demands efficiency and effectiveness in all other matters of 
economy and finance, how could development cooperation remain on the sideline? (European 
Commission, 2009a, p. 3) 
Showing this was an explicit purpose of the study, as outlined in the terms of reference given by the 
Commission’s DG responsible for development cooperation. The terms specifically requested to 
‘elaborate specific European examples of where aid effectiveness principles have been applied and 
illustrate savings incurred by EU donors, in a balanced sample of countries’ (Carlsson, et al., 2009, p. 
v, emphasis added). 
In November 2009, the Council finally adopted the Commission’s Communication establishing 
an EU Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness, which further operationalised intra-EU 
coordination through more precise provisions on the division of labour (Council of the European 
Union, 2009). However, it needed the prioritisation from Sweden, which held the Council Presidency 
in the second half of 2009, that policy discussions on aid effectiveness intensified again (Keijzer, 2011, 
p. 5). The Council Conclusions pledged for a ‘strong EU commitment to aid effectiveness which is 
essential towards improved development results and enhanced poverty reduction’ (Council of the 
European Union, 2009), and builds on previous EU and international initiatives. This was also seen as 
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a step towards an EU contribution for the upcoming Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 
2011, which was going to take place in South Korea in late-2011. In preparation for this conference, 
the division of labour arrangements became more advanced. The Operational Framework on Aid 
Effectiveness was amended over the years 2010 and 2011 to include more precise arrangements on 
cross-country division of labour, but also provisions on mutual accountability and transparency, which 
had been less pronounced before (Council of the European Union, 2010b; 2010c; 2011b). All these 
developments suggest that the basis for promoting coordination as a common policy norm with the 
member states became more technical, which tended towards working-level interactions rather than 
more political advocacy. 
In November 2010, Michel’s successor since the second half of 2009, Development 
Commissioner Andris Piebalgs, published a Green Paper that put ‘high impact’ at its centre (European 
Commission, 2010b), and he invited stakeholders to submit contributions. While Piebalgs had 
previously considered reviewing the European Consensus (Interview TT#1), this more political 
advocacy for common EU policy norms in external action failed. Limited enthusiasm from member 
states suggested that some of them seemed ‘more inclined to support an EU wide strategy on support 
to inclusive growth and sustainable development, rather than a review of the Consensus’ (Secretariat 
of the ACP Group, 2010, p. 1). The ACP Group, which submitted its contribution via the Dutch think 
tank ECDPM, understood the Commission’s hesitancy within the changed political and institutional 
context:  
First in an age of austerity and with the EU budget under pressure there is a desire for EU and EC 
development assistance to be seen to be giving value for money. Secondly there is a “relatively” new 
European Development Commissioner who does not come from a development background but has a 
reputation for being an effective manager who wants to “set out his stall”. Thirdly it comes at a time 
when the Commission is eager to protect its unique engagement and contribution to development, 
particularly vis-à-vis the European External Action Service, while at the same time be seen to be giving 
EU leadership. Fourthly, the global development agenda is shifting and there is a need to reflect and 
refocus and this is one serious and early attempt by the EU to do so. (Secretariat of the ACP Group, 
2010, p. 1) 
In addition, the second termly revision of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement in 2010 and the 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, which took effect on 1 December 2009, especially the initiation 
of the EEAS, received more public and political attention. While this brought attention back to the 
EU’s external policies (Bartelt, 2012; European Commission, 2011a), it opened a window for different 
FEDERATING EU DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION? 
90 
policy communities, also from within the EU’s institutions, to challenge development cooperation 
with little voice from third countries. 
2011 saw a brief revival of the aid effectiveness discourse, following the EU internal 
bureaucratic reforms of 2010. The newly re-merged DG DEVCO, which again hosted strategic policy 
and implementation units,12 continued in the tradition of DG Dev and engaged in actively promoting 
all-EU coordination initiatives based on their contribution to aid effectiveness. The Commission’s 
outcome document following the consultation process, the Agenda for Change (AfC) (European 
Commission, 2011e), however, did not reconstruct the discourse from before the crisis, which societal 
actors had helped to advance. Crucially, the AfC identified that in Europe ‘Fragmentation and 
proliferation of aid is still widespread and even increasing, despite considerable recent efforts to 
coordinate and harmonise donor activities’ (European Commission, 2011e, p. 10, emphasis in 
original), a discourse, which was picked up by multiple societal actors across Europe thereafter (see 
below). 
Nevertheless, when the Commission went to the High Level Forum in Busan in 
November/December 2011, it did so with a limited EU consensus on how to contribute to the 
international effectiveness discourse. In its proposal for a common EU position, the Commission 
linked joint programming, coordination and aid effectiveness (European Commission, 2011f). The 
Council Conclusions presented joint programming as a central EU input to the international debate 
on aid/development effectiveness, stating:  
To further deepen the aid effectiveness commitments and strengthen development effectiveness, the 
EU will promote and support specific initiatives [including to] Implement joint programming at the 
country level to reduce aid fragmentation and promote harmonization. (Council of the European Union, 
2011a, p. 5) 
While the Commission was able to push the Council Conclusions prior to the High Level Forum to 
reflect this discourse on reducing fragmentation, the Commission also accommodated issues such as 
fragile and conflict affected states. With this mandate to promote aid effectiveness and to ‘show 
leadership’ in the fight against increased aid fragmentation and proliferation (Council of the European 
Union, 2011a, p. 12), EU institutional representatives went to Busan but seemed unprepared to be 
confronted with a largely changed international environment and a strengthened voice from 
                                                          
12 On 1 January 2011, the EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AIDCO) and the Directorate General for Development 
and Relations with ACP States merged to form Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid (DG DEVCO). 
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emerging economies (Mawdsley, et al., 2014). Thus, 2011 came to signify the demise of the global aid 
effectiveness discourse (Abdel-Malek, 2015; Keijzer and Lundsgaarde, 2016). This meant that 
effectiveness became less conducive as a discourse for advocating EU policy coordination. The debate 
at the conference in Busan largely side-lined the understanding of aid effectiveness, which DG DEVCO 
had forcefully promoted and drawn on before. 
 
New discursive environment 
 
In early December 2011, before the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan came to 
an end, it had become evident that the international environment of development cooperation had 
fundamentally changed (Abdel-Malek, 2015; Keijzer and Lundsgaarde, 2016; Mawdsley, et al., 2014). 
Busan revealed how the global aid architecture had changed between the first HLF in Rome (2003) 
and the fourth HLF in Busan through the emergence of new economic powers, especially China, and 
the proliferation of competing models of development cooperation, which offer more choices for 
developing countries (Carbone, 2013d). This also gave a stronger voice to third countries than at 
previous conferences. In Busan, donors aimed at integrating non-traditional providers of 
development finance into the global development architecture (CONCORD, 2012; Mawdsley, et al., 
2014), which provided developing countries with increasing agency and assertiveness vis-à-vis EU 
donors (Carbone, 2013a; Smith, 2013a). However, this environment enhanced the politicisation of 
intra-EU relations. Harmonising EU development policies against the background of strong economic 
and political interests of EU member states in emerging economies presented a challenge (Grimm and 
Hackenesch, 2012). This had already been indicated by the divergence of reactions among EU actors 
towards the emergence of China as a development actor in Africa (see Carbone, 2011). The EU was 
side-lined as its position, presented by the Commission, had not overcome resulting internal divisions 
(Carbone, 2013a; 2013d; CONCORD, 2012; Smith, 2013a). 
While participants de-emphasised ‘aid effectiveness’ and replaced it with a broader principle 
of ‘development effectiveness’, the attention of Western donors declined, and the bloc of EU actors 
turned out more fragmented than at previous occasions. The discourse on aid effectiveness lost 
proponents in the international development community as cross-cutting coalitions involving EU 
donors promoted competing discourses. This weakened the EU discursive network of professionals 
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who had previously promoted a common narrative linking coordination and aid effectiveness. 
Commission officials, together with development officials from Germany, continued to cherish 
improving coordination for aid effectiveness (see chapter 4). The ACP Secretariat supported this 
discourse as it had prominently highlighted the lack of coordination and reducing aid fragmentation 
in its position paper for Busan and therein called for better harmonisation of donor actions (ACP 
Secretariat, 2011). 
In contrast, other EU actors activated network relations outside the EU development policy 
core to promote competing discourses. First, development finance was acknowledged to come from 
multiple and very different sources. Various private and public, domestic and internationals financial 
flows ranging from remittances to private philanthropists and investments from emerging economies, 
exceed official aid (ODA). ODA, the traditional tool of Western external development intervention, 
became open to reconsideration and the public funds that were spent on development cooperation 
became subject to increasing scrutiny. British officials, including at high political levels, had already 
begun to promote accountability and transparency with transnational societal actors, such as Publish 
What You Fund since Accra in 2008 (see chapter 5). In Busan, they joined forces with the ODI and the 
Commonwealth Secretariat to advance a narrative of transparency for effectiveness (see Rogerson, 
2011). Second, after the widely-recognised OECD high-level meetings to improve aid effectiveness in 
Paris, Accra and Busan, public and political attention diminished significantly. The remaining 
international high-level attention and resources switched to developing the successor of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the post-2015 development agenda around the UN 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This Agenda 2030 broadened the scope of development to 
include, alongside social and economic issues, environmental and other considerations to address 
challenges of sustainability and disseminate responsibility for development globally. Especially 
European civil society pushed in this direction and engaged less with development cooperation 
officials. Civil society organisations, including think tanks such as ODI, quickly adapted to the new 
discourse – while individual researchers maintained interest in coordination (Bigsten and Tengstam, 
2015; Carbone, 2017; Klingebiel, et al., 2014; Klingebiel, et al., 2017; Leiderer, 2015). Third, especially 
France and the EEAS continued to push coordination but increasingly outside of development 
cooperation (see below). In EU external policy-making, development cooperation was increasingly 
integrated in what had been called the ‘comprehensive’ or ‘integrated’ approach. The ambition for 
these actors was to align the EU’s means for external action, trade, aid, diplomacy, security etc. to the 
respective extents possible to assert the EU as a significant player in the world. 
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Thus, the established narrative within the Commission’s DG DEVCO on framing the EU’s role 
in effective development cooperation was challenged both globally and from within the EU, its 
institutions and member states. Externally, after 2011, arguments for advocating an EU role for 
development cooperation could no longer be based on an international discourse that had hitherto 
legitimised coordination. At the same time, internally, the Commission lost its ability to help project 
intra-EU coordination discourses at the international level. Member states had appreciated their joint 
influence on the international discourse through the EU, which seemed to have diminished (see 
chapters 4 and 5). The influence at the international level had been a central legitimising factor for EU 
norm advocacy. It motivated and tied together an active discursive network of EU development 
professionals despite their partly competing interests and ideas. 
While the Lisbon Treaty provided an enhanced mandate for coordination and joint action with 
and between member states, this mandate was claimed by several EU actors and policy communities. 
Internally, there was increasing competition over norm advocacy for EU collective action from new 
EU foreign policy actors who did not follow DG DEVCO’s narrative, which they perceived as limited to 
development policy communities (Interviews BMZ#1; EEAS#4). Yet there was also increasing 
competition inside the Commission and especially high-level political and bureaucratic support for 
development was increasingly undermined. Officially, Commission communications continued to 
make references to existing policy documents and discourses but without repeating the discourses 
themselves, for example:  
the EU and its Member States need to step up their efforts to meet current commitments, including 
increased and more effective financing to support developing countries, as outlined in the Commission 
Communication “An Agenda for Change”. (European Commission, 2013b, p. 2; emphasis added) 
Thus, as this excerpt suggests, the Commission did not link coordination to aid effectiveness any 
longer in its public discourse. 
Instead, the Commission adjusted its arguments and narratives. In its public statements, the 
Commission began to link aid effectiveness to ‘innovative modalities of delivering finance’, especially 
blending of grants with loans and equity, and catalyse private and public investments (European 
Commission, 2013b, p. 8). In February 2013 and June 2014 respectively, the Commission issued two 
Communications entitled ‘A Decent Life for All’, which proposed other areas for the EU’s common 
engagement in international development, including drivers for inclusive and sustainable growth; 
sustainable management of natural resources; and peace and security (European Commission, 2013c; 
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2014). This prioritisation also responded to challenges from EU security policy communities and to 
concerns in member states. Coordination hardly appeared in the public Commission discourse on 
development effectiveness of the time, other than that:  
The principles set out above should also ensure coherence and coordination of specific financing 
streams and on-going negotiation processes (e.g. in the context of the 2015 Agreement on climate 
change). This will ensure that each country can target resources where they contribute best towards 
agreed common goals. (European Commission, 2013b, p. 11) 
Following the demise of aid effectiveness, the resistance of member states to coordinate, and the 
emergence of institutional rivals, the commitment within the Commission to uphold the 
mainstreaming of aid effectiveness had been reduced on all levels, especially at the top. 
The reason for this transition of the debate does not seem to be a lack of room for further 
and intensified improvements of aid effectiveness of EU donors in the form of coordination. Less than 
two years before, the Council had indeed recognised that  
The evidence confirms that among the five aid effectiveness principles country ownership has 
advanced furthest. Alignment and harmonisation have progressed unevenly […]. Aid fragmentation and 
proliferation, which increased both at EU level and globally between 2005 and 2009, and transparency 
remain challenges (Council of the European Union, 2011a, p. 6) 
This Council Conclusions had identified the continued relevance of aid effectiveness principles 
‘beyond their present scope’ to ‘bring added value to wide partnerships as well as other sources of 
development financing’ (Council of the European Union, 2011a, p. 16). Moreover, the civil society 
watchdog report AidWatch by CONCORD, and think tanks, especially the German DIE and the Dutch 
ECDPM, found that the Commission’s efforts to approximate EU donor activities were followed by an 
upsurge of divergence in European development cooperation despite member states’ increasing 
formal commitment to effectiveness (CONCORD, 2012, p. 9; Klingebiel, et al., 2014; Mackie, 2013). 
Thus, some EU-level development policy professionals were generally prepared to continue the quest 
against fragmentation of European polices. 
The Commission’s overarching, more public and political, commitment to aid effectiveness, 
in general, and policy coordination, in particular, had only been periodically revitalised. Thus, aid 
effectiveness and donor harmonisation played a negligible role in the Commission’s input to preparing 
an EU position for the post-2015 agenda since 2013 (European Commission, 2013b; 2013c; 2014; 
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2015). Commissioner Piebalgs briefly expressed sympathy for further institutionalising EU 
coordination as conceptualised by the EP’s ambitiously formulated legislative own-initiative report in 
2013 (European Parliament, 2013). Yet, as reported by several observers, he quickly rejected it when 
confronted with member states’ objections (Interviews EP#1, #4; PREP#1). When the international 
environment became more favourable during the first high-level meeting of the Global Partnership 
on Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) in Mexico 2014, a follow-up to Busan, Piebalgs was 
again more sympathetic to the continued relevance of the aid effectiveness agenda (Interviews 
DEVCO#1; NGO#2). However, his successor from 2014, Neven Mimica from Croatia, was much less 
invested. Mimica finally set different priorities for his term, notably the post-2015, post-Cotonou, and 
Policy Coherence for Development.13 Especially internal coordination for the EU’s contribution to the 
post-2015 development agenda along a new set of development objectives, rather than means of 
implementation, took much of the commissioner’s and DG DEVCO’s attention subsequently 
(Interview DEVCO#5). Aid effectiveness was not a priority and donor coordination only a side issue. 
International deliberations on development effectiveness continued in the framework of the 
GPEDC, effectively since 2012, at a more technical level. The official definition of effectiveness in 
development cooperation, used by the Commission, was evidenced in its proposal for a new European 
Consensus on Development, presented in November 2016:  
The EU and its Member States reaffirm their commitment to applying the key principles of 
development effectiveness, as confirmed at the Busan High Level Forum in 2011 and to putting them 
into practice in their development cooperation. These principles are: results; transparency and mutual 
accountability; democratic ownership; and inclusive development partnerships. (European 
Commission, 2016b, p. 26; emphasis in original) 
What is evident in this formulation is the stress on results, transparency and mutual accountability 
(see also chapter 5) whereas coordination disappeared. However, in the same document, the 
Commission also maintained that:  
In response to global challenges and trends and focused on the priorities identified above, the EU and 
its Member States will further improve the way they deliver their cooperation, including through 
working together better. This includes improving effectiveness and impact through greater 
                                                          
13 Public hearing with Commissioner-designate Neven Mimica held by the Committee on Development on 
Monday 29 September 2014, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings-2014/en/schedule/29-09-
2014/neven-mimica [retrieved 13 September 2018]. 
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coordination and coherence. In order to be more effective in pursuing its objectives, and in particular 
eradication of poverty, EU development policy must be adaptable and responsive to pressing needs, 
potential crises and evolving policy priorities. (European Commission, 2016b, p. 19) 
Thus, while the definition of effectiveness in development cooperation had shifted, the previous 
coordination and harmonisation agenda remained present among different EU-level actors, but the 
justification shifted. 
Especially at the working level in DG DEVCO general policy directorate, effectiveness of 
development cooperation continued to be connected to EU coordination, especially joint 
programming (Interviews DEVCO#1, #2). Similar views were also present among development policy 
professionals in other EU institutions, such as the EEAS (Interview EEAS#1), the European Parliament 
(Interviews EP#2, #4), among some professionals in NGOs (Interview NGO#3; CONCORD, 2016, pp. 
21-2), but especially in think tanks and academia (Interviews TT#1, #3; Klingebiel, et al., 2014; Mackie, 
2013; Moe Fejerskov and Keijzer, 2013). At lower levels in the Commission bureaucracy, ambitions for 
coordination, harmonisation and aid effectiveness had been maintained in some parts. While most 
aid effectiveness efforts within the Commission were largely suspended (Interview DEVCO#1), some 




III Promoting policy coordination 
 
Less than 4 years after the conference in Busan, in spring 2015, the Council adopted its Conclusions 
for the third Financing for Development conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, which almost 
completely neglected the aid and donor commitment side of effectiveness. Instead, it disseminated 
responsibility for effectiveness of development cooperation much more broadly away from aid 
providers. It presented a largely changed intervention logic with a focus on fragile and conflict affected 
states while shifting the financing concerns to other sources of development finance. The EU’s 
position, as subsequently expressed by the Council (2013; 2014b; 2015), but also the Commission, 
moved incrementally away from what these EU actors had so unequivocally promoted in and before 
2011. While this was a result of the demise of the global aid effectiveness discourse, higher obstacles 
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to coordination due to enhanced politicisation of European aid (e.g., security and migration 
considerations), and the emergence of institutional rivals at the EU level, it also reflected changing 
power relations in the EU. 
This is not to say that coordination disappeared as a discourse at the EU level. It was, however, 
disconnected from development effectiveness. EU coordination continued to play a central role, but 
it was increasingly captured as a policy norm by EU foreign policy actors, including at the highest 
political levels. Newly empowered EU-level actors actively engaged in reshaping ideas about the EU’s 
role and framed development cooperation as one instrument of effective European external action. 
However, despite the end of the ‘aid effectiveness decade’ of the 2000s and the inter-institutional 
rivalry, Commission officials managed to keep aid policy harmonisation on the EU agenda, even in a 
less favourable global and European environment. To achieve that, officials in DG DEVCO had focused 
on fewer policy norms that were supported within a more technical, often predominantly 
administrative network of professionals, primarily joint multiannual programming (European 
Commission, 2011e; 2012b) and budget support (European Commission, 2011c), and later also a 
common results framework (European Commission, 2013d). This section draws primarily on the case 
of joint programming to illustrate how these professionals engaged in constructing and advocating 
policy norms for collective EU action through a discursive network. 
 
Joint programming and bureaucratic politics 
 
That joint programming became part of the EU’s approach to improve effective development 
cooperation was neither obvious nor uncontested. In a nutshell, joint programming means that EU 
institutions and member states decide jointly on a multiannual response to a third country’s 
development strategy to reduce their fragmented and uncoordinated presence and activities in this 
country, and thus enhance development effectiveness (European Commission, 2011e, p. 10). Some 
member states, especially Britain (see chapter 5), did not regard this EU policy norm as beneficial in 
terms of effectiveness and rejected the integrationist agenda behind it. Other member states, such 
as France, and a majority in the EEAS considered it as a means of enhancing the EU’s foreign policy 
impact in the world. In contrast, proponents within the German aid administration highlighted the 
benefit of joint programming in terms of development effectiveness (see chapter 4). To turn policy 
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initiatives into common EU norms and promote them internally, officials in DG DEVCO circumvented 
wider ambitions, which the Commission’s bureaucracy had in the mid-2000s, and sought 
compromises with EEAS officials and member state representatives. Moreover, they concentrated on 
targeted policy expertise, especially from individual consultants and organisations, even where this 
risked antagonising the European Parliament and other CSOs. The interaction processes between 
these professionals led to adjustments of the promoted policies, which started to differ from the 
original initiatives. 
The basis for what would become joint programming had been connected earlier to the 
coordination/effectiveness discourse before it was picked up again by actors in the EEAS. The 
Commission’s reform agenda of 2000 laid the groundwork for developing the concept of joint 
programming through the introduction of an EU multiannual programming tool, modelled on the 
World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, which was seen to enhance predictability and 
transparency. In preparation for the second OECD High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Paris 
(2005), the Council determined that the EU’s Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) framework should be 
used as a blueprint to implement joint multiannual programming for all EU and member state 
assistance to developing countries in order to encourage coordination and harmonisation (Council of 
the European Union, 2004a, p. 20). In Paris, the EU framed joint programming as a major contribution 
to the aid effectiveness agenda. Thus, subsequently, the European Consensus on Development 
(European Parliament, et al., 2006) and a Commission work plan (European Commission, 2006c) 
sketched out the gradual introduction of joint multiannual programming on the basis of a revised CSP 
framework. The Commission further explicitly suggested that the CSP framework could equally be 
used by member states when drafting their country strategies. The coordination and joint 
programming agenda was substantially linked to the principle of complementarity when the EU Code 
of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy enshrined the ‘emerging’ joint programming 
as a means to achieving complementarity of aid (Council of the European Union, 2007a). In 
preparation of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011, the Council of the 
European Union (2011a, p. 12) highlighted joint programming as a contribution to aid effectiveness. 
While aid effectiveness principles had then significantly changed since the heydays of 
harmonisation, the efforts coming out of DG DEVCO to improve the effectiveness of EU aid initially 
continued to focus largely on improving the coordination of EU donors’ development policies. The 
continued focus on overcoming fragmentation remained central in the Commission’s proposition for 
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an Agenda for Change (European Commission, 2011e). The Communication highlighted EU donor 
coordination, but increasingly stressed flexibility and voluntarism. It aimed at increasing intra-EU 
coordination and joint action with the member states, especially through joint programming, better 
division of labour amongst EU donors through the concentration on three priority sectors per country, 
and aid modalities conducive to collective action, such as budget support. According to the 
Commission, the EU’s approach to a division of labour aimed at increasing the complementarity of EU 
donor contributions to increase aid effectiveness (European Commission, 2011b, p. 3). Thus, it goes 
beyond simple coordination because it is about 
changing the situation by systematically reducing the number of donors in overcrowded sectors and 
increasing support for orphan sectors, making use of donors’ comparative advantages in the process 
to ensure the complementarity of their contributions. (European Commission, 2011b, p. 3, emphasis 
added) 
However, obstacles obstructing the improvement of division of labour and complementarity on the 
ground remained, for instance, the reluctance of member states to leave attractive sectors and 
‘darling’ countries (European Commission, 2011b, p. 14). 
To improve the arbitrary distribution of EU donors’ aid, which the DAC perceived as rather 
more political than technically-informed (OECD, 2012, p. 77), the Commission proposed the extension 
of joint programming of EU institution and member state aid. The proposal was based on the division 
of labour agreements in which EU donors commit themselves to engage in no more than three sectors 
per country and five donors per sector. However, the suggested tool goes beyond division of labour 
because it aims at creating a ‘single joint programming document which should indicate the sectoral 
division of labour and financial allocations per sector and donor’ (European Commission, 2011e, p. 11, 
emphasis in original). During this process, the Commission, the EEAS and EU member states jointly 
determine a development response strategy for a partner country and draft a joint country strategy 
document, ideally replacing bilateral country strategies. However, harmonisation in challenging areas 
such as joint modalities for delivering aid, including conditionality, pooling of funds, co-financing or 
delegated cooperation, and measuring results, was not necessarily part of the joint programming 
exercise (European Commission, 2011a; 2011e; Galeazzi, et al., 2013; OECD, 2012). Thus, observers 
criticised joint programming for being largely ‘limited to the drafting and ratification of a strategy 
paper for organising division of labour at the country level’ (Furness and Vollmer, 2013, p. 2). 
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Table 2. Presence of EU member states in countries with EU joint programming 
Germany 52 Ireland 11 
France 46 Austria/Czech Republic/Poland 9 
United Kingdom 39 Luxembourg 8 
Italy 27 Hungary 6 
Spain 24 Romania 5 
Sweden 23 Lithuania/Portugal 3 




Denmark 17 Croatia / Cyprus / Malta 0 
Finland 14   
Source: capacity4dev.eu, last updated April 2018, available at: https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/joint-
programming/minisite/country-cases/joint-programming-tracker [retrieved 13 September 2018]. 
 
Nevertheless, and although the basis for EU joint programming had emerged earlier, it was 
around 2011 when this initiative gained traction. The EU trialled joint programming in Haiti and South 
Sudan in 2011 and in 2012 (European Commission, 2012a, p. 4). Subsequently, the EU heads of 
mission initially deemed 52 countries suitable, mostly either least-developed or lower middle-income 
countries. As a result, the Commission’s DG DEVCO and the EEAS jointly pushed for an expansion of 
the implementation of joint programming with the member states for the programming period 2014-
2020 (European Commission, 2013a). This was despite the coordination and aid effectiveness fatigue 
at the EU and international level. 
Member states had been generally sceptical about any Commission attempt to foster 
coordination. In its early days, joint programming was broadly perceived as a ‘Brussels-led’ initiative 
that could possibly threaten the independence of member states’ development policy-making 
(Estrada-Cañamares, 2014; Furness and Vollmer, 2013; Galeazzi, et al., 2013). Moreover, regarding 
coordination on the ground, the Commission had often been perceived as ‘technocratic’ with a slow 
and ‘heavy bureaucracy’ (Delputte and Söderbaum, 2012, p. 43). Even within DG DEVCO, joint 
programming for improving aid effectiveness had not been universally accepted. Among senior 
officials, including the commissioner, the general enthusiasm for aid effectiveness was much reduced. 
Joint programming was not equally accepted among all directorates of DG DEVCO. Some geographic 
ADVOCATING EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH EU NORMS 
101 
units in DG DEVCO, especially those responsible for Asia, perceived it as an additional burden. 
Reportedly, in their view, joint programming made the already demanding bilateral programming 
process yet more complex for the EU, but it did not yield much credit and often disinterest by other 
donors and third countries (Interview DEVCO#1; see also Herrero, et al., 2015). 
To react to and partially pre-empt criticism both in Brussels and the field, Commission 
bureaucrats from the general policy directorate collaborated with their counterparts in the EEAS and 
in some member states, especially the Netherlands, France and Germany, to create favourable 
conditions to promote joint programming (TT#3; Helly, et al., 2015, p. 25). Despite institutional 
frictions between the top levels in DG DEVCO and the EEAS, policy professionals from both 
organisations collaborated to promote joint programming on a limited, technical and development-
focused basis (Interviews DEVCO#1, #2; EEAS#1, #2; TT#3). To convince critics of its added value, 
development officials used their close personal working relations to promote aid effectiveness 
principles horizontally and to help them travel up the political ladder. In the words of one Commission 
official, joint programming became their ‘area of pride’ and one of their ‘best endeavours’ (Interview 
DEVCO#2). On the working level, DG DEVCO and EEAS officials adopted a division of labour concerning 
both the promotion of joint programming and the successful implementation among the EU 
instruments. Although, the institutions come from different overarching conceptions of the purpose 
of joint EU action in development cooperation, at the Brussels working level, the respective actors in 
the EEAS and DG DEVCO interacted much ‘like a team’ in the promotion of joint programming, as 
officials from both institutions confirmed (Interviews DEVCO#2; EEAS#1). Crucially, several of the 
involved EEAS officials, who were committed to joint programming as an instrument of development 
cooperation, were development policy professionals themselves, often brought in as seconded 
national experts from development departments of member states to support the EU’s aid 
programming for 2014-2020 based on this policy norm (Interview EEAS#1). 
The collaboration with the EEAS provided a channel for DG DEVCO officials to advocate their 
understanding of joint programming at the country level where joint action is implemented. The EU 
delegations also needed to be convinced of the value-added of joint programming, which was not 
necessarily evident due to diverging internal priorities in the delegations between development 
officials and diplomatic staff (Carbone, 2017, p. 540). Thus, headquarters support from the 
Commission was relevant to establish on what discursive basis joint programming was promoted by 
the delegations with the local member state representatives. In the process of implementing the first 
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round of joint programming, DG DEVCO and EEAS officials sought to convince the delegations in the 
field of the political desire to expand joint programming (Interview DEVCO#1) – especially as political 
ambitions became reduced among higher level development officials. In letters from 2010 and 2012, 
both organisations asked the delegations to promote joint programming in the field, seeking to 
generate positive feedback to member states on the policy level (European Commission, 2010c; 
2012b; European Commission and European External Action Service, 2012). Subsequently, several EU 
delegations, mostly in Sub-Sahara Africa, tabled proposals for joint programming covering most of EU 
ODA. While the joint programming process was to be headed by the EU delegations in the respective 
countries, both DG DEVCO and the EEAS officials provided headquarters and delegations with 
significant support throughout the process (Estrada-Cañamares, 2014, p. 59). For instance, they jointly 
prepared a detailed ‘guidance pack’, trainings and regional workshops between early-2014 and early-
2015 for the EU delegations,14 and organised presentations and information campaigns in Brussels. In 
this process, DG DEVCO could contribute more human and financial resources at the headquarters 
level than the EEAS in order to pool expertise centrally and make the case for joint action. 
Originally, the staff in the EEAS engaging with the Commission remained committed to joint 
programming as an instrument of development cooperation, which also reflected the legal basis of 
aid programming. However, the wider ambitions within the EEAS to use joint programming more 
explicitly as a political instrument for enhancing the visibility of the EU also affected these officials. As 
expressed by several interviewees, they highlighted joint programming as a political instrument of the 
EU to ‘speak with one voice’ in order to increase the EU’s impact in third countries (Interviews EEAS#1, 
#2, #3). This followed a more general, high-level discourse of coordination in all EU external action 
horizontally and vertically with the member states. In this understanding, joint programming 
contributes to a ‘comprehensive approach’, i.e., the horizontal coherence of all-EU external action in 
which development becomes a part of foreign policy. Hence, although at the working level in Brussels 
the EEAS seemed committed to aid/development effectiveness, at higher levels in the EEAS, also 
among heads of missions (Carbone, 2017, p. 540), coordination was not primarily seen against the 
background of international development and aid effectiveness. Therefore, other development 
officials, who sought to promote joint programming at the working level together with DG DEVCO, 
                                                          
14 These (and other related) documents can be accessed through the capacity4dev.eu website, available at: 
https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/joint-programming/minisite/eu-joint-programming-guidance-pack-2015 
[retrieved 13 September 2018]. The Commission’s DG DEVCO maintains this platform as a knowledge sharing 
hub for development cooperation. Its aim is to improve capacity development through knowledge sharing with 
the wider policy community. 
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criticised the institutional frictions between the two organisations concerning the different messages 
about development cooperation that they communicated (Interview PREP#1). This was exacerbated 
because, especially under HR/VP Ashton, the level of development expertise in the EEAS was low 
(Interview EEAS#4). The capacity of the external service in development cooperation increased 
significantly under Ashton’s successor Mogherini. This shift also came with a more assertive position 
of the EEAS on joint programming. 
To promote acceptance and legitimacy in member state capitals, officials in the relevant units 
in DG DEVCO and the EEAS significantly increased their contacts and exchange with national aid 
bureaucracies at all levels. DG DEVCO and the EEAS frequently called and drew on meetings of 
ministerial development professionals and officials from member state headquarters. While certain 
professionals in EU institutions acted as policy entrepreneurs for joint programming, some member 
state officials, especially in Germany, the Netherlands and France, were strongly involved in shaping 
and promoting it on the policy level. Among them, Germany stood out as the most active to 
implement it (see table 2). German officials in Brussels and Berlin actively promoted and supported 
joint programming in the EU as part of Germany’s national contribution to development effectiveness 
(see chapter 4). An important role for the support at the working level played the secondment of a 
‘national expert’ (SNE) to the Commission. This working level exchange had the effect of linking the 
bureaucracies closer on the issue to raise awareness for joint programming not only among other 
member states but also within their own organisations (Interviews DEVCO#1; PREP#1). France actively 
promoted joint programming at the policy level as a step towards giving Europe more visibility and 
political clout as a whole (Interviews EEAS#2; TT#3). While German officials supported the linking of 
joint programming to the aid effectiveness agenda, French officials emphasised the added value of 
the EU not limited to development (see also Krüger and Steingass, 2018). 
The ambiguity of joint programming allowed a wider network of development officials from 
DG DEVCO, the EEAS and some member states to promote and advocate it as an all-EU policy norm, 
while justifying it on different grounds. However, the close engagement with the EEAS and some 
member states came at a price for DG DEVCO. While the EEAS was an ally in promoting joint 
programming, even on a limited, development-oriented level, its position in the network allowed it to 
assert its own institutional preferences vis-à-vis the more development-oriented policy professionals 
(Furness, 2012; Smith, 2013a). This was supported by an increasing assertiveness at higher levels of 
the EEAS and of the HR/VP, and the passivity of subsequent development commissioners. That the 
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foreign and security policy-oriented discourse had become more dominant at the expense of aid 
effectiveness, became tangible in the Commission’s proposal for a revision of the European Consensus 
on Development. It states that ‘the EU and its Member States will enhance joint programming in 
development cooperation in order to increase their collective impact by bringing together their 
resources and capacities’ (European Commission, 2016b, p. 20, emphasis added). In the same 
paragraph, joint programming is stressed for the context of fragile and conflict-affected countries, 
which had become the new guiding objective of EU external action. 
 
Expertise and networks 
 
While bureaucratic politics was the ‘engine’ behind gaining support for joint programming, at least 
from the Commission’s point of view, expertise became the ‘fuel’. Despite its own bureaucratic, in-
house expertise, the Commission had long relied on contracted external experts to increase its policy-
making capacity at all stages of the policy cycle. This ranges from hiring individual consultants and 
short-term experts to commissioning studies under explicit terms of reference and engaging large 
member state-financed organisations, such as the Dutch think tank ECDPM. However, while from the 
mid-2000s, the Commission had tried to put its expertise on a wider, more systematic and networked 
basis, to promote joint programming, officials in DG DEVCO relied heavily on more tailored expertise, 
which was considered ‘useful’ for its engagement in bureaucratic politics. Thus, during the 
formulation of joint programming, and the early implementation and evaluation, officials in DG 
DEVCO tended to be selective and focused on relevant expertise for the continued promotion of joint 
programming based on aid effectiveness terms. 
In the early phase of policy formulation, the Commission made the case for EU harmonisation 
based on what it saw as the public and research-backed perception of an increasingly pressing need 
for countering the progressing fragmentation of aid (European Commission, 2011d, pp. 15-6). While, 
at this time, such a perception was shared more widely among European think tanks and researchers 
(Carbone, 2010; Corre, 2009), DG DEVCO actively sought expert support with two commissioned 
external studies, published in March (O’Riordan, et al., 2011) and September 2011 (Bigsten, et al., 
2011). The study from March 2011, run by the same consultancy that had already done the study on 
calculating savings in transaction costs from further implementing coordination (Carlsson, et al., 
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2009), focused on showing the feasibility of joint programming. The second study from September 
2011 aimed at substantiating the claim of an added EU contribution, again in terms of concrete 
monetary gains for the EU and its member states. This study produced quantifiable cost savings in the 
case of increased EU harmonisation along the proposed reforms, which ‘could constitute a powerful 
incentive towards moving the aid effectiveness agenda forward’ (Bigsten, et al., 2011, p. 14). 
As DG DEVCO maintained its bureaucratic capacity in the area of development effectiveness, 
it had not only the staff but also the funds to commission such additional, highly targeted studies for 
which its officials could determine very precise objectives (terms of reference). Thus, while the 
evaluations were done independently, the Commission’s aid bureaucracy steered what kind of 
expertise these studies would produce, i.e., quantifiable ‘hard’ evidence (Bigsten, et al., 2011) and 
knowledge which can be directly used in the advocacy of joint programming in practice (O’Riordan, et 
al., 2011). While this expertise did not remain without criticism, for example, from researchers at the 
ODI (Prizzon and Greenhill, 2012, p. 9), DG DEVCO officials continued to concentrate on the direct 
engagement with specific experts, mostly those that it had already been familiar with and remained 
behind closed doors. Thus, while time-consuming, the development policy professionals in the 
Commission mainly responsible for general policy formulation continued to engage individual 
‘external’ experts to follow the promotion of joint programming in later stages and support the claim 
of an added value. 
Due to the relevance of ‘field knowledge’ in the promotion process with bureaucratic actors 
in Brussels, contracted consultants involved in joint programming at the EU delegations became highly 
important. The Commission hired and financed consultants, some of which were locals, to support 
the EU delegations in promoting and drawing up joint programming with the member states 
(Interviews DEVCO#1, #2; TT#3; Helly, et al., 2015). Guidance in this process came again from the 
Commission and the EEAS. Since DG DEVCO had the financial resources and staff to manage 
consultants, it was primarily the Commission officials who engaged with them, and often used their 
own existing institutional contacts and relationships (Interviews DEVCO#1, #3; TT#3). This fits with the 
more general observation that the Commission has traditionally heavily drawn on consultants and 
external contractors especially when it comes to stages of implementation and early evaluation 
(Interview TT#1, see chapter 2). The joint programming consultants also became a direct link for the 
Commission officials in Brussels to the field where the political steering had been passed on to the 
EEAS in the EU delegations. The EEAS had asserted increasing control over the former Commission 
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delegations, despite a large proportion of former Commission staff in development-heavy third 
countries. While this played a role for informing the policy orientation, Commission officials sought to 
keep processes of coordination and planning close to their chest (Interview DEVCO#3, #5). 
In contrast to EU institutional actors – especially in the context of increasing suspicion towards 
the Commission in member state capitals – external policy professionals could be more outspoken 
about advocating an EU policy norm. There was, as mentioned earlier, no shortage of research 
criticising fragmentation of aid in Europe and assessing the Commission’s policies for reducing it (e.g., 
Carbone, 2013a; 2017; Delputte and Orbie, 2014; Mackie, 2013). The European Parliament had also 
commissioned a study with a similar focus (Klingebiel, et al., 2013). Nevertheless, officials in DG 
DEVCO had decided to grant certain external experts in-depth insights and access, for instance, 
participation in the seminars with member state representatives. ECDPM was closely involved in the 
EU institutions’ positioning of joint programming for a study, and the reporting process, supported by 
the Commission, was used as input into the promotion process (Interview TT#3; Galeazzi, et al., 2013; 
Helly, et al., 2015). ECDPM has been well-connected and its expertise recognised by actors from very 
different parts of the European policy community, especially also in member states and the EEAS, as 
suggested by interviewees (Interviews DFID#2; EEAS#4). Another advantage was that, despite 
receiving core funding from the Netherlands, the think tank has continuously highlighted that it does 
not have primarily a national focus but a (African-)European one. In return for granting close insights, 
in the words an interviewee, ECDPM tried to make its expertise and knowledge-production process 
‘useful for those who wanted to promote it’ (Interview TT#3). 
While this degree of engagement of one organisation might have been exceptional rather 
than the rule, the strong reliance on individual consultants, researchers and organisations stood in 
contrast to earlier Commission discourses to put engagement with external experts on a more 
transparent and structured basis. This form of engagement shows a prioritisation of expertise that is 
‘produced’ directly for the relevant norm advocacy based on institutional demands as opposed to 
knowledge ‘on offer’ in the wider ‘market’. As a consequence, this fuelled criticism among observers 
within the wider expert community and led to tensions with and among experts who have constituted 
the wider network. It illustrates the capacity of Commission officials to become entrepreneurs in 
discursive networks as they not only manage network relations but also steer the production of 
expertise and knowledge within. 
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The perception that fragmentation was a problem for aid effectiveness seemed to dominate 
in bureaucratic and research circles. However, it was also shared by the EU’s civil society umbrella 
organisation CONCORD, which argued that the ‘problem of the fragmentation and proliferation of aid 
agencies has been identified as one of the major constraints on more effective development 
cooperation, at both OECD and EU level’ (CONCORD, 2012, p. 36). The Commission thus proposed the 
shift to joint programming as a way out, allowing for the flexible tailoring of donor coordination to 
the situation on the ground, which would be in line with country ownership, the core principle of the 
effectiveness agenda (European Commission, 2011e). This argument was, apparently, not sufficient 
to convince civil society at large of the added value of joint programming, which was also due to the 
bureaucracy-driven nature of policy construction in Brussels (see above). The collaboration between 
officials in DG DEVCO, the EEAS and in a few member state bureaucracies, on the one hand, and the 
selective approach to the engagement of external experts, on the other hand, meant that the 
advocacy of joint programming for a crucial period kept a low profile and remained depoliticised. This 
proved to be problematic for engaging the wider policy community. 
Officials at all levels in both DG DEVCO and the EEAS stressed the voluntary nature of 
coordination initiatives, including joint programming, division of labour, joint budget support etc. In a 
2012 letter to all member state ministers in charge of development cooperation, the three 
underwriting commissioners highlighted this when they state that 
It goes without saying that the EU and its Member States are the driving force behind our joint 
cooperation response [i.e., joint programming]. […] Therefore, when it comes to determining whether 
or not to undertake joint programming in a country, it is first and foremost up to the Member States 
providing assistance to said country to decide whether they are willing to go down this road. (European 
Commission, 2012b) 
This approach stood in contrast to the European Parliament. While the EP has hardly taken a (public) 
position either before or after, in a resolution in 2013, the EP called on the Commission to provide a 
proposal for a legally-binding regulation on EU donor coordination on development aid (European 
Parliament, 2013). The EP’s initiative report was based on a report entitled ‘The Cost of Non-Europe 
in Development Policy: Increasing coordination between EU donors’, which suggested to adopt ‘a new 
binding coordination instrument, building on current best practices and mechanisms, notably in 
relation to division of labour and joint programming’ (Nogaj, 2013, p. 3; emphasis added). This study 
itself was based on an external study, which the EP had commissioned before (Klingebiel, et al., 2013). 
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Although it merely called for a legal codification of already existing, albeit voluntary, measures, the 
initiative met the resistance of member states and DG DEVCO (Interviews DEVCO#1; EP#1, #4). Due 
to the ‘confrontational’ nature of this approach vis-à-vis the member states, the Commission 
distanced itself from the EP’s approach, including its study on the cost of non-Europe. 
Thus, although the EP’s Committee on Development (DEVE) shared argument coming out of 
DG DEVCO that enhancing EU donor coordination contributed to increasing the effectiveness of EU 
development aid, in DG DEVCO a more careful attitude prevailed, distancing themselves from the 
attempt to achieve a legal norm with the member states (Interview DEVCO#1). DEVE members and 
the committee’s officials could frame this initiative as supporting the Commission’s efforts at 
implementing EU coordination measures in increasingly difficult times (Interviews EP#2, #3, #4). 
However, the entire process was, arguably, mainly aimed at ‘testing’ the EP’s capacities post-Lisbon 
(Interview EP#4), especially the extent to which it was able to engage independently in the public 
debate based on its newly consolidated research capacities, the European Parliamentary Research 
Service (EPRS) or ‘EP think tank’. This incidence shows how DEVE members became more outspoken, 
confident and conflictual, even against their long-term ally and patron, the Commission, despite 
limited formal competences on policy formulation outside the financing instruments. 
A second issue was that the reduction to and promotion of joint programming through a small, 
exclusive, administrative-centric circle of policy professionals meant that a wide range of policy actors 
felt increasingly excluded from the debate about EU policy norms for effective development 
cooperation. As noted earlier, leading European development think tanks and researchers aside from 
ECDPM, such as ODI and DIE, also criticised aid fragmentation and supported the Commission’s 
policies to reduce fragmentation. Despite their attempts to present themselves as an entity through 
the ETTG, the Commission’s aid bureaucracy hardly engaged them as a group in this time.15 Instead, 
the attempts of DG DEVCO officials to engage European think thanks have been perceived as ad hoc 
(Interviews DEVCO#3; TT#1, #2). The continuity of such a European group was further challenged with 
the discontinuation of the European Report on Development (ERD) after 2015 when more and more 
member states dropped out of the financing and the report’s impact had been questioned (Interviews 
CON#3; DEVCO#3; Lorenzoni and del Carmen Bueno Barriga, 2014). Competing for the ERD tender 
                                                          
15 The ETTG experienced a ‘revival’ in 2018. In June 2018 the group of European development policy think tanks, 
which has been partly reconfigured, held an inaugural public event with the European Commission in Brussels 
with the aim of sharing expertise between policy professionals and to improve the engagement of experts in EU 
policy-making. 
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had been a principle incentive for think tanks to organise, which they have, however, found generally 
difficult. Their cooperation in the ETTG, for instance, was largely ad hoc, their relationship loose, often 
depended on personal ties, and generally overshadowed by competition (Interviews CON#3; TT#1, 
#2). 
In contrast, DEVE took over some ground from the Commission when it came to public 
expertise, stakeholder engagement and the wider communicative discourse from which the 
Commission had largely withdrawn concerning the advocacy of EU policy norms in development 
cooperation. However, as the case of DEVE’s Cost of Non-Europe report suggests, not all expertise was 
equally welcome, especially where this created public pressure on the Commission to be more 
assertive and thus politicised its bureaucratic interactions. This made it increasingly difficult for 
officials in DG DEVCO to engage in a more encompassing way within the wider network of 
professionals, which it had supported so strongly in the mid-/late 2000s. While some think tanks and 
academia showed strong interest, NGOs showed little interest in the technical linkages between (EU) 
coordination and development effectiveness and therefore hardly engaged in the promotion of 
measures to improve coordination. 
The main exception was budget support (Interview NGO#2; DFID, 2013c, p. 54). The 
Commission had linked the promotion of joint programming with measures conducive to 
coordination, especially budget support in its public discourse (European Commission, 2011e, p. 11; 
2013a, pp. 29-31). Budget support was perceived to support coordination operationally, including 
joint programming (Faust, et al., 2012). Importantly, it was also strongly supported by partner 
countries. Thus, think tanks and NGOs had been on the same page as the Commission with its 
argument. For example, a DIE discussion paper argued that, in principle, ‘the intervention logic of 
budget support is conducive to increasing the coordination among European donors’ as the question 
of how funds are implemented is left to partner countries and ‘could therefore have contributed to a 
more coherent and harmonised European development policy’ (Faust and Koch, 2014, p. 24). 
However, since the time of Paris Declaration, and especially during the so-called ‘Arab Spring’, 
budget support had significantly lost acceptance among EU donors, even when they had nominally 
supported it before, such as Britain. EU member states remained particularly divided on the 
conditions for and extent of budget support (CONCORD, 2012, p. 37; Faust and Koch, 2014; 
Vanheukelom, 2012). In the wake of the ‘Arab Spring’, any form of budget support became 
increasingly politically untenable in the eyes of many member states as it pushed human rights and 
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political governance higher on the agenda in the EU (Faust, et al., 2012, pp. 2-3; Vanheukelom, 2012, 
p. 11). Together with the financial crisis, this forced the aid and development bureaucracies in many 
member states to showcase accountability to their domestic audiences (see chapter 5). Thus, several 
EU member states became more restrictive by including more political issues of governance in their 
eligibility criteria and linked budget support disbursement explicitly to democratic governance 
reforms, which effectively led to scaling down of budget support (CONCORD, 2012, p. 37). 
Against this background, NGO support for DG DEVCO continued in the area of budget support, 
as expressed by CONCORD or the NGO network Eurodad (Interview NGO#2; Eurodad and Reality of 
Aid, 2010). It was there where societal policy professionals offered targeted expertise and advocacy. 
They criticised primarily that it was Europeans’ domestic demands for mechanisms to ensure tighter 
control and accountability that led to a significant reduction in support for EU budget support policies, 
not development demands. Although NGOs had shown limited interest in the Commission’s wider 
coordination agenda, they exchanged support with DG DEVCO to promote budget support vis-à-vis 
the member states (Interview NGO#2; DFID, 2013c, p. 54). Despite putting increasing transnational 
expertise and advocacy behind budget support (Wolff, 2015), the Commission failed to circumvent 
member state opposition (Koch, et al., 2017). This forced Commission officials also at the working 
level to adjust their priorities and their engagement with civil society soured (Interview NGO#2). 
That at higher levels the Commission made increasing concessions to security-oriented 
demands (see chapter 2) led to additional tension with and among other stakeholders, which had 
been traditionally on the side of the Commission. While NGOs and think tanks perceived changes in 
the EU’s approach towards development to become more integrated within the EU’s external 
relations as a chance to improve the effectiveness of European development cooperation (CONCORD, 
2015; Gavas, et al., 2016), they also stressed the risks of subordinating development cooperation to 
Europe’s short-term security concerns. In the eyes of some NGO representatives, as expressed in 
several interviews, the Commission’s adjustments, following their closer ties to the EEAS and member 
states, meant a divergence of objectives: Whereas in the mid- and late 2000s, NGO and EU interests 
seemed broadly aligned, especially with a focus on budget support and active attempts to involve 
CSOs, the increased focus on the private sector, Europe’s security, and the lack of appetite in DG 
DEVCO to involve especially European CSOs in it, has made their engagement continuously more 
confrontational (Interviews NGO#1, #4; TT#1). This has reduced their mutual advocacy of EU policy 
norms. 
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These tensions went against attempts in the Commission to structure its engagement with 
CSOs more systematically but also contributed to tensions within the wider (sub-)networks, e.g., 
within CONCORD and the ETTG. Instead, the EP emerged as the driving force behind the engagement 
of European CSOs through strong institutional access, for instance, invitations to hearings and 
exchange of information and resources (Interviews EP#2, #3). This shift was facilitated because many 
NGOs adjusted their priorities in the light of the UN’s updated set of international development 
objectives, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Civil society actors significantly shifted away 
from the aid effectiveness discourse of the 2000s. The differentiation of the international 
development paradigm around the global ‘Agenda 2030’ and the SDGs meant that external actors 
shifted their focus and became more diverse. Multiple NGO networks expressed to shift attention 
further towards ‘domestic’ issues, such as tax evasion, and away from aid and development 
cooperation (Interviews NGO#1, #3, #4, #5). This influenced and partly reduced their ties with and 
reliance on DG DEVCO, given that its mandate remained limited to development cooperation, and 
moved them closer to the EP. However, as an interviewee suggested, the Commission officials 
remained relevant interlocutors, so they have continued to engage with them in development policy 





Different actors in Europe such as politicians, bureaucrats and experts have pursued collective action 
through the establishment of common EU policy norms. The EU level has thus been a central arena 
for the competition over different norms for collective action. The chapter has demonstrated that this 
competition has largely revolved around promoting discursive frames of improving the effectiveness 
of the EU’s development cooperation. Various policy professionals have contributed in different ways 
to the promotion of discursive frames of improving the effectiveness of the EU’s development 
cooperation. To understand the contribution of policy professionals to the advocacy of policy norms 
for collective action between the EU institutions and the member states, this chapter has shown to 
what extent and how professionals have contributed to the competition over discursive frames of 
improving effectiveness. It has found that the EU level has offered various policy professionals a way 
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of engaging across organisational boundaries in norm advocacy and thus partly circumvent the 
gatekeeping of member state representatives through their participation in discourses on EU 
effectiveness. 
This chapter has traced and analysed the advancement of common EU norms within shifting 
discursive and institutional contexts, which have shaped EU norm advocacy. The emergence of norms 
for EU collective action has often been analysed as part of institutionalised policy processes (e.g., 
Bodenstein, et al., 2017; Orbie and Versluys, 2007), which omit large parts of the wider transnational 
discursive process in which policy professionals play a role who do not have a formal role. One 
conclusion of this chapter is that the transnational level offers various policy professionals a way of 
engaging across organisational boundaries in norm advocacy to promote their preferences and ideas. 
This goes beyond member state representatives who come together to engage in norm negotiations 
over common policy norms (Elgström, 2000; 2017). Instead, their interactions are part of a larger 
discursive contestation in which a wider range of professionals at the transnational and national level 
participate, including a range of non-state actors. The contribution of these policy professionals to 
norm advocacy has become visible through analysing their discursive interactions. The EU level has 
been relevant for policy professionals as it constitutes an institutionalised nodal point around which 
transnational networks form rather than an established hierarchical order. A central position in this 
institutional structure is occupied by institutional actors. This includes policy professionals especially 
from the European Commission but also the European Parliament and the EU’s diplomatic service 
(EEAS). 
Thus, the chapter has highlighted how professionals in these EU institutions, rather than 
member state actors (see chapters 4 and 5), have sought to participate in EU norm advocacy through 
competition over discursive frames of improving effectiveness. A key finding is that Commission 
officials have taken such a central role in EU norm advocacy because they have established and 
advocated a discursive frame of improving the effectiveness of the EU’s development cooperation. As 
the first section demonstrated, Commission officials managed to establish a discursive network of 
public support among state and non-state actors for promoting an agenda which aimed at reducing 
fragmentation in Europe by strengthening the role of the EU as a ‘federator’ in development 
cooperation. What this part has shown is that this promotion of common EU policy norms emerged 
within an international discourse of aid effectiveness that was simultaneously shaped by the norm 
advocacy in the EU. That this discursive network weakened as the international discourse on aid 
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effectiveness shifted, shown in the second section, indicates the relevance of the international 
discursive environment for EU norm advocacy. 
The last section has demonstrated how Commission officials, who have remained potent 
network managers, adjusted their interactions to continue to promote common policy norms even in 
unfavourable times when suspicion among member states had grown following the financial crisis, 
institutional rivalry increased among EU institutions after the Lisbon Treaty and the international 
discursive environment has shifted. Coordination did not disappear as a policy norm at the EU level 
but in the wider discourse it was largely disconnected from development effectiveness. To understand 
how norm advocacy continued in a shifting institutional and discursive context, the chapter has 
zoomed into the discursive network of policy professionals who have continued to promote 
coordination norms during unfavourable times. Officials in DG DEVCO focused on fewer policy norms, 
primarily joint multiannual programming, and advocated it by coordinating a discursive justification 
through a more technical, predominantly administrative network of professionals in DG DEVCO, the 
EEAS, and relevant officials in member states, including in Germany (see chapter 4). Instead of wider 
societal participation in the justification of common policy norms, policy professionals in DG DEVCO 
engaged external experts, such as consultants and researchers, more selectively to enhance their 
bureaucratic expert authority and justify joint programming against competing voices in the member 
states and EU institutions, which have highlighted alternative discursive frames of improving 
effectiveness (see also chapter 5). This strengthening of a (bureaucratic) coordinative discourse meant 
a break with the communicative discourse coordination of the 2000s. In contrast to earlier EU norm 
advocacy, when the Commission’s public promotion with the member states shaped the international 
discursive environment, the coordinative discourse has not had the same effect. Moreover, the 
approach made advocacy in a public sphere more confrontational and undermined earlier attempts 
at establishing societal transnational networks because it reduced incentives for collaboration. 
This chapter has advanced our understanding of the agency of policy professional in EU 
collective action. It has established how norm advocacy in EU development cooperation has occurred 
as part of competition over discursive frames of improving effectiveness in which EU policy 
professionals participate. This has allowed to draw first conclusions about how, in what ways and 
under what conditions policy professionals have contributed to collective EU action in development 
cooperation. The key implication of these conclusions for understanding wider processes of 
advocating collective EU external action is the need to identify how professionals contribute to the 
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justification of policy norms and thus engage in transnational norm advocacy, even when they have 
little formal role. While this chapter has concentrated at the networks and discourses of professionals 
around the EU institutions, the next step involves looking at the member state professionals who have 










The search for agency of policy professionals in EU norm advocacy sooner or later leads to Germany. 
Chapters 2 and 3 have shown how German actors – similar to the French – have sought to influence 
EU external action from within. When looking for a member state that seeks to shape EU norms and 
policy, Germany comes to mind not because of its untamed power projection but because of the lack 
thereof – despite its size and weight. Germany’s elites have avoided discourses of national interests 
and presented them instead as European interests. To pursue them, they have presented European 
initiatives, usually jointly with other member states, preferably France. The preference of German 
policy-makers for working behind the scenes and alongside others is a consequence of the country’s 
history in the 20th century and has shaped the country’s engagement in Europe’s regional integration 
(Bulmer and Paterson, 1989; Maull, 1990). Nevertheless, since reunification and with the eurozone 
crisis, this traditional approach has come under increasing pressure internally while external 
expectations of Germany assuming leadership have simultaneously experienced a step-change 
(Paterson, 2011). 
Chapters 1 to 3 have shown how transnational norm advocacy revolves around discursive 
competition in which policy professionals participate. The previous chapter has demonstrated that 
German professionals mattered for the coordination of collective action norms in EU development 
cooperation. That is hardly surprising given that German policy-makers have always stressed the 
relevance of the EU for Germany’s identity and interests. This chapter seeks to understand in what 
ways state and non-state professionals participate, how their participation matters for transnational 
norm advocacy and what affects their participation, especially national discourses, practices and 
institutional structures. Germany’s engagement in the EU has attracted considerable academic 
attention, which was revitalised after its reunification in 1990 (e.g., Bulmer and Paterson, 1996; 2010; 
Hyde-Price and Jeffery, 2001; Katzenstein, 1998; Paterson, 2011; Schweiger, 2007). Observers have 
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since been curious about what role a unified Germany plays in European integration, given that the 
country’s historical ‘baggage’ has shaped the process of integration. While much attention has since 
rested on Germany’s relationships and balance with other EU member states, some observers have 
turned to its role in EU foreign policy (e.g., Daehnhardt, 2011). European integration has become a 
central avenue for Germany’s external relations. This deliberate taming of opportunities reflects a 
general pattern of German power projection (Katzenstein, 1998), which has become part of its civilian 
power image (Maull, 1990). Development cooperation has been part of this power projection. 
However, relatively little has been written on Germany’s role in EU development cooperation. While 
France, Britain and the Nordic countries have often been singled out for their role in and influence on 
EU development cooperation (e.g., Cumming, 2001; Elgström, 2017; Elgström and Delputte, 2016), 
Germany has only occasionally surfaced (see chapter 2). 
Conversely, little has been written on the German politics of EU aid, with some minor 
exceptions (Ashoff, 2005; Schmidt, 2015). The expectation is that German engagement in the EU has 
become more assertive since the 1990s. While the preference of policy-makers for multilateralist 
approaches has continued, a ‘normalisation’ of power projection by the German government means 
that this approach has become less dominant (Bulmer and Paterson, 2010; Hyde-Price and Jeffery, 
2001). On the one hand, in the words of two seasoned observers, ‘Germany’s strong pro-European 
credentials enabled it to play a very large role in “uploading its preferences” to the EU level’ (Bulmer 
and Paterson, 2010, p. 1058), and German actors have become more strategic in using this 
multilateralist approach to promote national agendas. However, they are less tied to embedding 
competences in supranational institutions and instead tend to diffuse preferred discourses to other 
member states. On the other hand, unilateral action seems to remain the exception due to the 
German preference for conformity. Thus, the engagement of the German government has become 
‘normal’ in the sense of a more direct, interest-based projection of power in the EU. This 
‘normalisation’ of Germany’s ‘Europeanism’ following reunification has arguably accelerated with the 
eurozone crisis (Paterson, 2011). 
The extent to which such shifts guide Germany’s engagement in EU development cooperation 
is not immediately obvious. German actors use multilateral discourses explicitly to pursue their 
agenda and effectiveness of collective action has been a key discourse. In development cooperation, 
Germany has traditionally preferred to avoid political conflicts and instead used other channels for 
contestation. While there has been a domestic bilateral agenda, Germany has preferred a rhetoric of 
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multilateralism, which has been both consistent and persistent. This is evidenced, for example, in the 
so-called ‘Marshall Plan with Africa’ (BMZ, 2017a), which highlights ‘Europe’s stakes’ despite being an 
exclusively German policy. This ‘multilateral reflex’ is particularly relevant as the German 
development agenda goes beyond conceptions of aid giving, to include constructing internationally 
favourable conditions for development (BMZ, 2014; 2017b). Thus, engagement in the EU has a more 
prominent place when it comes to policies beyond aid. On the one hand, the EU is itself a system of 
international governance, which makes it a suitable forum for collective problem-solving. On the other 
hand, through the EU’s role as a global player, a wider system of international governance can be 
shaped more effectively, e.g., through its participation in the OECD-DAC, the international climate 
negotiations, and world trade rounds. 
Against this background, the chapter analyses how German actors have participated in the 
discursive networks on effective EU development cooperation. The extent to which Germany acts 
‘normally’ in an EU institutional system that favours intergovernmental interaction (Bickerton, et al., 
2014) adds to our understanding of who drives discourses on the EU’s role and how. The first section 
(I) of this chapter outlines the discourses of German development cooperation over time and how 
they have related to Community/EU policy. The second section (II) looks at the politics of EU aid in 
Germany. It disentangles the complex organisation of German development cooperation in the EU, 
and how actors coordinate and seek support for their arguments in the national and transnational 
arena. In the third section (III), the chapter then analyses the participation of German policy 
professionals in EU norm advocacy in the context of aid effectiveness to assess how their different 
discourses and capacities for engagement contributed to EU policy norms. 
 
 
I Development cooperation and the EU 
 
For a long time, Germany’s development cooperation was a substitute for, rather than a complement 
to, an assertive foreign policy. This shaped the advancement of German development cooperation, 
which has focused on political and commercial interests and has therefore been less progressive in its 
mandate. Although different political leadership put their stamp on German development policy, 
which empowered certain factions in the domestic constituency, there has been a great deal of 
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continuity. One observer at the German Development Institute (DIE) once compared the German aid 
system to a tanker at sea:  
German aid policy resembles a tanker. The size of its aid programme in absolute terms gives it a 
considerable weight in the convoy of donors and, for example, in efforts to improve donor co-
ordination. Like a tanker, German development co-operation has changed its course over time 
somewhat more slowly than some other reform-minded countries […], but once a change of course 
occurred, Germany has followed this course fairly steadily and reliably – again like tankers in real life. 
(Ashoff, 2005, p. 299) 
In this way, German discourses on international development have also shown a strong degree of 
continuity. They have been dominated by the pursuit of a global structural (or governance) policy and 
enhancing the effectiveness of cooperation. 
From the German perspective, the purpose of European integration in external relations was, 
in the 1950s, limited to opening third countries to international trade. This ambition was initially 
disappointed by French opposition, supported by the Commission (see chapter 2), and which thus 
created suspicion in Germany towards the common institutions.16 Pursuing a globalist trade policy 
remained a central concern in German discourses on the EU’s role thereafter. While Germany 
established its development policy in the 1950s, it was placed under the auspices of the Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation in 1961. Since financial assistance had previously been with the 
Federal Ministry of Economics, this influenced the way in which German aid developed (White, 1965, 
pp. 22-3). It meant that aid policy explicitly served German trade and domestic economic interests. 
Certain benefits, such as the creation of employment at home, were official criteria for committing 
German aid (Schmidt, 2015, p. 33). This directed aid towards large (prospective) export markets, 
which created a long-term bias in aid allocation to large, economically viable trade champions such as 
China, India, Brazil and Indonesia. Concerns about securing raw material imports have complemented 
this approach. While such a focus might be compatible with development objectives (Faust and Ziaja, 
                                                          
16 When France linked its approval to the Treaty of Rome to the financial commitment of Germany to its colonies 
in the late 1950s, Germany had not yet formulated a national external development assistance strategy. 
Nevertheless, although it has since contributed the lion’s share of the EU’s development budget together with 
France, it did not uncritically support the French conception of development cooperation. Germany, together 
with the Netherlands had challenged the particularistic Franco-European approach several times on the grounds 
of their universalist trade goals, originally with little success. Therefore, the German government insisted to 
maintain some degree of control about the collective European development efforts and posted the Director-
General as long as Frenchman held the office of Commissioner. 
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2012), it reflects strong and deeply embedded domestic pressure on the orientation of development 
cooperation in terms of commercial and business interests. 
At the same time, Germany’s development policy has also been part of its commitment to 
Western alliances and European integration. Thus, particularistic commercial and business interest 
were balanced against competing political interests. For instance, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s 
assent to the EDF was strongly criticised at home (Cosgrove Twitchett, 1978, p. 14). While opening 
formerly closed export markets in Francophone Africa was promoted as a ‘consolation price’ in 
exchange for Germany’s financial contribution, national businesses initially benefited little in practice. 
However, the German government came to accept the strong French influence on Community aid 
because of its overriding commitment to the vulnerable European unification process, even though, 
to some extent, this restricted Germany’s commercial and political engagement in Africa (Schmidt, 
2015, p. 33). Thus, Germany’s contribution to Community development cooperation fulfilled a 
different purpose from German aid coming out through bilateral channels (White, 1965, p. 22). 
Germany continued to promote a global orientation of European development cooperation, 
including its expansion to Latin America and Asia. This was facilitated partly by the accession of the 
United Kingdom (see chapters 2 and 5). Subsequently, the EU’s engagement in some third countries 
was also seen to have the potential for democratic transformation. While this became increasingly 
relevant as a German discourse on the EU’s role in the 1980s, the end of the Cold War brought this 
role of the EU to the forefront, as the government’s official development reports suggest (see BMZ, 
1993). However, the end of the Cold War came with multiple, partly competing shifts that became 
relevant for German discourses on the EU’s role. First, it meant that the EU could develop a strong 
role in the neighbourhood, especially in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Second, while the 
orientation towards the East was a German priority, German cooperation policies pushed to become 
more development-oriented, reflected, for instance, in the renaming of ministry from ‘Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation’ to ‘Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development’ 
in 1993.17 These competing discourses on Europe’s role were captured in the ministry’s 1993 report 
to parliament (Weißbuch), which expressed the need to assure that  
                                                          
17 From 1961 to 1993, the ministry was named Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit and 
thereafter Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, short BMZ. 
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The increase of the financial volume [of the EDF] reveals that the Community does not neglect its 
responsibility towards the Third World, even against the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and the 
related challenges. (BMZ, 1993, p. 91, translated by the author) 
Third, with the Treaty of Maastricht, the EU was not only given a competence in development 
cooperation beyond the external partnership agreement with the ACP countries, but it advanced into 
different policy areas, including foreign policy through the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP). This opened new avenues for German engagement through the EU and its institutions. 
The end of the Cold War strengthened Germany’s pre-existing propensity to see development 
cooperation as a policy for stability (Ashoff, 2005). Due to the high costs of reunification and increasing 
austerity considerations, financial resources for developing countries were reduced in the 1990s. At 
the same time, accelerated globalisation and changing security concerns, especially the crises in the 
Balkans and the opening of Eastern Europe, restructured the focus of German aid. The development 
ministry increasingly shifted towards conceiving development cooperation as part of what it called a 
‘global structural and peace policy’ (BMZ, 2001b, p. XI). While this perspective had already emerged 
in the early 1990s (BMZ, 1995, p. 47), it was strongly advanced under the long tenure of the social-
democratic Federal Minister Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul from 1998 to 2009, who also brought the EU 
into the picture. Coordination among EU member states in the run-up to international conferences, 
especially in the UN system, had been acknowledged as beneficial before: 
In the run-up to international conferences […] there is close coordination between the member states. 
A common approach on the basis on political recommendations facilitates the implementation of 
development policy priorities and thus simultaneously provides the Union with a distinct European 
profile. (BMZ, 1995, p. 108, translated by the author) 
However, from 1998 onwards, as evidenced in the ministry’s report in 2001, the EU as an institution 
played a more prominent role in areas of German policy interest beyond free trade, i.e., democracy 
and human rights, regional integration and crisis prevention (BMZ, 2001b, p. 157). 
These ambitions go back to the conception of German development cooperation as part of 
Germany’s overall foreign relations, its normative framework, principles and goals. Thus, it has been 
largely consistent with its post-war ‘civilian power’ image (see Maull, 1990). Issues of fragility and 
state failure moved closer to the centre of German development cooperation. This was accompanied 
after 1994 by a paradigm shift in Germany’s external relations concerning the use of military force 
abroad, first practiced in the Balkans. However, German engagement remained largely confined to 
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conflict prevention, and post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction of which development 
cooperation became a central component (Schmidt, 2015). Against this background, in 2001, the 
development minister demanded from the EU that  
preconditions for faster and more effective non-military crisis management of the EU must be created. 
The most recent example, the refugee catastrophe in Mozambique, showed that the combined use of 
military and non-military forces, of state and non-state actors, can accomplish fast and effective 
assistance for emergency relief and reconstruction. (Wieczorek-Zeul, 2001, p. 163, translated by the 
author) 
That the BMZ regarded the EU more openly as a central channel for shaping the global governance 
system was not primarily due to the EU’s own competence in development cooperation. Instead, it 
was due to the EU’s ‘explicitly political’ role in international trade, agriculture and fisheries, 
environmental protection, its role model character for regional integration, democracy, rule of law 
and human rights, and its role in international crisis management. This is, according to the ministry, 
what sets the EU apart from other international donors and constitutes its comparative advantage 
(BMZ, 2005, p. 175). Subsequent BMZ reports since 2008 put the EU in the service of Germany’s policy 
of improving global governance. While this had become the ministry’s main discourse on the EU’s 
role, different ministers have set different emphases depending on domestic priorities of the time. 
Thus, the EU’s role in global climate and energy governance was central during Germany’s Council 
Presidency in 2007 (BMZ, 2008), the EU’s role in international development effectiveness was 
highlighted in 2013 (BMZ, 2013a), and in managing the refugee crisis in 2017 (BMZ, 2017b). 
In contrast, the EU institutions’ role in development cooperation has long been seen in a more 
sceptical light. This became particularly relevant after Maastricht when the BMZ needed to develop a 
position on the Commission’s ambition as a donor and coordinator. German development actors saw 
the EU’s role therein as limited, and the German parliament (Bundestag) instead highlighted 
subsidiarity and the need for the EU institutions to become more efficient (BMZ, 1995, p. 119). This 
criticism of, and concern with, the EU institutions’ lack of efficiency was repeated thereafter (BMZ, 
2001b) and resonated with the criticism of other member states, in particular the United Kingdom 
(see chapter 5). While the BMZ had acknowledged the EU’s critical role in policy fields relevant to 
international development, e.g., trade, security, environment etc., it was more sceptical towards the 
role of the EU institutions in development cooperation. 
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This scepticism was also due to the lack of a clear conception of German development policy. 
In addition to commercial objectives (see above), development cooperation had long been used 
explicitly as a means of pursuing specific foreign policy objectives. These were originally arranged 
around West Germany’s aim of receiving international recognition, which resulted in spreading aid 
widely, known as ‘watering-can approach’ (Gießkannenprinzip), and aid to Israel and Yugoslavia 
(Schmidt, 2015, pp. 31-2). Aid had also been used for more distinct geopolitical concerns where other 
means of foreign policy were absent, e.g., in the case of aid for Turkey and Egypt that was justified as 
a contribution to the Middle East peace process, and after the end of the Cold War for Eastern Europe 
and again the Balkans (Faust and Ziaja, 2012). While an enhanced focus on poverty eradication had 
emerged at several points,18 it was only with the international resurgence of poverty orientation and 
a focus on fundamental needs, most prominently codified in the UN Millennium Declaration in 2000, 
that German development cooperation reflected this orientation more consistently. The formal 
codification of poverty reduction in the ‘Programme of Action 2015 for Poverty Reduction’ of 2001 
(BMZ, 2001a) has thus been regarded as a ‘milestone’ in the conceptual framework of German 
development cooperation, also due to its wide support within Germany (Ashoff, 2005, pp. 275-6). 
On this basis, the BMZ recognised the EU’s clout in international development negotiations. 
Referring to the international development conferences of the early 2000s, the ministry 
acknowledged that ‘The EU has been able to assert its superior weight in the past years especially at 
global development conferences’ (BMZ, 2005, p. 175, translated by the author). This referred 
primarily to the Monterrey consensus on financing for development, which established parameters 
on aid quantity and quality. While the contribution of the EU institutions to the aid effectiveness 
conferences in Paris and Accra received little recognition under Wieczorek-Zeul – with the exception 
of the German contribution to the EU Code of Conduct on the Division of Labour (see chapter 3) – it 
demonstrated to the subsequent political leadership in Germany that the EU’s role in international 
development negotiations was relevant. By 2011, German officials had defined the purpose of the EU 
in helping Germany to shape the international effectiveness discourse. In 2011, Dirk Niebel (2009-
2013) of the liberal party, who followed on Wieczorek-Zeul as development minister, asserted that 
‘The EU is present in almost all countries and has a pioneering role for efforts for more effectiveness. 
We want to use this potential better’ (BMZ, 2013a, p. 41, translated by the author). The Commission 
                                                          
18 This was the case under the tenure of the social-democratic Development Minister Erhard Eppler (1968-1974) 
and again in the early 1990s, which was also reflected in the renaming of ministry in 1993 (see above). 
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was increasingly recognised as an actor and its role had become presented as that of a BMZ ally in 
Europe, one that shared German concerns, especially regarding effectiveness (BMZ, 2013a, p. 42). To 
highlight this more strategic multilateral engagement, Niebel provided a first ‘strategy’ for Germany’s 
multilateral engagement, which had been missing before (OECD, 2010a). It was introduced in 2013 
with an explicit focus on effectiveness (BMZ, 2013c). While this focus was certainly informed by the 
political affiliation and preferences of the minister, it was compatible with the overall German 
discourse. Simultaneously, Niebel stressed the commitment to work bilaterally with France (BMZ, 
2013b), which emphasised the horizontal perspective in the German discourse to work with allies to 
influence the global governance system. 
The EU’s failure to maintain its influence on international discourses in international climate 
and development conferences in Copenhagen (2009) and Busan (2011) highlighted the limits of the 
EU’s role. At the same time, re-emerging domestic priorities, especially migration, but also climate 
change and environment, cast doubts among German development actors over the role of the 
Commission as an ally. In 2017, the BMZ report stated that achieving the goals of the agenda 2030 did 
not only require fundamentally reconsidering individual instruments but also ‘the self-understanding 
of the EU as a development policy actor’ (BMZ, 2017b, p. 72). Against the pressures of migration and 
climate change, the EU appeared mainly as a financial contributor. Beyond these limited functions, 
the EU was seen in an instrumental way, mainly limited to its power in global trade:  
In addition to tackling the root causes of migration, improving the social and environmental standards 
in global supply chains, which can be implemented effectively globally due to the EU’s market power, 
is a priority of German development policy in the EU. (BMZ, 2017b, p. 190, translated by the author) 
Hence, the multilateralist bias, which has motivated much of Germany’s active engagement in the EU, 
has primarily affected policies outside aid and development cooperation. The EU has been a channel 
of Germany’s ambition of shaping the global governance system both as a model and as a collective 
actor in the international system. As both Germany’s and the EU’s interest in international 
development broadened, this increasingly involved the EU’s role in development cooperation. 
However, the role of the EU institutions, especially the Commission, in development cooperation was 
regarded as limited, with the main exception of asserting its weight in international trade. This 
changed with a more assertive engagement under Federal Minister Niebel who perceived the 
Commission as a ‘horizontal’ ally for Germany’s global policy ambitions when it came to the shaping 
FEDERATING EU DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION? 
124 
of international institutions for policy effectiveness. Since then, the role of the EU has become more 
ambiguous and less pertinent. 
 
 
II Bureaucracy, fragmentation, expertise 
 
The organisation and institutional set-up of development cooperation has had repercussions for the 
engagement of German policy professionals in and with the EU. The complexity of development 
cooperation structures comes together with the general ‘de-concentration’ of Germany’s domestic 
institutional structures for EU policy-making, i.e., the sectorisation of policy responsibilities (Bulmer, 
et al., 2000; Bulmer, et al., 2001). Sectorisation refers to the sector-specific representation in the EU. 
It comes with the potential for political competition between ministries and policy communities, 
which may undermine each other. As a result, even when the political commitment to ‘doing things 
through the EU’ is high among officials, political parties and socio-economic stakeholders, this can be 
undermined by the loosely coordinated articulation of German interests in day-to-day government 
diplomacy in Brussels (Bulmer and Paterson, 2010, p. 1057). 
For development cooperation, the issue of coordinating political engagement in the EU has 
been amplified by a persistent lack of separation between political governance and the 
implementation of development cooperation. The ministry’s capacity for engaging in the EU has been 
significantly enhanced by the separate implementation agencies and other closely affiliated 
organisations. Keeping close contact with the development professionals in these organisations has 
been indispensable for government officials at all points, also when going to Brussels. However, the 
fragmented organisation of the development constituency means that political steering has been a 
challenge. While officials seek to anticipate much of the political demands when engaging in 
expertise-based coordination, there continues to be partly competing messages communicated in 
Brussels. There have been different attempts at dealing with this issue, most prominently, the 
institutional reforms under Dirk Niebel between 2009 and 2013, which were aimed at improving the 
effectiveness of German development cooperation through enhancing the capacity for political 
steering within the sector. 
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These institutional arrangements shape how Germany engages at the European level and how 
German development professionals participate in EU norm advocacy. While these arrangements shift 
over time, this section outlines the two main themes that have shaped the country’s politics of EU 
development cooperation. First, German bureaucratic representation externally is not centralised but 
horizontally fragmented and sectorised. This comes with compliance-based parliamentary scrutiny. 
As a result, the development ministry (BMZ) enjoys a degree of autonomy when engaging in the EU 
from the Bundestag, civil society and other government departments as long as it remains within the 
confines of legal requirements, for instance, regarding the budget, and does not step onto other 
actors’ ‘turf’. Second, ministry officials need to engage with policy professionals to substantiate and 
promote policies. While BMZ officials have the political responsibility, they lack technical capacity. 
The necessary substantial expertise comes from specific government-funded, state-owned 
organisations and agencies with different technical expertise and experience from the field, which are 
closely affiliated with the ministry, rather than from traditional NGOs. This is a central component of 
German state-society organisation. 
 
Representing development cooperation 
 
Institutional complexity has been a defining feature of German development cooperation because its 
organisation had emerged incrementally with more and diverse actors joining the system. Originally, 
until a dedicated development ministry was founded in 1961, competences were spread over several 
government departments. Since 1961, development cooperation has been represented at federal 
cabinet-level by a federal government department (BMZ). This status has provided development 
cooperation with some political autonomy vis-à-vis foreign affairs, trade and defence. At the same 
time, it increases the political fragmentation of Germany’s international relations internally and 
externally. This is due to the horizontal political division of policy sectors, which means that the 
political responsibility is with the respective minister (Ressortprinzip). As a result, the existence of the 
ministry had not always been a given. Before the conservative-liberal government formed in 2009, 
Dirk Niebel, who later became the development minister, favoured the abolition of the ministry to 
merge its competences into the Federal Foreign Office. 
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The scope of engagement is confined by the guidelines outlined by the chancellor according 
to which the ministries are formed. The BMZ and its minister have the primary political responsibility 
for development cooperation. Traditionally, more than half of German ODA had been channelled 
through the BMZ budget, but since 2013 this share has continuously fallen to a third in 2016 (Bohnet, 
et al., 2018, p. 11). This was also due to the expenses for the large number of refugees in Germany in 
2015 and 2016, which count as aid for the OECD’s statistical purposes (see table 1). As a result, the 
BMZ budget, despite increases, has constituted a smaller proportion. Other government 
departments, e.g., the ministries responsible for the economy, health, or education and research, 
continue to be responsible for disbursing sector-specific funds. Especially the Federal Foreign Office 
(Auswärtiges Amt), the Federal Ministry of Defence or the Federal Chancellery also play a role in 
specific geographic contexts, e.g., in Afghanistan, or thematic and overarching issues, e.g., migration, 
and they have their own agendas when it comes to engaging in the EU. In addition, there is 
development assistance by the federal states (Länder), about 5.4 percent of total ODA in 2015 
(Bohnet, et al., 2018, p. 11), which is a particular element of German development cooperation 
(Ashoff, 2005, p. 283). Thus, the BMZ has never been unrivalled in its competence, although civil 
society organisations, the Christian churches in Germany, as well as a cross-party ‘informal coalition’ 
in the Bundestag have long supported the ministry’s emphasis on aid as an expression of solidarity 
(Schmidt, 2015, pp. 31-2), in contrast to other interests and values. 
German federal government departments have their own ‘EU competence’, which means that 
they are responsible for promoting and defending departmental and governmental interests in the 
EU. Thus, the BMZ engages directly with EU institutions and other member states horizontally on all 
levels. Internationally, German development cooperation is represented by the ministry’s political 
leadership, i.e., the minister and the secretaries of state, and the units in Berlin responsible for the 
ministry’s international representation. The latter coordinate Germany’s input into European and 
multilateral development cooperation. Apart from the EU, the BMZ is represented on all relevant 
international development bodies, such as the World Bank and the UN, where it puts forward the 
strategies and positions adopted in German development policy. The ministry’s representation in 
Berlin is responsible for the coordination of the internal units, as well as communicating and 
coordinating its policies with external actors. The minister or a state secretary represents Germany in 
the informal EU Development Council meetings and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) meetings when 
dealing with development topics. That this is not done by the permanent representative, as is the case 
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for several other EU member states, identifies Germany as one of the member states which give 
significant attention to development cooperation. 
The lynchpin between the national and EU level in the BMZ is a dedicated EU department. 
The officials in the EU department collect input from within the German development constituency 
and promote it externally. To do so, the department seconds a team to the German permanent 
representation in Brussels. There is a very close connection and interaction between officials in the 
ministry’s EU department in Berlin and its seconded staff in the permanent representation in Brussels 
through frequent phone calls, video conferencing, and personal exchanges during and on the 
periphery of EU meetings (Interviews BMZ#1, #2; PREP#1). In contrast, there is potential for a 
disconnect between staff in Berlin/Brussels, and the majority of staff in the thematic and geographic 
departments, which are mostly situated in Bonn.19 The BMZ staff in Brussels receives its written and 
verbal instructions through the EU department in Berlin, but the input for these instructions comes 
directly from the relevant thematic and geographic departments within the ministry. These 
departments are expected to deal with EU (and other multilateral) aspects largely autonomously and 
prepare the instructions based on their awareness of European processes. 
Due to increasing demands for horizontal, working-level interactions in the EU on topics that 
require expert engagement, EU competence in thematic and geographic departments becomes more 
relevant. The knowledge and awareness of EU processes and, generally, of European development 
cooperation processes, had traditionally been low. Thus, according to an interviewee, it has been part 
of the role of the EU department to communicate the functioning of EU processes to the relevant 
units; yet the knowledge of EU processes has been improving with new generations of graduates 
joining the ministry (Interview BMZ#1). In general, however, the feeling for the European ‘business’ 
in thematic and geographic units has been less developed unless EU issues are reoccurring for a longer 
period or are a ministerial priority. Therefore, the quality and intensity of horizontal engagement at 
the European level varies significantly between different BMZ units. 
BMZ officials engage directly with their counterparts in the EU institutions and member states 
where this is relevant, i.e., on topics that have been pushed either by Germany or in the EU and 
                                                          
19 When the capital of the Federal Republic of Germany was moved from Bonn to Berlin, the ministry was split. 
Most of its administrative overhead, and the thematic and geographic units remained in Bonn, which also 
remained the official first seat of the ministry. Primarily the political and coordination units moved in Berlin, 
closer to the political centre. In addition, a small proportion of employees are always abroad taking on 
development policy assignments worldwide for a period of a few years. 
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require expert-based responses (Interviews BMZ#1, #3). For this reason, BMZ issue specialists engage 
directly in expert groups, for example on transparency, which could be termed ‘a large issue-specific 
network of issue experts’ (Interview BMZ#3). In 2013, the BMZ identified two ways of engaging 
systematically in multilateral organisations, codifying such practices and offering guidance for 
strategic engagement. First, the ministry identifies its own priorities internally and promotes them, 
for instance, ‘by the BMZ placing staff in an issue-focused manner at key interfaces within the EU […] 
and maintaining close exchange’ (BMZ, 2013c, p. 9). Placing such a seconded national expert (SNE) 
was the case, for instance, for joint programming (see below). Second, the BMZ was asked to react to 
priorities of multilateral organisations based on political priorities. This is an attempt at providing 
stronger overall political guidance. This has been the case, for instance, for EU budget support. 
Including stricter criteria for budget support was part of the coalition agreement between the 
conservative and liberal parties after the 2009 election (Merkel, et al., 2009, p. 130). In most other 
cases, however, exchanges on the working level consist of mere information exchanges and in 
extreme cases, national issue professionals are even substituted by staff from the permanent 
representation in meetings in Brussels. 
The multiplicity of other pressures on thematic and geographic units, especially on country 
desks to spend bilateral funds in a way that satisfies their accountability obligations, make it difficult 
to keep EU issues high on their agenda. This situation is exacerbated since political priorities have not 
been, with few exceptions, on multilateral issues. On the one hand, there is some lack of awareness 
of senior ministry officials of multilateral processes (Interview BMZ#1). The political leadership often 
comes in with little background in external relations, let alone development cooperation. Instead, 
especially for political appointed officials, political experience tends to be closer to home in domestic 
policy. On the other hand, this background means that the political leadership comes in with 
domestically informed political priorities. However, changing priorities, for example, moving attention 
to specific sectors, may obstruct the longer-term promotion of priorities through the administrative 
system, especially in overarching topics such as effectiveness. Bilateral cooperation can be steered 
more easily towards political and ministerial priorities where visibility is key. Thus, there is a tendency 
to favour bilateral cooperation, especially when the new political leadership takes office. Despite a 
general tendency to favour multilateral engagement, it takes some time to adapt to and familiarise 
with processes of multilateral development cooperation and to decide how to engage with them. 
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The political system of parliamentary scrutiny in the German parliament exacerbates the 
policy area’s executive focus. German parliamentary scrutiny is based on a system of checking 
compliance through interrogating the political leadership and publishing their responses. This general 
working system has implications for engaging on issues of transparency and accountability (see below; 
Interviews BMZ#3; BT#1; CON#2). In the Bundestag, development cooperation is represented in a 
separate committee on economic cooperation and development (Ausschuss für Wirtschaftliche 
Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung) whose agenda corresponds to the competence of the ministry. 
Hence, the development committee also deals with EU development cooperation where appropriate. 
In exceptional cases, issues of EU development cooperation are dealt with in the Bundestag’s separate 
Europe committee, e.g., in the case of migration (Interview BT#1). As the development committee is 
not a legislative committee, its main function is scrutiny. In addition, the committee conducts debates 
and takes decisions on the fundamental principles of development policy, topical issues or specific 
regions. These debates are based on reports produced by the government, including the White Paper 
(Weißbuch), a report to the parliament, which is usually published once per legislative term, or current 
political events and international conferences. Especially current events generate wider attention and 
often begin a political top-down process in the ministry, most prominently, migration since 2015 
(Interview BMZ#1; BT#1). Increasingly, development policy concerns are also being taken into 
consideration in crisis management and prevention, foreign trade and foreign policy. Thus, there are 
overlaps with other Parliament committees. 
Political attention means increasing involvement of other government departments and 
pressure from day-to-day politics. As this suggests, despite the ministry’s autonomy, there are limits 
to the engagement of BMZ officials in the EU. The ministry’s mandate is not fully congruent with all 
issues that are discussed and covered in EU development cooperation, especially within the wider 
framework of ACP cooperation. Moreover, there are different processes in place that deal with issues 
of horizontal coherence. The Federal Foreign Office oversees humanitarian assistance and 
coordinates Germany’s interventions, including development cooperation, in countries such as in 
Afghanistan or Mali, where the Federal Ministry of Defence has also played an important role. 
However, also in other contexts, the BMZ’s limits to political appropriateness are often reached within 
discussion in the EU, which requires collaboration with other government departments. This issue is 
particularly crucial, as, on the government side, the Foreign Office stands between the BMZ and the 
actors on the ‘ground’ in partner countries where concrete policy coordination with EU actors takes 
place. Therefore, certain BMZ-backed EU policies, such as joint programming, have been promoted 
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internally primarily where the BMZ has its own actors present (Interview BMZ#1; Krüger and 
Steingass, 2018). This points to a general condition for ministry officials to be able to promote 
priorities in the EU. 
 
Generating capacity for Brussels 
 
While the BMZ is politically responsible and represents Germany in the EU, much of its capacity has 
come from closely associated organisations, which constitute the core of Germany’s development 
cooperation constituency. Whereas the thematic and regional units in the ministry have the 
responsibility and authority over programmes and projects, the implementation of development 
cooperation has been delegated to various organisations. These include powerful agencies, 
consultancies and NGOs, a large proportion of the latter are political foundations (Stiftungen) and 
churches. 
In Germany, political governance and the implementation of development cooperation have 
always been separated, providing a clear division of labour. While political steering comes from the 
ministry, specialised, predominantly state-owned agencies conduct financial, technical and personnel 
cooperation with and in third countries. Shortly after the development ministry had been founded, 
the first development agencies followed, such as the German Development Service DED (1963). Other 
organisations followed later, especially the provider of development consulting services GTZ (1975),20 
which merged into the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and dominates 
the German development cooperation landscape. Despite their formal separation, questions of 
political governance can often not be separated from implementation, and therefore require that 
implementing agencies are involved in high-level management talks (Interview CON#2; BMZ, 2013c, 
p. 10). The BMZ requires the support of these organisations when engaging with EU actors, especially 
their knowledge and feedback from the ‘ground’. This applies to both promoting political priorities 
and reacting to EU-level initiatives. Thus, professionals in these agencies play a role – at least in the 
background – for representing Germany in the EU. 
                                                          
20 The BMZ also provides funds to other federal agencies, such as the Federal Agency for Geosciences and 
Natural Resources (BGR) and the National Metrology Institute (PTB). 
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While the international engagement of these organisations can have political implications, 
prioritisation comes mainly from the political and top administrative levels in the BMZ. The BMZ has 
a clear policy steering role at headquarters-level. However, as a ministry, it has limited human 
resources, compared to its budget, and capacity constraints when it comes to subject knowledge and 
expertise. As with most German ministries, the BMZ had traditionally been staffed predominantly by 
lawyers. While this has changed significantly over time, the ministry’s capacities have remained 
limited as it does not have its own representations on the ‘ground’ to help inform decision-making as 
compared to, for instance, Britain’s development department DFID (OECD, 2015, p. 54; see chapter 
5). Individual BMZ officials are seconded to several German embassies as ‘policy advisors’ to improve 
ministerial steering. Following an agreement between the BMZ and the Foreign Office, which is in 
charge, seconded BMZ staff becomes part of the foreign service (OECD, 2015, p. 56). This makes them 
answerable officially to the foreign service hierarchy whereas communication with the BMZ ‘home’ 
unit is informal. 
Despite these limits, Germany has a strong, well-informed and knowledgeable representation 
in third countries through its aid agencies (Rauch, 2015), which ‘allow it to play a prominent role in 
policy dialogue with partner governments and in co-ordinating other development partners’ (OECD, 
2015, p. 67). These stakeholders include a powerful aid agency and a development bank, GIZ and KfW 
respectively,21 but also other government ministries, federal states, political foundations, church-
based organisations, NGOs, scientific and training institutions. Thus, in partner countries, key German 
implementation agencies have their own representations. In contrast to the BMZ country desks, the 
GIZ country desks are usually better staffed and can draw on their experience from the organisation’s 
various activities (Interview CON#2). BMZ officials commission implementing organisations with 
executing the agreements, which set out in detail the objectives, time schedules, form and volume of 
support, and they monitor the results of their work. For a long time, however, internal harmonisation 
between the different agencies was perceived as a major problem for the German aid system with 
negative repercussions for aid effectiveness, repeatedly highlighted by the OECD (OECD, 2010a, pp. 
78-9; see also Rauch, 2015). The complexity of the German aid system not only entails problems of 
coordination but also provides an additional level of complexity for partner countries and 
international partners. In 2010, an OECD-DAC peer review on Germany, referring to two independent 
                                                          
21 Financial and technical co-operation have separate budgets and are implemented by different institutions. 
Germany’s financial cooperation is through (concessional) loans by the German development bank 
(Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, KfW), similar to the European Investment Bank (EIB) on the EU-level. 
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studies (Ashoff, 2008; Eurodad and Reality of Aid, 2010), explicitly noted a relationship between the 
internal complexity of the German aid system and its adverse effect on external coordination:  
it is noticeable that two recent surveys of aid effectiveness in Germany’s development co-operation 
highlight harmonisation within the German development co-operation system as a major issue […] but 
it is important to note at this point the negative impact of Germany’s fragmented development co-
operation system on its capacity to harmonise aid with other development partners. This theme was 
picked up by the second survey […], which reported that respondents in BMZ, DED, KfW and GTZ felt 
that harmonisation within the German aid system remained a considerable challenge that in some 
cases needed to be addressed before there could be effective harmonisation with other development 
partners. Germany’s institutional fragmentation is also hampering its efforts to make greater use of 
common arrangements or procedures and to co-ordinate joint missions. (OECD, 2010a, pp. 78-9, 
emphasis in original) 
This assessment suggests that the institutional fragmentation has affected Germany’s external 
representation and preferences concerning multilateral cooperation and coordination. 
A major reform of the German aid agency landscape in 2010 (Vorfeldreform), directed by the 
development minister of the time, Dirk Niebel, aimed at reducing the system’s complexity in order to 
increase the effectiveness of German development cooperation (Rauch, 2015). The reform reduced 
the number of German development agencies that focused on technical assistance to create one 
central, highly capable and articulate aid agency for technical cooperation, which outranked the 
ministry in terms of size by about 20:1 (OECD, 2015, pp. 58-9). As such, the GIZ, which is a fully state-
owned limited liability company, has a prominent role. While its core task is the implementation of 
German (and other donors’) projects and programmes, it also offers consulting services to the BMZ 
on overarching policy issues (Sektorvorhaben). This consultancy focuses mostly on sector policies, e.g., 
education or climate, but it has also included cross-cutting issues such as the implementation of 
development effectiveness principles (Interview CON#2). Through these direct consultations, GIZ 
professionals influence policy formulation. 
The ministry often heavily relies on the GIZ’s input. The GIZ, whose staff is directly and usually 
in significant numbers present in over 130 countries, far more than the BMZ, draws on its vast 
experience from its representation in the field. Part of this experience comes from the 
implementation of projects and programmes of other donors. According to the 2015 peer review by 
the OECD (2015, p. 54), some 15% of GIZ’s activities have been commissioned by ministries other than 
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the BMZ, including the European Commission. In has included, for example, technical cooperation in 
the context of accompanying EU budget support (Interview CON#2). While political oversight remains 
with the BMZ, the GIZ has a certain degree of autonomy in its acquisition of external contracts. Based 
on the intimate knowledge of GIZ professionals of both the conditions on the ‘ground’ and the working 
system of the German (and international) aid system, the GIZ assists the BMZ in its engagement within 
multilateral development cooperation, including at international conferences and in the EU where 
BMZ officials are often in convoy with experts from the GIZ and KfW (Interviews BMZ#3; CON#2). To 
benefit from the available expertise that is generated in the German development constituency, 
professionals from the different organisations work on specific topics in ‘work teams’, which consist 
of the relevant thematic experts from the different organisations and coordinate policy expertise. 
Depending on the issue, the BMZ asks for the participation of and consultation with relevant experts 
from the different organisations that it supports financially. These working-level experts coordinate a 
position nationally, which is then represented internationally by the BMZ, e.g., in EU expert groups. 
Despite this coordination, BMZ officials continuously rely on the technical support and knowledge 
from the field and are thus also accompanied in technical seminars at the EU level (Interview CON#2). 
In addition to the GIZ, the BMZ is closely associated to other organisations which contribute 
to developing its priorities and positions internally and externally. One of these organisations is the 
German Development Institute (Deutsche Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, DIE). The DIE is a research 
institute or think tank, funded by the BMZ. It has three core functions in the German aid system: 1) 
research, 2) policy advice and 3) training. While its work is research-oriented, DIE researchers work 
closely with BMZ officials on bilateral and multilateral questions of development cooperation, 
including the EU, since the early/mid-1970s, and they engage in relevant European networks such as 
the European Think Tank Group (ETTG). The DIE has undertaken research on EU development policies, 
especially where this has been deemed relevant within the BMZ. The BMZ can commission studies 
and assessments directly, but it also supports the DIE with core funding. This provides the researchers 
in the DIE with some autonomy in selecting fields for research and setting priorities. On effectiveness 
and multilateral development policy, the DIE has developed a large portfolio. DIE and GIZ 
professionals also engage directly on technical questions to avoid overlaps or push topics internally. 
With the increasing international and domestic attention, and pressure on improving results 
for national and mutual accountability, the German Institute for Development Evaluation (Deutsches 
Evaluierungsinstitut der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, DEval) emerged as a later addition to the 
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system in 2012. DEval was founded under the auspices of Federal Minister Niebel (2012) as the 
‘closing act’ of his institutional reform agenda to make German development cooperation more 
efficient and effective. The institute has been mandated to evaluate the effectiveness of German 
publicly funded development projects, programmes and policies. It supports the BMZ to improve its 
policy-making with the goal of increasing the effectiveness and impact of development interventions 
by Germany’s implementing organisations and NGOs. In this context, DEval also provides evidence to 
the Bundestag to support the parliament in performing its scrutiny. Thus, through its evaluations, the 
organisation is supposed to enhance the transparency of German development cooperation. 
However, evaluation of different policies was shared between BMZ, GIZ and Deval (Interview CON#1). 
Especially the evaluation of multilateral development cooperation remained in the BMZ. 
The ‘tight’ organisation of the domestic development constituency has left little room for 
private NGOs in aid and development cooperation. The NGO landscape is traditionally dominated by 
churches and political foundations (Stiftungen), which are closely associated to the political and 
administrative organisation of the state. There are separate budget lines for six political foundations 
and the development associations of the Protestant and the Catholic Church, which allows them to 
engage in countries or sectors that are not part of the ministry’s bilateral programming (OECD, 2015, 
pp. 36-7). In 2012, a not-for-profit service provider (‘Engagement Global’) was founded. It has been 
commissioned and funded by the BMZ and offers a point of contact for civil society. Nevertheless, civil 
society in Germany has found it difficult to engage constructively on strategic policy issues at the heart 
of German aid policy, especially aid effectiveness. According to the OECD (2015, p. 68), ‘some 
stakeholders point to a risk that the autonomy of NGOs be [sic] reduced by a tendency to use them 
to pursue the German government’s objectives’. 
German NGOs have been less active in promoting discourses transnationally as, for instance, 
in the case of Britain with is transnationally-operating private NGOs and NGO networks (see chapter 
5). Instead, German NGOs have been more in the background and often focus on awareness-raising 
and non-aid policies in German political circles (Interviews NGO#5, #6). The German civil society 
umbrella organisation (Verband Entwicklungspolitik und Humanitäre Hilfe deutscher 
Nichtregierungsorganisationen e.V., VENRO) engages on European issues predominantly indirectly 
through CONCORD. The shift away from aid due to the universality of the UN’s post-2015 
development agenda gave them a more easily accessible area of engagement and securing funding in 
the domestic context. This includes topics like sustainable consumption, taxation, energy and 
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environment. EU co-financing, in contrast, had become increasingly less relevant for their activity 
(Interview NGO#5). This has made NGOs become even less interested in Germany’s engagement at 
the EU level. 
As a result, rather than through a wider transnational network, the participation of German 
ministerial officials in EU norm advocacy has long been in close cooperation with development 
professionals and researchers from associated organisations who provide relevant additional expert 
capacity. This internal working mode of a coordinative discourse for policy norm advocacy has also 
been reflected outward in the mode for engaging within the EU. 
 
 
III Effectiveness, efficiency and coordination 
 
The effectiveness and the quality of development cooperation have long been central to German 
discourses on development cooperation. An important discursive distinction therein lies between the 
terms Wirksamkeit (effectiveness) and Effizienz (efficiency); the German term Effektivität is used more 
ambiguously. The discourses on effectiveness and efficiency have motivated support for a range of 
international arrangements and initiatives in development cooperation. With the emergence of the 
international aid effectiveness principles in the early 2000s, these principles fitted with the German 
ambition for a global structural policy, which goes beyond international development to improve the 
efficiency of global governance. As global governance principles, they became connected to the 
function that Germans attributed to the EU (see above). Despite overlaps between (i) efficiency; (ii) 
the effectiveness of projects, programmes and policies; and (iii) the international effectiveness 
principles, divisions remained within the German institutional structure and between relevant actors, 
which affected how and on what grounds development actors supported arguments for EU policy 
norms. 
German policy professionals have been influential in advocating policy norms that have come 
to characterise the EU’s role in effective development cooperation. Yet they have not always been 
able to do so in the same way. German policy professionals actively shaped and preserved the 
discourse on the relationship between effectiveness and coordination within the EU’s bureaucratic 
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circles, which allowed them to advance collective EU policy norms for coordination against resistance, 
especially from the UK. In contrast, they had less of an impact on the EU policy norm for aid 
transparency. The remainder of this section deconstructs these processes of norm promotion and 
contestation. It pays specific attention to the different role of policy and issue experts, on the one 
hand, and those actors close to Brussels who act as advocates and gatekeepers for different 
discourses, on the other hand. The first part of this section traces how German development policy 
actors helped promote an EU coordination norm for enhancing effectiveness, especially through the 
policy tool of joint programming. The second part unravels the reactions within the German aid 
constituency towards increasing discursive differentiation over effectiveness on the EU level. 
 
Making sense of EU coordination 
 
Since the 1990s, Germany had increasingly advocated better coordination of development 
cooperation within the EU (BMZ, 1993, pp. 89-90; 1995, p. 113). The precept of coordination in the 
Treaty of Maastricht was acknowledged as a means of enhancing the efficiency of European 
development cooperation: 
The development policy of the EC creates the framework for a coordination process between the 
member states and the Commission […]. This wide coordination process aims at enhancing the 
efficiency of development aid of the Community and its member states. […] The coordination precept 
creates the preconditions for a future division of labour, based on comparative advantages, which 
allows for improving efficiency and synergy effects. (BMZ, 1993, pp. 89-90, translated by the author) 
This coordination norm was perceived as a positive step to avoid competition, initially over structural 
adjustment programmes with the Bretton Woods institutions, but also to avoid the subordination of 
the Community to these institutions (BMZ, 1993, p. 89). 
Thereafter, however, the EU’s promotion of enhancing coordination and complementarity 
had received mixed reactions in the German aid constituency. The official governmental and 
ministerial position remained reluctant during the 1990s and early 2000s under both conservative 
and, after 1998, social-democratic development ministers. While increasing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the EU was a central concern of German engagement on EU institutional questions in 
development cooperation, especially during the German Council Presidency in 1999 (BMZ, 2001b, pp. 
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83, 157), the political opposition of the conservative Christian democrats felt that the government 
during the tenure of the social-democrat Wieczorek-Zeul was not doing enough. A group of 
parliamentarians was critical that ‘coordination and coherence between the development 
cooperation of the EU Commission […] and national development activities of the EU partner 
countries have hardly improved’ (Brauksiepe, et al., 2003, p. 1, translated by the author). Therefore, 
they demanded from the government that it should  
work towards a vastly better coordination of EU development cooperation with the bilateral 
development activities of the individual EU member states and, in this context, increasingly implement 
programmes and projects that are co-financed with the EU Commission; (Brauksiepe, et al., 2003, p. 2, 
translated by the author) 
While the parliamentarians still talked of the ‘quality’ and ‘efficiency’ of EU development cooperation, 
it was primarily the German Development Institute (DIE) which – eagerly – picked up EU coordination 
in the context of the emerging international development effectiveness principles (Ashoff, 2004; 
2008). 
Subsequently, the ministry became interested in European aid effectiveness. However, there 
was a perception in the DIE that, although Germany had welcomed stronger European coordination 
of (national) development policies, it remained critical of the Commission’s role in steering European 
coordination (Ashoff, 2005, p. 290). Indeed, the Commission was not given public credit for its efforts 
or potential in this respect as outlined in the European Consensus on Development. Instead, the BMZ 
initially continued to separate the issue of Commission policy and efforts to improve coordination 
between member states (BMZ, 2008, p. 205). While coordination had been a lingering option, the 
BMZ eventually reacted to the Commission’s efforts of pushing EU coordination as a means of 
improving the effectiveness of European development cooperation. Based on its previous 
preferences, a European division of labour became the most prominent effectiveness principle in 
Germany and German officials began to push it as such in the EU (Interview PREP#1). Political actors 
used the German Council Presidency in the first half of 2007 to put weight behind their support, which 
determined the German position and course of engagement in the EU for several years. Especially 
during and after its presidency (which coincided with its G7 presidency), the government and senior 
ministry officials emphasised the EU division of labour for increasing the effectiveness of the EU in 
development cooperation:  
FEDERATING EU DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION? 
138 
Furthermore, a Code of Conduct for the Division of Labour in the EU was decided: more efficient 
coordination of donors is to reduce the burden on the partners and increase the effectiveness of EU 
aid. With this initiative, Europe is asserting its pioneering role in implementing the Paris Agenda. 
(Bundesregierung, 2007, p. 36). 
Despite deficiencies in political steering, at this point, BMZ actors engaging in and with Brussels were 
able to establish a strong understanding of division of labour as a means for effective development 
cooperation against competing effectiveness principles. 
Hence, it took until about 2007 that promoting coordination, which had been on the German 
multilateral development policy agenda since the 1990s, and stronger support from the BMZ to push 
EU coordination as a means of improving the effectiveness of European development cooperation 
became connected. This was only after this discourse, also with the support of the Commission, had 
been firmly established at the international level. Due to the international prominence of the 
coordination discourse, especially researchers in the DIE had already established experience on the 
topic on which BMZ’s officials could draw in their interactions at the EU level. This support was 
reflected in several commissioned and BMZ-funded studies of the time (Furness, 2010; Mürle, 2007). 
The DIE had become an outspoken advocate of the advantage of the EU in reducing fragmentation. It 
criticised the international community because, while it had translated several requirements for 
policies to be effective into international commitments, it had missed an institutional dimension:  
The exception […] is the Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development 
Policy adopted by the EU in 2007. It aims to reduce the number of EU donors engaged in a country or 
sector by division of labour. (Ashoff, 2008, p. 2) 
While the DIE called for a strengthening of the institutional agenda also at the European level, the 
BMZ lowered this expectation and highlighted a more intergovernmental understanding of 
coordination through division of labour. 
German support for EU coordination surged between about 2007 and 2013 and thus after the 
heyday of the international harmonisation discourse. EU coordination was promoted most strongly 
when improving efficiency of national development policy was at the top of the national agenda. 
There was additional political weight when international pressure on aid quantity surged, partly due 
to the German failure to live up to the aid quantity commitments. Following the international 
operationalisation of division of labour in the second half of the 2000s, especially in Accra (2008), 
German development actors began to adopt and appropriate division of labour more strongly and 
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took it to the EU level. The BMZ took the lead on the EU Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour in 
2009 together with the Commission to support the implementation of the in-country division of 
labour and complementarity until 2011 (BMZ, 2009, p. 5). This cooperation between BMZ and 
Commission officials continued despite the change of the coalition in government in late 2009. It was 
even amplified due the new minister’s priority of showcasing efficiency and effectiveness of 
development cooperation. Under the incoming Federal Minister Niebel (2009-2013), as agreed in the 
Coalition Agreement (2009), the effectiveness of German development cooperation became a priority 
(Merkel, et al., 2009, p. 129). German development officials were to take this priority to the 
international level more actively. For the first time, pushing this internal priority became part of a 
‘strategy’ for multilateral engagement, including in the EU. The ministry’s strategy stated that 
Improving efficiency and effectiveness in development cooperation is a key concern of the German 
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) in its efforts to shape its policies 
with cooperation countries and international organisations.’ (BMZ, 2013c, p. 4) 
This introductory sentence to Niebel’s multilateral engagement strategy points to the prioritisation of 
connecting effective development cooperation and multilateral engagement, pointing particularly at 
a special role for the EU (BMZ, 2013c, p. 5). 
Consequently, German development actors gave more visibility to EU efforts and sought to 
promote them among European development professionals. Central to this norm advocacy was the 
support for EU joint programming. The minister and parts of the BMZ began to support EU joint 
programming as a contribution to aid/development effectiveness and to help promote it internally 
and externally (Interview PREP#1; BMZ, 2013a, p. 43). This active advocacy must be seen against the 
context of Niebel’s overriding agenda of showcasing the efficiency of all aspects of German 
development cooperation. Thus, during his time, BMZ officials promoted international aid 
effectiveness principles at the EU level to fulfil national efficiency concerns. At the same time, they 
justified this promotion with existing discourses on aid effectiveness principles, which served as a 
common justification to opposition from more reluctant member states such as Britain (see chapter 
5). This advocacy occurred at several level, including the political. During and in preparation of the 
Busan High Level Forum, Niebel advocated joint programming to reduce aid fragmentation and 
achieve a European division of labour in countries where donors only just arrived or returned after a 
longer period of absence, like South Sudan and Myanmar, and fragile countries (Niebel, 2011). In this 
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context, Niebel collaborated with European Commissioner Piebalgs to promote the idea of joint 
programming (Sarmadi, 2013). 
While the decentralised understanding of coordination excluded a special role for the 
Commission, German development officials nevertheless sought to co-opt Commission officials as 
allies in the promotion process. This was partly also reflected in public discourse in which the 
Commission was increasingly presented as a like-minded ally for Germany in Europe whose policy 
‘corresponds to a high degree to German ideas’ (BMZ, 2013a, p. 43, translated by the author). The 
BMZ, for instance, promoted the extension of delegated cooperation between the Commission and 
individual EU member states as a contribution to donor coordination and harmonisation (BMZ, 2013a, 
p. 43). In return, at the end of Dirk Niebel’s term as development minister, the Commission lauded his 
‘strong political commitment’ to joint programming (Sarmadi, 2013). This political commitment to EU 
joint programming became institutionalised within the BMZ strategy for multilateral cooperation 
(BMZ, 2013c) and within a bilateral agreement on closer cooperation in development with France 
(BMZ, 2013b). The 2013 strategy on multilateral development policy, for instance, explicitly welcomed 
joint programming as a ‘promising example of the division of tasks’ (BMZ, 2013c, p. 7). The German 
government emphasised ‘Germany’s leadership’ on the issue in Europe and stressed the 
Commission’s support for Germany’s approach (BMZ, 2013a, p. 43). In the 2013 BMZ White Paper 
report the ministry was explicit about the role of the EU to advance Germany’s ambitions for effective 
development cooperation. It portrayed the EU as a central forum for the preparation of international 
political processes and as a leader on the international division of labour (BMZ, 2013a, p. 41). 
The political commitment in Germany and the institutionalisation helped to maintain the 
advocacy among Commission officials where political prioritisation had already been weakened at 
that time (see chapter 3). Political priorities trickled down to the BMZ officials who coordinated and 
advocated German positions in and with Brussels and led to their active engagement in promoting 
joint programming. BMZ officials close to Brussels understood joint programming to be more than the 
implementation of an aid effectiveness principle. According to close observers, they also understood 
it as a way of establishing one EU voice (Interviews DEVCO#1; PREP#1). They found, reached out to 
and maintained allies in DG DEVCO and the EEAS who shared the ‘one voice’ discourse at the working 
level (Interviews DEVCO#2; EEAS#1; PREP#1). These working-level discussions in Brussels left room 
for diverging domestic justifications (Interview TT#3). Joint programming could be promoted 
nationally because it was talking to different agendas of different actors in the BMZ. This created some 
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compatibility despite clashes with other effectiveness principles, especially ownership. That joint 
programming was more than division of labour fitted the wider German concept of development 
cooperation, especially the idea that the institutionalisation of such coordination was a means of 
enhancing the effectiveness of EU governance more generally. This ties into the structural policy 
priority that is based on a preference for multilateralism when German actors pursue national 
agendas. 
While the engagement of German officials at the EU level helped to maintain and strengthen 
the norm advocacy efforts of Commission officials, the advocacy in the EU in turn created some 
institutional legacy in the BMZ, and joint programming became translated into German aid structures 
to some extent. Despite political prioritisation, domestic implementation had been continuously 
deficient although ‘everyone has generally been open’ to it in the ministry, according to an 
interviewee (Interview BMZ#1). This resistance was – allegedly – especially persistent among BMZ 
country desks official, who felt capacity constraints and burdened with existing, partly conflicting 
obligations (Interviews BMZ#1, #2). The justification for joint programming was not self-evident to 
many of these officials. As a result, joint programming required strong institutional promotion, 
support and facilitation through information, advice etc., including BMZ officials in third countries, for 
example, in Mali (Interview BMZ#1). Such deficiencies were also acknowledged by the OECD-DAC in 
2015. While deficiencies persisted, the DAC nevertheless found that 
Germany leads by example, working with other development partners through joint programming and 
delegated co-operation […]. In partner countries, Germany increasingly takes a lead role in donor co-
ordination and works with a range of partners who value the professionalism and expertise of its staff. 
[…] Germany is among the strongest supporters of good division of labour and joint approaches with 
other development partners. […] Germany appears to be ahead of the game. (OECD, 2015, p. 67) 
While this indicates that the political patronage created some form of ‘institutional legacy’ over the 
medium-term after 2013, the divisions over the purpose of coordination in the EU had repercussions 
for the reactions in the German aid constituency. For many observers around the BMZ, it was clear 
that the discourse on coordination and effectiveness was primarily a DG DEVCO agenda (Interviews 
CON#2; TT#1). Thus, to convince country desks and missions in the field, it was necessary to make the 
case for how such a policy served to alleviate growing pressure on bilateral results. 
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Reacting to discursive differentiation 
 
While the BMZ’s political support for EU coordination reached its peak between 2011 and 2013 when 
joint programming was first trialled in a few pilot countries (Furness and Vollmer, 2013), the 
international discourse on effectiveness had already moved on. After the Busan conference in late 
2011, globally, aid effectiveness lost political prominence. Instead, the discourse on aid effectiveness 
continued to be advanced within the more technical Global Partnership for Effective Development 
Co-operation (GPEDC), which was less politically prominent. At the same time, the weight among 
effectiveness principles in the international discourse shifted away from coordination. As a result, 
development professionals within the BMZ and its affiliated organisations, especially the GIZ and DIE, 
began to differentiate more clearly between EU coordination, e.g., through joint programming (‘one 
EU voice’), and the shifting development effectiveness agenda (Interviews BMZ#3; CON#2; TT#1). 
Reducing fragmentation and enhancing coordination remained a priority for enhancing 
effective development cooperation in Europe. For instance, in the context of the GPEDC, where 
Germany had become engaged as a co-chair since 2012, it pushed the initiative on managing diversity 
and reducing fragmentation (OECD, 2015, p. 67). That a division of labour, coordination and joint 
programming remained part of Germany’s effectiveness agenda in the EU was also maintained within 
parts of the BMZ. The 2017 BMZ report to the Bundestag stated that 
Instead of 28 donors with their own strategies there should be one common development policy in 
which member states and EU institutions complement each other in their cooperation with partner 
countries […]. (BMZ, 2017b, p. 73, translated by the author, emphasis in original) 
Against this background, Germany explicitly supports, for instance, the so called ‘joint programming’ 
(JP) of the EU. In the context of JP, the EU and its member states develop one common strategy, which 
is the basis for the cooperation of all active EU donors in a country. (BMZ, 2017b, p. 161, translated by 
the author, emphasis in original) 
However, the report was less clear than the previous report on the connection between coordination 
and aid effectiveness. This development was similar to the discursive shifts at the EU level (see chapter 
3). What became evident was that arguments for coordination and joint programming began to 
adjust, and the effectiveness discourse had progressed. 
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The understanding of the function of EU coordination and joint programming had 
consolidated in bureaucratic and policy circles. This consolidation was reflected in the division of 
labour within the BMZ and the German development community, more generally. From an 
organisational perspective, joint programming remained a central component of the BMZ’s 
engagement with the EU (Interviews DEVCO#1; PREP#1; BMZ, 2017b, p. 161), but it was organised in 
a separate unit from effectiveness (see below). The BMZ also kept the assessment and evaluation of 
joint activities close to its chest, i.e., not assigning it to the GIZ or DEval (Interview CON#1). This 
indicates that joint programming remained politically relevant rather than on a technical effectiveness 
basis. On the one hand, joint programming had already been established in BMZ structures and 
discourse. On the other hand, arguments in favour of coordination were actively justified politically 
based on its contribution to aid quality. While aid quality is relevant independently of the amounts 
spent, the internal but especially international attention for aid quantity targets in the run-up to the 
SDGs 2015 increased pressure on German officials as the government seemed not able (or willing) to 
achieve the aid spending target at this point (i.e., before the increases due to in-country refugee costs, 
see table 1). This was even more so since Britain increased attention on aid quantity within the EU 
(see chapter 5). Other donors and international civil society professionals similarly pushed for 
financing for development and highlighted the continued relevance of aid ahead of the SDGs 
negotiations (Interviews NGO#6; PREP#1). In this context, before going to the international financing 
conference in Addis Ababa in summer 2015, BMZ officials attempted to keep the focus at the EU level 
on aid quality by highlighting what they were already good at. Coordination therefore continued to 
be a political priority based on the argument that it improved the effectiveness of policies. Thus, 
continuing with a focus on coordination and advocate it as a collective EU policy norm was a 
contribution to the political dispute, not simply institutional legacy. 
At that point, however, German professionals needed to adapt their argumentation due to 
the changing effectiveness discourse. Thus, the German debate on the relationship between 
effectiveness and coordination followed the EU level debate about enhancing the EU’s impact as a 
foreign policy actor. This fitted the overall German conception of development cooperation as a peace 
and structural policy. German officials who promoted joint programming based their understanding 
of coordination on the EU’s Agenda for Change (AfC) of 2011 (Interview BMZ#2), not the European 
Consensus on Development of 2006, which had connected EU coordination more explicitly to aid 
effectiveness. This is important because it shows how mutual norm advocacy at the EU level has 
depended on the discursive context, which is partly constituted by a wider discursive network and 
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subject to external shifts. The understanding since 2011 that was supported by officials in other 
member states, especially France, in the EEAS and by the HR/VP (see chapter 3) saw joint 
programming as a way for the EU to be seen as a unified actor in third countries with a reduced role 
for the Commission. This understanding became increasingly pertinent in the German context over 
concerns for fragility and migration. The EU level discourse fitted well with the dominant political 
concern between 2015 and 2017 of tackling migration (Interview BMZ#1; BMZ, 2017b, p. 73). While 
it was on this changed discursive basis that BMZ officials, who engaged at the EU level, continued to 
support the advancement of joint programming in Brussels, these more political considerations were 
not necessarily shared by country desk officials, which reduced implementation (Krüger and Steingass, 
2018). 
While donor coordination and joint action may be relevant for development effectiveness in 
practice, it did not reflect the international development effectiveness discourse post-2011. German 
development policy actors, experts and officials alike, were confronted with a different effectiveness 
agenda of emerging themes, especially accountability and transparency of results, which they 
perceived as less compatible with German development cooperation (Interviews BMZ#3; CON#2). 
Transparency as a precondition for effectiveness had been pushed since Busan, both internationally 
and in the EU, primarily by a wider transnational network, and officials in Britain (see chapter 5), and 
the Nordics, especially Sweden (Interviews CON#1, #2; TT#1). As a result, the BMZ officials needed to 
consolidate work on effectiveness. At the working level this occurred through a ‘working group’, which 
followed the changing effectiveness paradigm in the international processes. These processes took 
place in the GPEDC, IATI, the United Nations Development Cooperation Forum (UNDCF), and the EU, 
and were partly competing and overlapping. The focus of the working group has been on 
transparency, the use of country systems, fragmentation, and mutual accountability. German 
development actors have followed the international discourse on effectiveness mostly at the expert 
level, and it was primarily at this level that they engaged at the EU level, mostly due to the insistence 
of other member states. It was simultaneous to this participation in EU norm advocacy that German 
policy professionals and Commission officials advocated coordination and continued to push joint 
programming as ‘suitable’ for effectiveness (see chapter 3). 
As the discourse shifted more strongly towards transparency, German development 
professionals were caught partly unprepared as transparency had only been slowly and reluctantly 
institutionalised in the German system. This was despite the fact that the issue of transparency had 
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been around for some time: Dirk Niebel (2012) opened the evaluation institute (DEval) in 2012 with a 
reminder that its work contributed to the international development effectiveness principles. Yet the 
international discourse did not resonate in the same way as the one on coordination and 
harmonisation. Among those actors close to the administrative centre, the emerging discourse on 
transparency became quickly perceived as foreign (‘Anglo-Saxon’), based on fundamentally different 
societal views, and thus partially incompatible from a ‘cultural’ perspective (Interviews BMZ#3; 
CON#2). While the BMZ had changed its approach to country strategies to enhance its results focus 
since 2012 (OECD, 2015, p. 64), the argument was that the promoted transparency standards went 
beyond traditional principles in the German system of how to deal with government action, especially 
in external policies. 
This mismatch had repercussions for the participation of German policy professionals in EU 
norm advocacy regarding a collective EU transparency norm. German policy professionals could not 
ignore the intensifying norm advocacy on transparency at the EU level and, as one interviewee put it, 
had to notice that they had ‘missed the train’ on shaping the discourse based on which this norm 
advocacy took place (Interview CON#2). One potential reason for the missing political clout, affirmed 
by an interviewee, was that the incoming minister in 2013, Gerd Müller, was less active in EU-level 
norm advocacy than his predecessor and had – at least initially – little priorities regarding common 
EU norms for collective action (Interview BMZ#1). While the relevant German policy professionals 
realised that they needed to react at the EU level, their participation has become more challenging. 
The debates had become more technical not only at the international, but also at the EU level. Thus, 
norm advocacy was conducted in a more technical way than previous discussions on coordination, for 
example, through an EU expert group of issue experts (Interview BMZ#3). The participation at the 
expert level required a concerted approach between BMZ officials and professionals in the other 
relevant organisations. This made a reaction more time-consuming and, while German officials have 
usually been well prepared and active in EU interactions, some officials had the perception that in this 
case the Germans were partly absent from the debate at the EU level (Interview DEVCO#4). As a result, 








This chapter has analysed the contributions of German policy professionals to the construction of 
discourses on EU effectiveness in development cooperation, in particular since the early 2000s. The 
chapter has demonstrated that much of the contribution to the construction of these discourses has 
occurred as part of direct, mostly administrative engagements of German officials at the EU level 
(‘coordinative discourse’). In this way German policy professionals have participated in advancing 
policy norms for collective action between the EU institutions and the member states. The central 
contribution of this case study has been to identify the agency of policy professionals in a member 
state which has actively advocated EU norms for common development cooperation. As part of this, 
the chapter has also shown how professionals, on the one hand, participate in the construction of 
discourses to advance EU-level norm advocacy, while the wider policy community, on the other hand, 
hardly participates or even contradicts it. This helps to understand the partly competing roles of policy 
professionals even within one member state when it comes to their contribution towards common 
EU external action. 
As the largest EU member state with the highest financial contribution to EU aid and a strong 
professional, publicly-funded development sector, the German case is relevant for understanding the 
ways in which national policy professionals become engaged in the advocacy of collective action 
norms in EU development cooperation, as well as the scope, conditions and limits of their 
contributions. As already indicated in chapter 3, German professionals have participated in discursive 
processes at the EU level to develop and promote justifications to advance common policy norms 
among member state and EU institutional actors. This has been based on a national discourse of 
improving international aid effectiveness. As the first section of this chapter has suggested, this fitted 
the longstanding discursive commitment to structuring global governance and enhancing its 
efficiency, which has been maintained by recurrent high-level political support, and which has guided 
the external engagement of German development officials, including in the EU. As the second section 
has suggested, the sectoral, expertise-based engagement of Germany in the EU has offered leeway 
for administrative, technical coordination and specialist engagement at the European level. This 
suggests that there is potential for agency of policy professionals in discursive coordination processes 
at the EU level. The analysis has highlighted a tendency towards discursive coordination among 
administrative professionals whereas the more public discourse construction in the EU through 
GERMANY: COORDINATING FOR CONSENSUS? 
147 
political and societal actors seems less prevalent. Domestic professionals have engaged with other 
European professionals from relevant member states and in the EU institutions, both as part of 
intergovernmental networks and across organisational boundaries. Therein, the administrative 
development professionals have concentrated on regular, issue-based engagement within an 
exclusive circle of relevant actors aimed at finding consensus. The preference for such a coordinative 
discourse has been a general characteristic of German EU engagement and corresponds to both its 
structural organisation and discourses on international cooperation. 
A central reason behind the agency of administrative professionals has been the sectoral 
organisation, which provided these officials with a degree of autonomy from parliament, civil society 
and other government departments when engaging in the EU. In development cooperation, this 
engagement tends to be based on a kind of political ‘permissive consensus’ by a cross-party political 
alliance. One implication has been that technical experts from selected public service providers, 
especially the country’s development think tank (DIE) and aid agency (GIZ), who support and even 
accompany ministerial professionals in their dealings with Brussels, become part of the coordinative 
discourse at the European level. Their participation has been largely restricted to pre-selected 
professionals. This is because the German system seeks to engage only few, closely-tied organisations, 
which provide what is perceived as relevant capacity to make arguments for administrative network 
interactions. These issue professionals are important because they provide input and partly engage 
directly as part of a transnational discursive network. The DIE has somewhat been an exception due 
to its participation in a wider communicative discourse formation as part of the European think tank 
network ETTG. 
While German professionals tend to seek EU-level participation, how active they are has 
depended on top-level prioritisation. Minister Niebel sought a strong German role in EU norm 
advocacy regarding coordination based on his preferred discourse on effectiveness, which was 
dominated by efficiency concerns. The ministerial prioritisation and international advocacy came with 
more administrative resources, including the secondment of a BMZ officials to the Commission to 
strengthen the Commission’s work on joint programming. Thus, political prioritisation has increased 
participation in the EU-level coordinative discourse to keep control over the EU policy norm for 
coordination. This participation, especially on EU joint programming, initially continued at the working 
level under the incoming minister, Gerd Müller, even though he was less active at the EU level. 
However, the shifting discourse on effectiveness, both a result of competition between policy 
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communities at the EU level (see chapters 2 and 3) and wider international advocacy on development 
effectiveness (see chapter 5), has shown the limits of this participation. While German development 
actors close to Brussels sustained support for coordination, most German professionals have had 
competing priorities. Especially, discourses on effective EU development cooperation shifted towards 
transparency, which did not fit German ideas and interests. This has partly led to disengagement of 
policy professionals at the EU level. 
This last finding has implications for the limits of German policy professionals in EU norm 
advocacy, which also illustrates the limits of German power in the EU. Contestation in the German 
system comes primarily from within the bureaucratic organisation rather than the wider societal 
network. Opposition to EU norm advocacy has been fuelled by resistance within the national aid 
bureaucracy, for example, hesitance of country desk officials to joint programming, and 
implementation agencies despite high-level political commitments. This has also contributed to gaps 
between commitments in Brussels and compliance ‘at home’ (see also Krüger and Steingass, 2018). 
This lack of wider transnational advocacy was amplified by a reduced interest of societal actors in EU 
norm advocacy on coordination. Thus, the domestic organisation has reduced the capacity for more 










During the years of Britain’s membership in the EU, the public and political discourse has repeatedly 
challenged a distinctively EU approach to development cooperation. While this seems to fit the 
country’s popular image as the ‘reluctant European’ (Gowland and Turner, 2000) and ‘awkward 
partner’ (George, 1998), Britain has shaped European development cooperation as no other member 
state, with the possible exception of France. That Britain has strongly shaped EU development policy 
was not only the impression of British development professionals, as expressed in several interviews 
(Interviews DFID#1; PREP#2; Olivié and Pérez, 2017), but its footprints are reflected in the major shifts 
of EU development cooperation over several decades (see chapter 2). Understanding how these two 
observations go together involves looking at British engagement in more detail, especially by 
disaggregating the state and its transnational interactions. British actors have used the EU to promote 
policy norms more widely and, in this process, also shaped common EU norms. Thereby, British 
development professionals have participated in norm advocacy across EU transnational networks. Yet 
they have not directly aimed at an EU-specific consensus on norms for collective development 
cooperation and domestic prioritisation has limited their ability to commit themselves to these norms. 
This chapter seeks to understand how and on what grounds British policy professionals have 
shaped and participated in EU norm advocacy. Given Britain’s financial contributions, influence on 
global development discourses and effect on common European development policy norms over time 
(see chapter 2), such an analysis centrally contributes to our understanding of what drives norm 
advocacy on the EU’s role in development cooperation. This analysis is expected to enhance our 
understanding of how and under what conditions the agency of policy professionals matters for EU 
norm advocacy. Chapters 1 to 3 have shown how transnational norm advocacy revolves around 
discursive competition in which policy professionals play different roles. Chapters 3 and 4 have shown 
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how policy professionals become relevant if they coordinate discourse on a technical level through 
regular working level interactions (‘coordinative discourse’). Looking at the national arena has helped 
to understand in what ways state and non-state policy professionals participate, how their 
participation matters for transnational norm advocacy and what affects their participation, especially 
national discourses, practices and institutional structures (see chapter 4). While British professionals 
were present in all EU level discussion, they have played less of a role on EU coordination norms and 
seemed sceptical of joint programming. The chapter traces how they participated in contesting these 
norms through competition over the discourse on effectiveness. 
The ‘Mission for Global Britain’ (Mordaunt, 2018) was not a consequence of the 2016 
referendum on EU membership but an ambition that has dominated the country’s international 
engagement, including through the EU, long before the referendum. For example, Britain has sought 
to influence global institutions for international development, such as the World Bank, which exerted 
adjustment pressure also on the EU (see chapter 2). Respectively, analyses of Britain’s role in and 
perspective on international development only marginally touch on the EU (Ireton, 2013; Morrissey, 
2005). Britain has seen the EU as a channel for influencing international development institutions, and 
those institutions that are relevant for international development, especially in trade, while keeping 
the existing balance of competence (see DFID, 2013c). Yet assessments on Britain’s interactions in EU 
development cooperation have remained rare in the academic literature, with the partial exception 
of the country’s accession to the Community (Cosgrove Twitchett, 1978; 1981). Eventually, it was the 
Brexit referendum which has created momentum to examine the relationship between the EU and 
Britain in this sector (Bond, 2017; Lightfoot, et al., 2017; Olivié and Pérez, 2017; Watkins, 2016). This 
chapter draws on various insights ranging from governmental publications, public reports and expert 
submissions, to opinions and advocacy statement in order to identify different sources of British 
contestation. The fast forgotten Balance of Competence Review (DFID, 2013c) is one of the few bits 
of public discourse which considered the EU’s role explicitly. This is complemented with interviews 
conducted by the author to analyse the relationship and the engagement of policy professionals in 
Britain within EU development cooperation. 
The first section (I) of this chapter revises the historical and discursive background that is 
relevant to understand British contestation over the EU’s role in development cooperation and 
collective EU action. The following second section (II) draws a picture of Britain’s organisation for 
engaging in and with the EU, including the EU institutions, other member state governments and 
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bureaucracies, and European civil society. This section highlights governmental coordination and civil 
society networks, which make up Britain’s concerted engagement in international development. The 
last section (III) analyses how the discourses and organisation in the national arena contributed to the 




I Britain and EU development cooperation 
 
Britain’s relationship with EU development cooperation has historically been shaped by two sets of 
factors. First, there is Britain’s colonial and imperial legacy, Euroscepticism, and its special 
relationships to the Commonwealth, the US and US-dominated international institutions. Second, 
especially since the 1980s there is a concern for managerial efficiency and international economic 
development, which is expected to yield mutual benefits for the reduction of global poverty and 
British commercial interests. As a result, the UK balanced its multilateral engagement, used the EU as 
a channel for influencing global regimes but did not hesitate to go it alone if necessary, and preferred 
the EU’s intergovernmental development fund (EDF) with its focus on poorer countries to budget-
funded policies and support less productive sectors, such as culture. 
The emergence and advancement of British foreign aid and its relationship to EU 
development policy help to understand the perspectives of British actors on the role of the EU for 
effective development cooperation. British development cooperation emerged from colonial 
development efforts, i.e., assistance in the form of grants-in-aid to provide a minimum level of public 
administration and infrastructure. This was a move away from the principle of colonial financial self-
sufficiency. However, several colonies were originally excluded from such assistance and it was not 
foreseen that this form of aid would continue after the colonies had become independent (Ireton, 
2013, p. 6). The new Colonial Act in 1940 clarified the goal of subsequent development programmes 
to improve the economic situation in such a way that colonial governments could ultimately finance 
their own social and other services. While the Second World War delayed the implementation in 
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practice, the underlying concepts and the regional distribution became the basis of modern 
development policies at the heart of British international cooperation policies (Ireton, 2013, pp. 8-9). 
Britain’s involvement in EU development cooperation began with its accession negotiations 
over the role of the UK’s former colonies. Before joining the European Community in 1973, it had 
already significantly shaped Community policy.22 The UK played a major role in rewriting the 
Community’s policy of association and in transforming it into a development cooperation policy that 
became more compatible with British interests both geographically and thematically. The EC’s 
geographical focus on Francophone countries in Africa, which was enshrined in the Rome Treaty and 
Yaoundé Agreement, was significantly extended to include members of the British Commonwealth. 
Yet this only contributed to the distinctiveness of the common development cooperation. Shortly 
after the UK eventually joined, the Community negotiated the first Lomé Convention in 1975 (Lomé 
I). The cooperation enshrined in this convention stood in contrast to the US-dominated, global 
development agenda of the Bretton Woods institutions in which Britain actively engaged. While 
Britain’s accession to the EC pushed the balance further towards a more globalist, liberal orientation, 
the Commission and France had insisted on preserving an exclusive, regionalist approach (see chapter 
2). 
Partly because of this continued opposition within the Community, Britain did not view the 
European level as its preferred channel to deal with external development cooperation challenges 
such as the African economic and debt crisis. Their preferred channels for influencing the global 
development agenda were other multilateral fora, such as the Commonwealth, but especially the 
Bretton Woods institutions (Grilli, 1993, p. 39). Yet, as Chris Patten, then Minister for Overseas 
Development, suggested in 1988, British officials argued their case simultaneously in Brussels (Brown, 
                                                          
22 In early 1962, the Six made clear that association would only apply to African and Caribbean countries and 
exclude the Asian Commonwealth. Despite de Gaulle’s veto on British membership, the Six issued a Declaration 
of Intent assuring the Commonwealth LDCs in Africa and the Caribbean that association remained open to those 
that were deemed similar in development status and otherwise to the associates. Nigeria was the first country 
to respond to the declaration. The attempt to integrate Nigeria was not based on Yaoundé association but on a 
special association agreement based on Article 238 of the Rome Treaty. It resulted in the Lagos Convention of 
July 1966 (see Okigbo, 1967). However, it never entered into force. The association agreement expired in 1969 
before French ratification took place. It was postponed over France’s position during the Nigerian civil war 
(Cosgrove Twitchett, 1978, p. 146). Subsequently, it was the East African countries Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda 
as a bloc to negotiate an association agreement with the EEC, like the Nigerian one. This became known as the 
Arusha Convention. The Arusha Convention of 1969 constituted an important landmark of Community 
development policy. It rested on the free-trade area principle between EEC and East Africa (as regions) of 
reciprocal preferential access to each other’s markets. 
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2004, p. 22) and Britain ended up channelling a large part of its multilateral funds through the EC. As 
a result, the priorities of EC and UK development cooperation converged over time. The common 
European development cooperation converged towards the global consensus, reflecting US-
dominated liberal and multilateral norms of international relations as embodied in the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ in the 1980s and 1990s (Arts and Dickson, 2004; Brown, 2000; Cumming, 2001). This 
meant that the European level remained relevant for Britain as a forum for influencing the global 
development agenda. 
However, despite the new EU competences in development cooperation under Maastricht, 
Britain initially showed little signs of recognising this during the second Major government. The 
government was rather more defensive due to splits on Europe in the Conservative party (Bulmer and 
Burch, 2005, p. 867). In addition, development cooperation was not independent but part of the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). This changed under Tony Blair’s premiership with the British 
aid reform from 1997 onwards, which put development cooperation on an independent basis with its 
own cabinet-level minister, a governmental Department for International Development (DFID), 
representation in Brussels and an explicit mandate for poverty eradication. With DFID came a more 
sectorised, professional, expertise-based representation of British development cooperation in the 
EU. While development cooperation has been an integral part of Britain’s foreign policy from post-
colonial times, it had only been represented by a separate ministry before under Labour governments 
in 1964-70 and 1974-79.23 Following the establishment of a cabinet-level Secretary of State for 
International Development, the EU immediately received significant attention from the new minister. 
The inaugural office holder, Clare Short, was particularly critical of the EU’s bias towards middle-
income countries and lack of managerial efficiency. Notoriously, in a newspaper article, she called the 
EU ‘the worst aid agency’ and threatened to review the UK’s engagement in EU development 
cooperation (Short, 2000). The parliament’s International Development Committee (IDC) also 
criticised the Commission for its inability, inefficiency and ineffectiveness in managing the 
supranational development policies and programmes (International Development Committee, 2000). 
As the EU seemed to be a potent platform for shaping the global discourse on aid 
effectiveness in the wake of the 2000 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), it also became more 
                                                          
23 The Ministry of Overseas Development was created in 1964 by Harold Wilson. Under Conservative 
governments in 1970-74 and 1979-97 it was part of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office under the name of 
Overseas Development Administration. 
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attractive as a forum for influencing the global agenda. As the fourth White Paper of 2009 suggested, 
the UK’s ‘place in the EU is perhaps our best opportunity to make an impact on global challenges 
beyond what we could achieve by ourselves’ (DFID, 2009, p. 111). While criticism of the EU repeatedly 
surfaced, especially with the 2010 coalition government’s emphasis on evaluation and accountability, 
many British development professionals began to accommodate the EU’s role. For example, the 
British parliament’s development committee concluded in 2012:  
The UK has a certain amount of choice as to whether it spends its aid bilaterally or through multilaterals. 
Although we have acknowledged that there are some problems with channelling aid through the 
European Commission, for example the large amount of aid going to middle income countries and its 
slow bureaucracy, on balance we are not convinced it is any worse than the other multilaterals DFID 
funds, for example the World Bank which we have previously reported our concerns on. (International 
Development Committee, 2012, p. 17) 
Such perceptions were the result of a rigid series of evaluations, which the coalition government 
initiated after 2010, and which became increasingly sophisticated (DFID, 2011c; 2013a; 2016c). To 
inform these evaluations, several surveys focused explicitly on the role of the EU in development 
cooperation or included the relationship with the EU in their scope (DFID, 2011b; ICAI, 2012; 
International Development Committee, 2012). The most explicit document assessing the EU’s role in 
international development from a British perspective was the Balance of Competence Review on 
Development Cooperation of 2013. It concluded:  
Most respondents supported the present parallel competence in the areas of development 
cooperation and humanitarian aid. Their view was that, while there is a need for improvement in many 
areas of EU activity, the advantages of working through the EU outweigh the disadvantages. (DFID, 
2013c, p. 6) 
While societal actors, especially those with transnational links, such as the British civil society umbrella 
organisation Bond, the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development and the Trades Union Congress, 
had become well-acquainted with the option of projecting policy norms on the EU level, 
Euroscepticism remained part of the debate. For example, the Freedom Association, a Eurosceptic 
pressure group, which emerged as an outlier in the Balance of Competence Review, argued that EU 
development cooperation had been ineffective and harmful to the UK’s objectives, and Britain should 
thus pursue its goals unilaterally and independent of the EU (DFID, 2013c, pp. 36, 51). 
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One persistent concern was the differentiation of EU development cooperation in the 
national British discourse according to instruments. This differentiation suggests that the EU’s role 
was acknowledged positively where it followed and closely complemented British priorities. This was 
arguably the case for the more intergovernmental EDF, which covered a higher share of 
Commonwealth countries than British aid itself and political steering was more direct (DFID, 2011c). 
British development policy professionals remained critical of the Commission’s autonomy. For 
instance, the watchdogs in Britain’s Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) highlighted the 
risk of giving too much independence to the Commission:  
The relationship between Member States and the EU in setting policy and planning and implementing 
projects remains problematic. The OECD DAC review of EC [European Commission] aid in 2012 noted 
that the response to central EU initiatives from Member States is variable. It commented that the 
relationship required further work. A recurrent issue is the level of autonomy versus accountability that 
the development arms of the EU have from and to Member States. (ICAI, 2015, p. 15) 
Thus, while much attention had been given to protecting Britain’s global political and commercial 
ambition from the EU, British professionals had become more active in ‘using’ the EU after 1997 (until 
the EU referendum 2016) and promoted policy norms proactively in development cooperation on the 
EU level. This was mainly due to the changed attitudes towards the EU and towards development 
cooperation under Prime Minister Tony Blair. Thus, the EU itself became a relevant forum for British 
development cooperation activity, even as government officials remained defensive when it came to 
common EU policy norms. Likewise, the majority of societal actors in the policy area, who often 
maintain extensive international links, became accustomed to the parallel competence, which 
allowed them to engage in contestation both nationally and transnationally in the EU. 
After the 2015 general election, the Conservative government started to rearrange funding 
and to reduce the role of DFID on aid spending (ODA). It planned to reduce the share of ODA 
channelled through DFID to 70% by 2020 and to spend more aid through other departments and funds 
(HM Treasury and DFID, 2015). Fragility became an increasingly prominent aspect of development 
effectiveness. Shifting attention to fragility required the recognition of other foreign policies and 
foreign policy instruments. In this context, the government put some trust in the EU’s institutional 
changes post-Lisbon and considered them an opportunity for promoting its domestic policy norms 
more actively in the future: 
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Working through these new institutions DFID can help transform the effectiveness of EU aid, improve 
its coherence with wider policies and help the EU to demonstrate more clearly the development results 
that it achieves. (DFID, 2013b, p. 3) 
This emerging reorientation towards effectiveness, especially uploading the ‘results agenda’, which 
reflected pressure on DFID itself, offered potential for active EU engagement. The focus on results 
was one of the most dominant shifts in DFID since its foundation, but it was also seen critically from 
within both DFID and among other development professionals (The Economist, 2016; Valters and 
Whitty, 2017). Nevertheless, it became the core of Britain’s engagement in the EU up until the EU 
referendum 2016. 
This brief overview has traced how the link between EU development cooperation and 
effectiveness were treated in the British public discourse. The section has also highlighted the role of 
political prioritisation over time. The priorities of common European and British development 
cooperation have diverged and converged several times. Especially the convergence is puzzling given 
the scepticism towards direct engagement in EU norm advocacy for collective action. Before this will 
be analysed in more detail, the next section sets out how British development policy professionals 
have organised to engage at the transnational level in the EU. 
 
II Coordinating for Brussels 
 
Britain’s internal and external coordination and engagement processes in the EU had been well 
developed despite the notion of a general ‘awkwardness’ when it comes to the engagement with the 
EU (George, 1998). While European integration brought some movement of power ‘up’ to the EU, 
Britain’s organisation for Europe absorbed this into the ‘logic’ of the Whitehall (government) 
machinery (Bulmer and Burch, 1998, p. 606; Burch and Holliday, 1996). While certain principles 
generally apply, different actors, interactions and networks come to the foreground depending on the 
EU policy context. The relevance of certain actors and institutional mechanisms also changed over 
time. For instance, the role of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in general policy coordination 
had become reduced since the early days of Britain’s membership. In contrast, the Treasury emerged 
as an important player, setting policy frames for improving the accountability and transparency of 
government engagement in the EU. Such institutional scope and sector-specific characteristics make 
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it relevant to identify the main elements of Britain’s ‘coordination for Brussels’ in development 
cooperation. 
This section disentangles the politics of EU aid in Britain; it identifies the institutions, actors 
and networks that matter for Britain’s national coordination in and organisation for the EU. Britain’s 
‘coordination for Brussels’ is based on the organisation of the British state, its external projection of 
domestic policy priorities and its integration with the EU. While some aspects may seem 
‘quintessentially British’ (and are fundamentally revised following the Brexit decision), other aspects 
are similar for several member states, e.g., a strong consideration for ex ante coordination. The 
section pays attention to the political and bureaucratic representation and coordination, as well as 
wider societal networks. A closer look suggests that there are some particularities in development 
cooperation, for example, regarding the relatively large bureaucratic autonomy within DFID’s 
circumscribed mandate. The section, first, outlines the governmental networks and bureaucratic 
politics that are relevant for Britain’s engagement in EU development cooperation. Then, it turns to 
the engagement of the wider, societal network that is particularly important because these actors do 
not only matter for national discourse formation and norm advocacy but have strong transnational 
links. This analysis is relevant to understand how the institutional structures empower British actors, 
their networks and narratives when engaging in the EU. 
 
Coordinating governmental engagement 
 
As mentioned above, more proactive engagement in EU development cooperation goes back to two 
major developments within Britain’s administrative structure that came with the change of 
government in 1997. First, there was a step-change in Britain’s engagement with the EU under Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, which aimed at a stronger ‘projection’ of British priorities instead of the previous 
defensive-reactive approach (Bulmer and Burch, 2005). Second, the creation of an independent 
government Department for International Development (DFID) meant that development policy 
officials would engage directly within the EU without being represented within the wider framework 
of the FCO. However, the Treasury’s continued scepticism when it came to aid spending within the EU 
had an influence on DFID’s subsequent engagement, including the framing for policy formulation in 
the EU. 
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Centralised government, characterised by its collective cabinet responsibility and the 
resulting ambition for ex ante interdepartmental coordination, dominated Britain’s engagement with 
the EU (Bulmer and Burch, 2009; Geddes, 2013; Kassim, 2001). The Cabinet Office, the Treasury, the 
FCO and the UK representation in Brussels (UKREP) provide the effective communication 
infrastructure and central authority to ensure coordination. The European and Global Issues 
Secretariat of the Cabinet Office coordinates the collective agreement of the government’s 
international economic and European policy, including international trade and development issues. 
In theory, the Treasury has a central role in policy planning; the FCO has the overall responsibility for 
European affairs, after the Prime Minister, and is the lead department in Whitehall for all EU external 
relations, including development cooperation. The FCO had been very much in the driving seat of 
coordinating the government’s position at the beginning of Britain’s membership. For a long time, the 
British system was geared towards a defensive and reactive approach to the EU. There was little 
enthusiasm for using the opportunity structures offered by European integration to promote British 
interests actively. Arguably, this was particularly strong when the governing party was split over 
European integration, for instance, during the second Major government (1992-97). 
This limited how officials engaged in the EU. Yet, over time, there had been a shift in system’s 
capacity away from absorption, or reception, to projection (Bulmer and Burch, 2009; Geddes, 2013; 
Kassim, 2001). Structurally, the machinery for securing an effective voice in formulating policies in 
Brussels was strengthened with the Blair government in 1997. This meant getting away from the 
defensive and reactive approach. Instead, the aim was to realise potential for affecting 
intergovernmental forces in the EU through networking and coalition-building with the member 
states on a horizontal level (Bulmer and Burch, 2005, p. 877). This horizontal networking and coalition-
building with member states became increasingly important for development cooperation on all 
levels (Interviews DFID#1; PREP#2). As Bulmer and Burch (2005) argue, these shifts occurred largely 
within existing institutional structures, e.g., central government, and trends, e.g., new public 
management. At the same time, increased demands of the EU and the technical nature of policies 
required more specialist involvement and direct engagement by the government departments and 
associated networks. Government departments have their own ‘EU competence’, which varies 
significantly due to their exposure to EU-level policies, but also due to different personalities who 
headed these departments (Geddes, 2013, pp. 206-7). In this context, the personal prioritisation of 
the different development secretaries of state was relevant for DFID’s orientation and external 
UNITED KINGDOM: TOO EFFECTIVE FOR EUROPE? 
159 
representation, for example, Short’s shift away from a national interest discourse (Valters and Whitty, 
2017, p. 19). 
Nevertheless, DFID’s EU engagement had been subject to the Treasury’s more reluctant 
position towards the EU, as well as the parliament’s and societal scrutiny. This scrutiny has been 
relevant wherever British funds are spent in the EU. While the Cabinet Office had become increasingly 
important for Britain’s overall coordination, the Treasury had an important constraining effect on 
European initiatives with expenditure implications. This effect was amplified by increasing pressure 
for results management in DFID (Valters and Whitty, 2017). The implication for development 
cooperation was that especially the Treasury, rather than the FCO, came to exert pressure on 
development policies in the EU. The Treasury maintained its sceptical and reluctant position despite 
Blair’s initiative to move towards a more positive and proactive engagement (Bulmer and Burch, 2005, 
p. 880). This had an influence on the general frames for DFID’s EU policies, i.e., what kind of policies 
were supported, what tone and emphasis they had etc. The Treasury’s role is closely connected to 
parliamentary scrutiny, which limits DFID’s autonomy to compromise. This became expressed through 
DFID’s self-restraint, cautioning and risk aversion. 
While political power is centralised, sovereignty is vested in Westminster. Parliamentary 
sovereignty and the principle of parliamentary supremacy dominate the system’s accountability. It 
demands constant and transparent reporting to and scrutiny of parliament, which differs from some 
other member states, e.g., Germany (see chapter 4). The system favours a defensive posture on 
sovereignty concerns and value for money among government departments (Kassim, 2001), which 
links policy effectiveness to accountability. While parliament does not mandate the Secretary of State 
or DFID on EU policy positions, all EU documents are shared with parliament in a – more or less – 
timely fashion to allow for oral and written questions in advance of EU Council agreements. The House 
of Commons’ International Development Committee (IDC) is primarily an investigative committee. 
The IDC monitors the policy, administration and budgetary spending of DFID, and the policies and 
procedures of EU development cooperation to which DFID financially contributes. To enhance the 
capacity for constant public scrutiny, the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) was 
established in 2011. It is independent from the government and responsible for the scrutiny of official 
UK aid, which is carried out by a specialised development consultancy on its behalf. The watchdog 
institution focuses on maximising the impact of the UK aid budget for intended beneficiaries and 
getting the best value for money for the British taxpayer. It is an advisory, non-departmental public 
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body, sponsored by DFID, and reports to the parliament’s development committee (IDC). The 
committee exchanges correspondence with ICAI on how to approach scrutiny reports on the EU in 
order to avoid duplication (ICAI, 2012, p. 10). ICAI also engages directly with DFID and other societal 
actors through interviews to gather information for its EU evaluation reports. This has put additional 
pressure and limitations on DFID officials’ EU engagement. 
Reduced flexibility has not been a guarantee for success in an EU policy process that benefits 
more fluid, open, consensual, network-based, rule-guided, multilingual and sectorised engagement 
(Bulmer and Burch, 2005, p. 872). With the establishment of DFID also came a more sectorised, 
expertise-based representation of British development cooperation in the EU. Engaging in EU 
development cooperation was largely left to the development department, even though oversight 
over some finance instruments had later been relocated to the FCO or shared between DFID and the 
FCO, e.g., the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). Due to DFID’s mandate, it is in the 
lead where EU policy remained closely concentrated on issues of aid and poverty eradication. Due to 
Britain’s ring-fencing of aid, DFID promoted internally agreed policy positions in Brussels on a largely 
autonomous basis, focusing on the development-specific aspects. Moreover, although development 
officials share all EU fiches with other government departments, officials from these departments 
often lack the attention, time and simply resources, e.g., travel budgets, to accompany DFID officials 
to meetings in Brussels (Interview DFID#1). Thus, on most thematic development issues, DFID has 
been the lead department, as in the case of the presenting the UK’s position in the EU on the SDGs, 
even though the SDGs cover a broader range of policy areas (Interview PREP#2). This often leaves 
engagement in Brussels de facto to the lead of DFID officials, but it also means that they only engage 
in EU norm advocacy when it is limited to development cooperation. 
While the ring-fencing provides the development secretary and DFID with some leverage to 
engage on behalf of the British government on issues of EU development cooperation, it requires at 
times lengthy governmental coordination. DFID acts in a constant ‘shadow of hierarchy’ and thus 
coordinates and consults proactively with other government departments within a tightly coordinated 
policy network (Interviews DFID#1, #2; EP#5; PREP#2). This follows the ‘logic’ of the Whitehall 
machinery (see Burch and Holliday, 1996). Against the shadow of top-down coordination, DFID 
attempts to engage in close interdepartmental coordination on EU development policy issues before 
going through the formal EU channels, i.e., the working and expert groups, and committees. The 
purpose of governmental networks is to consult and align departmental positions to present a joined-
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up British position at the EU level, which is promoted equally by all involved actors. This is to prevent 
a British position in one working group from being undermined in another. As a former official in the 
UKREP suggested, promoting and defending this position takes precedence over the need to achieve 
consensus in Brussels (Interview PREP#2). Thus, arguably, DFID’s strength in the international arena 
has depended on whether ‘the government as a whole was committed to international development, 
and on the role of aid and other international policies in reducing poverty’ (Ireton, 2013, p. 66). 
Coordination, and the willingness to communicate across and within departments, has been 
important in determining the relationship between DFID and other departments. This corresponds to 
the (self-identified) ‘national identity’ of British civil servants, which has been described as based on 
horizontal coordination, collegiality and professionalism (Interviews DFID#1; PREP#2; Morrissey, 
2005, p. 166). While DFID has attempted to coordinate and consult proactively with other government 
departments (OECD, 2014, p. 15), for example, regarding the British EU position on the SDGs, it has 
been less successful in persuading them to promote development-relevant positions in the EU. 
According to interviewees, this applies especially to the FCO, the Cabinet Office and the Ministry of 
Defence (Interviews DFID#1, #2). Yet these departments have become increasingly relevant regarding 
EU development policies on middle-income countries, migration and fragile states, respectively. The 
degree of sectorisation has shifted with different development secretaries. Whereas Clare Short could 
implement an independent agenda, subsequent secretaries were more aligned to a national interest 
agenda, which has depended on both personalities and the wider political climate (Valters and Whitty, 
2017). The political prioritisation has empowered different views over time while marginalising 
others. 
The professionalisation of development policy, the ring-fencing of aid and the department’s 
relative independence, and the generally proactive coordination meant that DFID engaged directly 
and actively in the EU on all levels. The department has its own expertise regarding the functioning of 
EU processes and its Europe Department (EU Department before 2008) communicates the functioning 
of EU processes to those units which have subject specific knowledge. The Europe Department is the 
lynchpin for organising Britain’s engagement in EU development cooperation. It is divided into teams, 
all but one of them are based in London. One team is hosted by the UKREP in Brussels. The teams in 
the London office are responsible for feeding policy priorities into the EU system, ensuring that EU 
policy does not go against British interests, and scrutinise EU development cooperation. UKREP in 
Brussels allows direct contact between DFID and other departments for their representation in the 
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EU. It is an ‘all of government’ operation under the auspices of the FCO. These officials communicate 
processes in Brussels to Whitehall and they are the ‘gatekeepers’ for engagement with the EU 
institutions. DFID, in turn, sends all agendas and information from its meetings in Brussels to the 
UKREP. Yet their contact and interactions vary and leave significant leeway for EU engagement to 
London. The leeway also depends on the political relevance and implications of proposed policies 
because it affects how EU interventions are perceived in Britain’s domestic arena. For example, trade, 
sanctions or humanitarian aid, generate more public and political attention than long-term 
cooperation policies. The direct and horizontal engagement of development officials with their 
counterparts in other member states has been stretched as discussions on EU-ACP cooperation often 
cross the boundaries of long-term aid and cooperation policies and require input from the FCO 
(Interviews DFID#1; PREP#2). Generally, DFID’s internal system has tended to foster a compliance and 
risk aversion culture (OECD, 2014, p. 57). As a result, DFID officials have also tried to limit their EU 
interactions to technical and thematic discussions. 
Nevertheless, DFID officials have used their access to the EU strategically to promote priorities 
that they considered relevant for effective development cooperation. To do so, they have relied on a 
combination of advocacy among peers in the formal Council system, especially the general 
development working group (CODEV), pushing priorities in technical expert seminars bottom-up, and 
placing officials as seconded national experts (SNEs) in relevant places in the Commission’s DG DEVCO. 
While not geared towards consensus, as compared to Germany and France, also foreign observers 
considered British representatives in the relevant working groups, CODEV and ACP, active and 
constructive (Interview PREP#1). This has been underpinned by good personal relationships based on 
a degree of trust in which argumentation and persuasion, but also the knowledge of the other, play 
important roles. As a former UKREP official put it:  
It is a priority for us to work well together and I never felt that there was some kind of game playing 
involved but we had honest interactions. That’s the kind of people that they send to Brussels. This is 
specifically true for the development working group where it is easier than in other areas to have this 
kind of interaction because there is a general sense of goodwill. We had a kind of ‘Mini-Codev’ group 
of key actors which was very informal and under the radar and people informed their successors and 
were integrated immediately – like a group of like-minded friends. (Interview PREP#2) 
Support for arguments in terms of subject expertise has come from internal coordination in DFID. A 
central advantage of British officials has been their direct connection to DFID colleagues on the ground 
UNITED KINGDOM: TOO EFFECTIVE FOR EUROPE? 
163 
in cooperation countries, which differs in both DG DEVCO and the German BMZ. This kind of 
knowledge is highly valued in EU working groups. 
DFID has relied heavily on (informal) links to like-minded member states and working level 
engagements (see Elgström, 2017). Its officials engage regularly with representatives from EU 
institutions and member states on all levels to ensure that priorities get the necessary weight in the 
Council and ACP system. Thus, DFID combines political top-down intervention and bottom-up working 
level argumentation. At the highest political level, informal ministerial exchanges are strongest 
between like-minded ministers. These high-level, informal links have been traditionally stronger with 
the Nordics, especially Sweden and the Netherlands. They also rely on personal relationships for 
which the reduced language barrier matters, as one interviewee suggested (Interview DFID#1). 
Similarly, as suggested by the quote above, DFID officials have engaged informally with like-minded 
member states as well as France and Germany to coordinate policy positions before they go through 
formal processes. They have invested a great deal into keeping good working relations both at the 
level of the UKREP and in London. DFID officials from London have also regularly travelled to Brussels 
to meet with representatives from EU institutions as part of working groups, expert groups and in 
management committees. The Europe Department team in the UKREP has been responsible for 
‘lobbying in the EU corridors’ (Interview DFID#1). 
Development officials in thematic and geographic units have engaged with EU institutions and 
member states horizontally on specific themes. This is especially important where they have sought 
to push a topic bottom-up. It is in these areas where DFID has seconded individual experts to the EU 
institutions or organised staff exchanges with other member states (Interviews DFID#1, #2). One way 
to push priorities with the Commission has been through horizontal expert groups/seminars with the 
Commission, which are formal channels of bottom-up promotion of priorities through technical 
expertise. DFID has used these channels, for instance, for promoting a results framework (see below) 
and strengthening the gender dimension, which were both deemed very successful British 
contributions (Olivié and Pérez, 2017, p. 20). DFID officials have reached out to stay in contact with 
Commission staff working on the same thematic issue, especially their own seconded expert to keep 
oversight over the relevant thematic network (Interviews DEVCO#4; DFID#2; EP#5; PREP#2). 
However, the proportion of British SNEs had generally been low compared to Germany or France, 
according to evidence by the FCO to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2013, p. 92). 
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‘Stateless society’ and its networks 
 
Britain’s style of representative government, the importance of private actors, and the 
professionalisation of politics provides a central role for civil society (see Hilton, et al., 2013). In 
development, UK-based civil society has a strong presence in Brussels and significant capacities in 
terms of funds, expertise, networks and human resources. This has been exceptional for development 
NGOs in Europe, especially when compared to member states of a similar size, such as Germany (see 
chapter 4). However, with a large civil society sector also comes a heterogenous structure from 
internationally-operating advocacy leaders with vast networks, such as Oxfam, to specialised 
consultants and very influential think tanks. The role of non-state actors has been relevant for Britain’s 
national coordination and engagement in EU development policies due to their wide networks and 
international recognition and reputation. The Overseas Development Institute (ODI), the UK’s leading 
think tank on international development and humanitarian issues, which is mainly funded by DFID, 
has been instrumental for governmental capacity-building. Non-state actors, more generally, play an 
important role in transnational agenda-setting and advocacy but also in keeping competing agendas 
alive at the domestic level. Thus, Britain’s engagement in the EU has also been an arena for domestic 
contestation on a wider societal level. 
The prominent role of British civil society and societal actors during policy formulation and 
implementation is based on a general understanding of the state ‘according to which public policies 
emerge from the interaction of societal interests’ (Knill, 2001, p. 83). In contrast to Germany’s state-
society organisation (see chapter 4), the British understanding implies that the legitimacy for 
contributing to policy coordination arises from societal competition. Traditionally, this coincides with 
a bureaucratic machinery which has a low degree of professional specialisation and is dominated by 
generalists while its specialist capacity comes from stakeholders (see Knill, 2001). As a result, NGOs, 
think tanks, research institutes, and consultants have been involved in formal and informal ways. DFID 
provides grants to UK-based CSOs through several mechanisms ranging from providing core funding, 
especially to ODI, to funding poverty reduction projects in developing countries, for instance, the UK 
Aid Match scheme, which match-funds public donations to charity. As noted earlier, development 
cooperation differs to some extent due to the significant degree of specialisation and 
professionalisation within the public administration and the direct contact of officials with primary 
stakeholders, i.e., partner country governments, which gives officials relevant information for 
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engaging in the EU. In addition, coordination in the EU is highly intergovernmental, which reduces 
space for direct interaction with national civil society. 
Nonetheless, it is the demand that arises from the combination of professionalisation and 
horizontal, intergovernmental engagement in the EU which makes knowledge providers such as the 
ODI relevant. This is due to the importance of knowledge in European-level interactions (see chapter 
3). DFID officials, especially in Brussels, are often preoccupied with managing the relationships with 
and expectations of political and foreign policy actors in London (Interview PREP#2). In this situation, 
ODI enhances the ‘capacity’ of British officials for engaging in EU development cooperation through 
briefings and trainings on the functioning of EU processes (Interviews DFID#1, #2; PREP#2; TT#2). 
Despite its in-house expertise on European development processes, DFID has also drawn on EU-
specific expertise from ODI. This was institutionalised through the European Development 
Cooperation Strengthening Programme (EDCSP), established in 2009 and financed by DFID (Interview 
TT#2; Bayne, 2013). For instance, DFID’s Europe Department officials asked for ODI training on EU 
processes to provide upskilling and awareness raising (Interview PREP#2). There is also some external 
mobility of staff. While there is only limited commissioned work, the Europe Department in London 
has made occasional requests for briefings where ‘external’ expertise seemed particularly relevant, 
for example, on EU budget support (Interviews DFID#2; TT#2; Bernardi, et al., 2015). As a former 
official explained, the ODI involvement has been motivated by the desire of British officials to 
demonstrate supportive evidence in the EU without appearing ‘awkward’ (Interview PREP#2; see 
below). 
ODI’s role has been limited on wider, politically salient questions about the EU’s role in 
development. This is different to Germany’s development institute (DIE), which regularly makes such 
contributions (see chapter 4). Nevertheless, ODI has developed both an interest and extensive 
capacities in the European dimension of development cooperation. With the financial support 
through the EDCSP, ODI created a European network with other think tanks to improve its outreach 
and help establish a European policy community of researchers and practitioners. First, ODI facilitated 
the creation of a network of EU researchers and research institutions through the establishment of 
the European Think-Tanks Group (ETTG), a lose grouping of like-minded, leading European 
international cooperation think tanks (see chapter 3). The goal was to create a more coherent and 
cross-EU approach to development cooperation by strategically using national think tank platforms 
and capacities to influence process at the European level. Also due to its autonomous funding, within 
FEDERATING EU DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION? 
166 
the group, ODI has been viewed as a leader and lynchpin (Bayne, 2013, p. 16). Second, in the same 
context of ODI’s European programme, the think tanks have promoted a European dimension of 
development policy-makers through the establishment of a network of policy-makers and researchers 
known as ‘EU Change-makers’ (Bayne, 2013) who meet occasionally, for example, during the annual 
European Development Days (see chapter 3). Occasionally, ODI also works together with Bond, one 
of Britain’s NGO networks, to write joint reports on EU development cooperation (Herbert, 2013), and 
they consult and inform each other on an ad hoc basis. For instance, ODI’s European programme 
supported British NGO’s to engage in a more targeted way in effective advocacy with the EU on the 
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) (Bayne, 2013). 
For NGOs, the picture is different despite their growing research and expert capacity (Hilton, 
et al., 2013). Instead, due to their strong European and international links, they have a role in 
transnational advocacy and agenda-setting, which makes them central for discursive challenges of 
governmental-driven agendas, not only domestically but also within the EU. Bond is one of Britain’s 
national membership organisation (the other one is the UK Aid Network, UKAN) and is a member of 
CONCORD, the European civil society umbrella organisation. Bond represents its members, advocates 
on their behalf, and adds input into European-level advocacy and network formation. Bond is not only 
part of a well-defined network of civil society organisations, but its members and staff are also part 
of wider networks. For instance, Bond’s chief executive since 2017, Tamsyn Barton, was previously at 
DFID and then at the European Investment Bank (EIB) where she brought in a results framework (see 
below) and advocated for the EIB to sign up to the IATI. Bond had previously emphasised ‘the 
importance of the EU as a development actor and the need for the UK Government to strongly support 
this role and invest in this relationship’ (Bond, 2011). Thus, the organisation itself acquired skills and 
knowledge of European development processes through its staff, members and the annual EU-wide 
AidWatch report process (Interview NGO#6). On this basis, it also helps develop the skills of other 
NGOs in the sector regarding knowledge on EU development policy processes, build organisational 
capacity and effectiveness, and provide opportunities of exchanging information, knowledge and 
expertise (e.g., De Toma, 2009). 
The role of CSOs has been crucial for building domestic societal support, which has helped 
political representatives to promote issues in Brussels. An important example, in the run-up to the 
Council meeting in May 2015, was the informal alliance between DFID and several CSOs organised in 
Bond to lobby EU institutions and member states especially through CONCORD. The intention was to 
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back the British government positions in the EU negotiations concerning development finance and 
ring-fencing of EU aid (Interview NGO#6). The government further encouraged this function of British 
transnational CSOs. When launching a review of DFID’s engagement with civil society, then 
Development Secretary of State Justine Greening (2015) addressed NGOs directly:  
I want to urge you to use your networks, knowledge and passion in that wider world – less on campaigns 
to lobby us, but to get on the case of more countries – show why the UK was right to do 0.7 and urge 
others to follow our leadership. That’s where we need to put our efforts. 
While civil society had benefited from a privileged access when development cooperation was largely 
defined in terms of assistance to social development, e.g., education or health, which was dominant 
between 2000 and 2015, its role came under increasing pressure with the advance of the ‘results 
agenda’. The British government grew more critical of NGO engagement, which also affected shifting 
funding away from core funding (DFID, 2016a, p. 11). DFID’s focus on engaging the private sector 
challenges NGO’s privileged access (Interview NGO#6). This includes the Civil Society Partnership 
Review process between July and November 2015, which sought to assess the grounds for ‘reforms 
that will maximise value for money and results from CSO programmes and engagement’ (DFID, 2016a, 
p. 10). As a result, DFID’s engagement with CSOs expanded to involve a broader range of 
organisations, including more private sector suppliers. 
Yet, aside from potentially more strategic adjustments in the relationship between public 
administration and civil society, British participation in transnational advocacy has been characterised 
by interactions between state and society, often as part of a wider competition over global 
development policy norms. Transnational advocacy has not been aligned primarily to the EU, as it has 
always been global in outreach, but professionals have nevertheless participated in and pervaded EU 
structures. 
 
III Effectiveness beyond coordination 
 
The British concern for effectiveness in development cooperation significantly affected the 
engagement of British development policy officials in the EU. The UK presented itself as a global leader 
in enhancing aid and development effectiveness, and ‘Europe’ had some role to play in it. On the one 
hand, Britain has been part of European development cooperation structures since it joined the 
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Community. On the other hand, the EU was an opportunity structure for influencing the global debate, 
which became increasingly evident in the early 2000s (see chapter 3). The European Consensus on 
Development of 2005, with its focus on coordination, was also shaped under the UK Council 
Presidency to set a strong development agenda as a response to the 2004 enlargement and the 
associated perception that development cooperation might slip as a priority (McAvan, 2016). While 
British development professionals shaped EU policy, the government always sought to avoid the 
impression of common European policy norms, unless they were, in fact, global policy principles as 
was the case, for instance, for division of labour. 
This section examines on what grounds and how British development professionals sought to 
shape discourses on common policy norms in the EU. It helps understand how British actors supported 
certain transnational coalitions and networks, which affected the competition over policies on the 
European level. The engagement in the EU became driven by the domestic politics of advancing a 
results agenda (see Mawdsley, 2017; Valters and Whitty, 2017); and Britain used the EU to pursue this 
agenda both nationally and internationally. The first part of this section looks at the case of policy 
coordination and how British actors reacted to those EU initiatives that were based on an 
international discourse establishing a close connection between coordination and effectiveness. The 
second part turns to how British actors subsequently sought to establish transparency and 
accountability principles at the EU level as part of the internal advance of the results agenda. This 
occurred in a changed international discursive environment, which British development professionals 
had themselves helped to create. 
 
Diverging ideas of coordination 
 
British development officials had perceived the EU as a potential forum for influencing the 
international development agenda. In a speech by Gareth Thomas, then DFID’s Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State, at the ODI in September 2003, he made clear that the EU was a channel for 
coordinating policies that needed to be dealt with at the global level:  
The Commission is uniquely placed to co-ordinate and harmonise Member States’ development 
policies and practices. […] It can also push agreed EU positions in international development fora. This 
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is most apparent when one thinks […] of the WTO, but could equally apply to the Global Health Fund 
or other multilateral structures. (Thomas, 2003) 
While British officials were very active in pushing the aid effectiveness agenda outside the EU, in the 
subsidiary bodies of the OECD Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and the Nordic Plus group24 (OECD, 
2010b, p. 71), their engagement on aid effectiveness in the EU was considered as key given the EU’s 
‘global lead’ in the 2000s (DFID, 2009, p. 111). It was in this way of using the EU for exerting concerted 
influence on the international agenda, rather than the coordination of bilateral aid, in which British 
development policy professionals, including in the ODI, principally perceived the EU’s coordination 
role for its member states. This understanding found wide support because it was in the EU where 
British actors were confident that they could influence common policy norms according to their 
preferences. 
Even as the discourse on coordination for effectiveness experienced significant momentum 
at the international level around the time of the European Consensus in the mid-2000s, DFID 
remained sceptical towards the EU efforts. On the one hand, in its Institutional Strategy for engaging 
with the EU, DFID officially committed itself that it would ‘actively support the EC [European 
Commission]’ in its ‘Efforts to make European donors work better together (improve coordination and 
harmonisation)’, including through joint multiannual programming and joint financing of aid 
programmes (DFID, 2005, p. 8). On the other hand, there was strong reluctance to this kind of policy 
harmonisation as an ODI study of the time reports (Warrener and Perkin, 2005). The study analysed 
DFID’s perspective on EU approaches to harmonisation and was prepared with input from DFID’s 
Poverty Reduction Strategy and Aid Harmonisation team. It found that  
Despite DFID’s strong engagement with the EC’s approach to harmonisation and alignment there are 
also some tensions visible. […] in as much as DFID sees itself as one of the leaders in framing innovative 
and progressive international aid policy dialogues, there is a sense that to conform to EU approaches 
would be to sacrifice some of the more subtle nuances of DFID’s own thinking on these issues. 
(Warrener and Perkin, 2005, p. 8) 
                                                          
24 The Nordic Plus (Nordic+) Group, which has been built up gradually since 2003, is an informal partnership 
between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Ireland. These 
countries claim to share a joint vision of development cooperation. Their objective is to strengthen mutual 
cooperation, and to harmonise procedures and practices, primarily on the ground, in order to reduce 
fragmentation and the resulting burden for developing countries, primarily through delegated cooperation. 
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This thinking, as expressed by the then DFID Head of Development Effectiveness, included the ‘desire 
to avoid prescriptive, centralised approaches’, which DFID saw in the EU’s approach to harmonisation 
(cited in Warrener and Perkin, 2005, p. 8). The scepticism towards the EU’s role was partly shared by 
the ODI, which cautioned against expectations of bilateral policy coordination, pointing to political 
considerations: 
Although multilateral channels would seem to offer considerable potential for greater harmonisation 
and alignment of aid, donors are likely to always maintain a mixed portfolio as bilateral aid enables 
greater innovation, political engagement and flexibility. (Warrener and Perkin, 2005, p. iv, emphasis 
added) 
In the same study, Hilary Benn, then Secretary of State, was cited as concerned over the implications 
of harmonisation and alignment for policy accountability (Warrener and Perkin, 2005, p. 14). 
However, these political counter-incentives did not only exist in DFID. The FCO had strong concerns, 
stressing the visibility of Britain in certain countries where DFID had a powerful, historical presence 
as a bilateral donor. In contrast, country offices perceived harmonisation to be a passing trend, which 
was mainly championed by senior management to deal with staff losses. Thus, it was seen to be less 
about aid effectiveness for the development in third countries but about efficiency of cooperation 
procedures, which already burdened country-level staff due to high internal accounting requirements 
(Warrener and Perkin, 2005, p. 15). This suspicion was not countered by building incentives for 
considering harmonisation into the institutional system, for instance, training, promotions etc. This 
seemed to confirm the perception of many policy professionals that harmonisation was merely a 
‘trend’. Instead, DFID considered pursuing different alternatives to the EU for pooled bilateral funding 
at the country level, for example, ‘Delivering as One’, an approach piloted by the United Nations 
(OECD, 2010b, p. 54). 
As outlined in chapter 3, the financial crisis 2008/2009 postponed the debate on coordination 
at the EU level for some time. However, when the debate resumed, and the European Commission 
pushed concrete coordination policies, especially joint programming, the careful optimism in DFID for 
EU harmonisation, which had briefly emerged following the EU reforms of the early 2000s (e.g., 
Thomas, 2003), had largely vanished. Instead, the discourse in Britain had moved on due to the 
deepening of the results agenda (Valters and Whitty, 2017). The growing preoccupation with 
efficiency and transaction costs, reinforced after 2010 within the wider British coalition government, 
pointed towards a predicament regarding EU coordination. Britain’s first Multilateral Aid Review 
UNITED KINGDOM: TOO EFFECTIVE FOR EUROPE? 
171 
(MAR) of 2011, which spelled out DFID’s expectations of a multilateral organisation, highlighted 
among others (i.e., outreach, economies of scale and international standard setting) that ‘their 
leadership and co-ordination function reduces transactions costs for both donors and developing 
countries’ (DFID, 2011c, p. 2). This and subsequent evaluations were ambivalent in the sense that 
growing concerns for value for money justified stronger engagement in terms of coordination. Against 
this background, the Balance of Competences review, for instance, summarised the position of several 
British development professionals and stakeholders by referring to evidence from Christian Aid, which 
‘made the point, echoed by most of the respondents, that coordinated EU action can improve the 
efficiency and impact of Member States’ aid spending’ (DFID, 2013c, p. 37). 
Despite this general affirmation, the British governmental position became very clear: EU 
coordination initiatives were only relevant where policies were closely aligned and complementary to 
British priorities and ways of working. Regarding Britain as a leader in international development, 
leading officials saw little need to coordinate policy with the EU and the other member states. This 
understanding, which was partly considered a form of ‘arrogance’, as some interviewees suggested 
(Interviews DFID#1; EEAS#1), was based on DFID’s financial contribution, but also on its experience, 
expertise, representation in the field, and the positive assessment by third actors, such as the OECD-
DAC. DFID’s overall structure, especially its well-staffed and flexible in-country offices, provided it with 
a strong presence on the ground. Thus, international partners tended to have high expectations of 
the UK taking the lead in reducing aid fragmentation and promoting division of labour. The UK had 
already participated in joint country strategies and programmes with other, not necessarily EU, 
development partners, e.g., through multi-donor trust funds or delegated cooperation, and had 
played a ‘leadership role’ in donor coordination, which was recognised by external stakeholders 
(OECD, 2010b, p. 19; 2014, p. 19). 
The political reluctance to support EU coordination became clear in the IDC’s assessment of 
EU joint programming. The parliament’s development committee concluded that while  
It seems sensible that there is a reduction in the overlap between donors by having a form of joint 
programming, […] the question remains over who coordinates the process if Governments do not want 
to hand over responsibility of bilateral projects to the European Commission. As the ODI points out—
everybody wants to coordinate, but no one wants to be coordinated. (International Development 
Committee, 2012, p. 23) 
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The conclusion was that the coordinating should be done by the donor with most experience and the 
strongest track record in a certain country. The committee suggested that ‘the European Commission 
does not necessarily have the capacity or the expertise to lead the coordination’ (International 
Development Committee, 2012, p. 23). While it seemed not possible to prevent the establishment of 
a distinctive EU joint programming at this point, British actors instead sought to minimise the 
Commission’s role and maintain ‘exit options’. 
In particular, the International Development Committee (2012, p. 4) objected to EU joint 
programming when ‘it involves the Commission playing a leading role in coordinating the work of 
Member States with a better track record than its own’. On these grounds, DFID officials justified their 
insistence on keeping joint programming open to non-EU members, not only on paper but in practice, 
so that it resembled the kind of (non-EU) joint programming that the UK had already participated in. 
This referred primarily to the UK’s preferred multilateral organisations, the World Bank and Gavi, the 
Vaccine Alliance (formerly known as the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization), but also the 
private sector and civil society. In such an arrangement, the EU/Commission would merely be one 
partner in a multi-stakeholder engagement. DFID supported this argument with resistance in partner 
countries (Interview DFID#2; European Commission, 2011a; Furness and Vollmer, 2013; OECD, 2012). 
Thus, DFID officials abstained from promoting joint programming centrally and, instead, diverted the 
decision about participation to the professionals in the field (DFID, 2013c, p. 39). Yet, as its staff on 
the ground had long engaged in other non-EU coordination activities, e.g., the joint donor trust fund 
or the UN, these professionals tended to prefer established coordination within more comprehensive 
or like-minded groups to the EU (Furness and Vollmer, 2013). 
The dominant narrative in DFID was based on the argument that it was a priority to have a 
flexible, voluntary and pragmatic approach to joined-up working within the EU, which must be ‘open 
to other donors, aimed at reducing transaction costs and not least adapted to the realities on the 
ground’ (DFID, 2013c, p. 39). The high-level opposition to joined-up working within the EU meant that 
DFID officials had to face negative reactions despite being not the only member state to divert from 
the common EU policy norm. Initially, also Spain and Portugal had been very critical of EU joint 
programming, while other member states, such as Germany, remained behind their commitments, 
even though they had strongly supported the common policy norm at the EU level (see chapter 4). 
While DFID perceived its approach to be pragmatic, other member states perceived Britain as 
more destructive and ‘cherry picking’ (Interviews PREP#1). This perception was also shared by other 
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European observers in EU institutions and among researchers (Interviews DEVCO#2; EEAS#1; 
Klingebiel, et al., 2013). As an official from the Commission put it, ‘in countries where DFID is strong, 
it can block the whole process’ (Interview DEVCO#2). This indicates that the British projection of an 
alternative conception of joint programming was dismissed as being primarily a defensive reaction to 
a common EU policy norm. That the UK became increasingly reactive rather than proactive grew due 
to the political opposition against jeopardising national visibility and accountability. The increasing 
political preoccupation with domestic process for accountability made it politically increasingly 
difficult to commit to EU joint programming. As the OECD-DAC observed, the strong British focus on 
‘value for money’ and results ‘has led DFID to impose its own processes and requirements, making it 
more difficult to engage in joint programmes’ (OECD, 2014, p. 19). However, this did not only affect 
joined-up engagement, coordination and harmonisation in the EU but became a more general issue 
for Britain’s engagement in bilateral policy coordination. 
 
Results, transparency, effectiveness 
 
While accountability demands made bilateral coordination more problematic, it offered DFID an 
incentive for organising more proactive, ‘constructive’ input into the EU by seeking to ‘up-load’ 
domestic policy priorities on effectiveness to the EU level. This also happened against criticism from 
other European actors and development policy professionals while DFID staff, as expressed by an 
interviewee, saw the ‘need to ensure that the EU is seen as efficient as possible’ within the UK 
(Interview DFID#1). 
For British development professionals, as for others after the conference in Busan 2011, 
donor harmonisation, coordination and division of labour did not play the same role as they had done 
before and continued to do among officials at the EU’s bureaucratic centre. The British government’s 
focus in development cooperation since the beginning of the 2010 Conservative-led coalition 
government fully shifted towards results and value for money, transparency and accountability based 
on the prioritisation of the incoming Secretary of State Andrew Mitchell (Valters and Whitty, 2017, 
pp. 26-8). With increased spending came an increased focus on value for money, which had become 
firmly established as a ministerial priority for ‘everything’ DFID does, including its engagement in the 
EU (Interviews DFID#2; PREP#2; DFID, 2012; 2014). Similarly, Mitchell’s successor, Justine Greening 
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(2015), summarised her term in office with the words: ‘I’ve driven value for money and efficiency in 
everything we do’. These issues were not new in British development cooperation and had already 
emerged under the previous Labour governments. One reason for the stronger emphasis was that, 
from 2006 onwards, the British government, with cross-party support, began to expedite its 
commitment to achieve the 0.7% ODA/GNI target. The aid quantity goal had subsequently become a 
very strong point of reference for British development actors (Interviews DFID#1; NGO#6; PREP#1, 
#2). 
The 2006 International Development (Reporting and Transparency) Act had already focused 
on the ‘promotion of transparency’ for both aid effectiveness, i.e., ‘securing that aid supports clearly 
identified development objectives’, and efficiency, i.e., ‘promoting the better management of aid’ 
(Parliament of the United Kingdom, 2006). Moreover, DFID had pioneered a value for money 
approach as part of its so-called ‘Making it Happen’ programme. This approach sought to assess 
whether the results achieved represented good value for money against the costs incurred. This was 
not only to enhance domestic accountability of development cooperation but also to improve its 
effectiveness in development terms as these results would be used to maximise the impact of aid 
programmes (OECD, 2010b, pp. 63-4). Therefore, in January 2008, DFID launched its first Results 
Action Plan, which became a central pillar of the ‘Making it Happen’ programme. Later in the same 
year, DFID launched the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) in Accra. IATI is an 
international, voluntary, multi-stakeholder initiative, which seeks to improve the transparency of aid, 
development, and humanitarian resources to increase their effectiveness in tackling poverty. 
These initiatives heralded an increasing institutionalisation of accountability in British 
development cooperation, but these ‘innovations’ were not without criticism. In an external, DFID-
commissioned evaluation of it actions since the Paris Declaration, the reviewers concluded:  
If there are any grounds for concern about DFID’s commitment to the Paris Declaration, it is the 
preference for high-profile new initiatives over the hard work of implementing old ones. New 
initiatives, such as global spending commitments and new funding vehicles for global public goods, do 
not fall clearly within the country led paradigm, and have the potential to push Paris Declaration 
commitments into the background. (Thornton and Cox, 2008, p. vi) 
British NGOs and their networks also preferred to put partner country ownership first as this would 
improve mutual accountability whereas donor-driven concerns for accountability were considered 
destructive (Thomas, 2013). However, as this distinction suggests, the concept offered much room for 
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ambiguous use. The financial crisis and the change of government fuelled such concerns among civil 
society professionals. While the financial crisis led to a (small) dip in British official aid spending (see 
table 1), the commitment to the schedule for achieving the 0.7% spending target in 2013 remained 
unchanged (Lunn and Booth, 2016). Thus, it was left to the coalition government to make the 
necessary large increases in aid. This increased public attention on aid and its ring-fencing, first 
politically and then legally, made it vulnerable to criticism against the background of public spending 
cuts elsewhere (Lunn and Booth, 2016, p. 3; Watkins, 2014). Thus, in contrast to its predecessor, the 
Conservative-led governments decided to push the issue of value for money, accountability and 
transparency more strongly in a concerted effort in bilateral policies and in its engagement with all 
multilateral platforms. 
Pushing this agenda in multilateral arenas had been a priority from the very beginning. In May 
2010, then International Development Secretary of State Andrew Mitchell commissioned, in addition 
to a Bilateral Aid Review (DFID, 2011a), a Multilateral Aid Review (DFID, 2011c) as a basis for 
promoting value for money externally. This was justified on the grounds of domestic accountability 
demands of the British system of constant scrutiny of public expenditure through parliament and 
fitted the incoming government’s scepticism regarding European coordination efforts. To underline 
the political relevance, ICAI, which was founded to promote accountability, turned early to the EU. In 
an assessment of the EU, the evaluation body concluded that  
An important challenge for the EU is to improve the value for money of its development assistance. A 
focus of DFID’s effort is for the EU to develop a framework for assessing value for money within the 
organisation. The DFID Europe Department plans to call for more value for money considerations in 
future EU aid and use upcoming opportunities […] to further this. (ICAI, 2012, p. 7) 
Subsequently, this became the central mission of DFID’s Europe Department. In its mission 
statements, it had been unequivocal to highlight the challenges of improving value for money through 
promoting results orientation and transparency in the EU:  
To address these challenges, our main objective is for the EU to develop a framework for assessing VfM 
[value for money] within the organisation. This would work better when incorporated as part of a wider 
Results Framework (DFID, 2012, p. 10) 
The Europe Department had internalised the political prerogatives: ‘Results, transparency and 
accountability are our watchwords and guide everything we do’ (DFID, 2012, p. 1), which was also 
echoed by DFID officials (Interview DFID#2). The focus on results developed as the overarching 
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principle in DFID, followed by concerns for transparency and accountability (Interviews DFID#2; 
PREP#2). DFID officials connected transparency to development effectiveness, which they used to 
promote the issues at the EU level and among European partners. The narrative of DFID’s Europe 
Department highlighted the dual benefit of transparency: ‘Transparency […] helps us achieve greater 
value for money and improves the effectiveness of aid’ (DFID, 2013b, p. 2). Thus, ‘As EU aid represents 
56% of global ODA, the benefits of EU action on transparency would be huge for poorer countries as 
well as for our domestic constituencies’ (DFID, 2013b, p. 14). This was closely aligned to what DFID 
officials simultaneously promoted in IATI, namely, transparency increases the effectiveness of 
development cooperation through enhancing mutual accountability and improving decision-making, 
including for better coordination. 
This converging and mutually reinforcing domestic and international discourse was the basis 
for the organisational support of DFID officials in the EU, especially through seconded national experts 
(SNEs) in the area of results and evaluation in DG DEVCO (Interviews DEVCO#4; DFID#2; DFID, 2013b, 
p. 13), and maintaining a horizontal network of relevant experts. Internally, those views in DFID on 
the issue of promoting accountability and the promotion of these effectiveness principles were 
empowered as they had become engrained in the department’s organisational structure. The Cabinet 
Office drove administrative reforms to establish ‘value-for-money’ firmly in all DFID activities, notably 
through the civil service reform of 2013 (HM Government, 2012), which focused on performance and 
results, and made DFID a lead department in its implementation (OECD, 2014, p. 55). Subsequent 
development secretaries and DFID’s leadership have embraced these requirements to exert political 
top-down pressure in the Council of the EU. The high domestic accountability demands and pressure 
on DFID itself and its officials (Interview DFID#1; Greening, 2015) reduced the ability of British 
development officials to compromise on issues that put either scrutiny (e.g., transparency) or the 
‘returns’ of EU money to ‘national interests’ at risk. This even increased when parts of the national 
media attacked British aid effectiveness itself, with a series of stories appearing in some newspapers 
between March and June 2016, which alleged British bilateral aid was spent in a wasteful and 
ineffective manner (Lunn and Booth, 2016, p. 3). 
While the limited room for manoeuvre risked putting individual DFID staff at the EU working 
level into a ‘destructive’ position, their reference to societal support helped to promote results 
transparency horizontally against criticism from member states and ‘not to appear as the awkward 
UK’ (Interview PREP#2). Britain’s leading development think tank ODI had put transparency high on 
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the aid effectiveness agenda (Moon and Williamson, 2010) and supported this prioritisation also in its 
other interactions, such as with the Commonwealth Secretariat in a background note to the bloc’s 
position for Busan (Rogerson, 2011). ODI’s research on the topic had been funded by the International 
Budget Partnership, which works with governments and civil society to achieve more open budgeting 
practices, and Publish What You Fund, a global campaign to achieve better transparency of 
development financing. ODI was closely involved with these organisations ‘with the aim of informing 
and influencing the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI)’ (Moon and Williamson, 2010, p. 
1). 
Thus, societal support was not only a discursive device in EU-level debates but became a 
component of DFID’s organisational support. Britain’s influence on and promotion of IATI was decisive 
as it emerged as a principle global framing devise for accountability and transparency in international 
development effectiveness. The engagement of DFID officials in the Global Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation (GPEDC) and the G8 (2013) shaped the international effectiveness 
discourse and thus created a strong international precedence, which was received positively by DFID’s 
Europe Department: 
During the Secretary of State’s time as co-chair of the Global Partnership for Effective Development 
Cooperation, DFID played a key role in encouraging different development actors to work together and 
use internationally agreed principles for aid and development effectiveness. (DFID, 2014, p. 2). 
The global debates in IATI and the GPEDC were more technical in nature than the OECD high-level 
fora of the 2000s. The GPEDC and the fatigue with the previous aid effectiveness principles after Busan 
opened a window of opportunity for British policy professionals to get involved more strongly to by-
pass discussions in the EU. This window of opportunity fitted the British government’s perception for 
effective governance more widely, which was part of its national reform strategy after 2010. While 
the international development discourse provided a justification for Britain’s insistence in the EU, it 
also opened it up to criticism from other member states (Interviews BMZ#3; CON#2) and internally, 
as some development professionals felt that the governmental results agenda sat uncomfortably with 
development objectives (Valters and Whitty, 2017). However, DFID received support especially from 
Publish What You Fund. This UK-based campaign for aid transparency was launched at the Accra High 
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2008 with support of DFID. The group’s advocacy gained 
significant momentum after 2011 when it was increasingly promoted by DFID: 
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Several of Publish What You Fund’s recommendations have not only been accepted, but also 
championed, by DFID – including support for data user tools and the piloting of the crucial budget 
alignment component of the IATI standard. (Publish What You Fund, 2012, p. 8) 
Thus, there was a mutually reinforcing relationship for norm advocacy between the organisations. 
First, the campaign provided DFID with discursive and organisational support, which it used to engage 
with the European Commission and other EU institutions, such as the EIB (see above). Second, their 
engagement affected the wider international discursive environment, which increasingly reflected aid 
transparency. 
In addition to this active engagement and organisational support for promoting transparency 
and accountability at the EU level, the British government emphasised its option of ‘walking away’. 
While the government’s announcement to adjust its financial contributions to international 
organisations according to their performance against these international standards was not mainly 
directed towards the EU, the EU received much attention. The Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) process 
(DFID, 2011b; 2013a) and, in 2016, the Multiannual Development Review (DFID, 2016c) extended and 
institutionalised scrutiny to multilateral aid channels in a regular and (domestically) regulated process. 
This process also targeted the EU despite its different character (ICAI, 2015). Additional political 
pressure specifically on the EU came in the context of the Balance of Competence Review (Secretary 
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 2012), which heralded the increasing pressure of a 
reassessment of the general relationship between Britain and the EU. This political pressure was also 
underpinned with research insights and expertise. For example, in 2012, ODI summarised various 
findings on EU aid effectiveness and suggests a potential decision rule for engagement with the EU 
(Geddes, 2012, p. 6). 
Eventually, by 2015, the EU had picked up the international transparency norms that were 
significantly shaped by British policy professionals in a wider, international discursive network, which 
included societal actors. The effect of this norm advocacy, mainly through a communicative discourse, 
became evident as the EU instruments scored well on DFID’s new indicators in subsequent 
assessments. DFID had introduced indicators for value or money and accountability, which became 
‘tougher’ over time (DFID, 2016c, p. 13). Nevertheless, as a 2016 assessment on the EU concludes, 
‘Since the 2013 MAR Update, the EU has made good progress on transparency, and taken important 
steps to improve reporting of results’ (DFID, 2016b). The EU’s 2015 results framework reflected DFID’s 
priorities, which was perceived as relevant among officials in DFID’s Europe Department for 
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demonstrating to the domestic audience that the EU is as efficient as possible (Interview DFID#1). 
Similarly, after the British EU referendum in 2016, a study found that British policy-makers were 
convinced that they had shaped the EU development policy according to their own goals and 
principles in terms of aid to LDCs, raising awareness on gender issues, and introducing transparency 
as well as result orientation (Olivié and Pérez, 2017, p. 20). 
The example of the results framework also shows how the promotion of specific priorities 
clashed with diverging understandings on the EU’s role. Due to the strong domestic accountability 
concerns for public spending and the unwillingness to be bound to EU policy norms, British officials 
had not been inclined to commit to a common EU results framework (Interviews DFID#1; PREP#2). 
Instead, they retreated to a defensive and reactive approach when this option was put on the table. 
To illustrate this point, while in its 2012 mission statement, the Europe Department still sought to 
‘lobby the EU to adopt an EU-wide guarantee on aid transparency that would commit both the 
European Commission and EU Member States’ (DFID, 2012, p. 12, emphasis added), the phrase 





This chapter has traced the participation of British policy professionals in EU norm advocacy in 
development cooperation in the years before the 2016 referendum on EU membership. While British 
officials have actively participated in networks of member state and EU officials, they have been less 
invested in a coordinative discourse to arrive at a working-level consensus on common EU policy 
norms. This has contributed to the perception of an ‘awkward partner’ in the EU. Yet British 
professionals have actively participated in the discursive formation on EU effectiveness in 
development cooperation, as the chapter has demonstrated based on the case of transparency. The 
central channel for British norm advocacy has been a wider international discursive network around 
(aid) transparency, including societal actors, which officials helped to strengthen. Since Britain has 
been a major contributor to EU development cooperation and has significantly shaped EU policy 
norms over time despite the reluctance of officials to engage in consensus-seeking, this contributes 
to close the knowledge gap of how policy professionals have contributed towards common EU 
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external action. As part of this, the chapter has demonstrated that the discursive contribution of 
British professionals stands in contrast to professionals in Germany, which highlights different ways 
of understanding the contribution of professionals to EU norm advocacy. 
The EU has not been the primary channel for British actors to shape discourses on 
international development. The chapter has shown that despite the country’s weight in the EU, British 
officials have primarily relied on extra-EU discursive networks to promote priorities. However, as the 
chapter has also shown, British officials have become more involved in the EU’s administrative 
networks, especially since the founding of DFID. The analysis of discursive competition over 
effectiveness in EU development cooperation in the final section of this chapter has suggested that 
British officials became more engaged in using the EU’s opportunity structure. This part first analysed 
the reaction of UK policy professionals to EU policy coordination and then their participation in EU 
discourse construction to support the promotion of alternative policy norms, especially transparency. 
How active British officials have been in the EU coordinative discourse has depended on the extent to 
which they could steer the discourse to align common EU policy norms with the principles that they 
promoted within their international network. For this end, similar to Germany, and despite the 
continued British reluctance (Geddes, 2013, pp. 200-1), British professionals participated in technical, 
administrative coordination. For example, they actively engaged in an EU expert group, and seconded 
a national expert on transparency to the Commission to steer policy formulation and coordination 
from within the institutional network hub. 
This suggests that there had been some form of ‘Europeanisation’ of the engagement of 
British officials in the EU, which had to overcome the ‘extra’ scepticism that British officials have been 
facing at the EU level. Seeking to overcome scepticism of other professionals, British officials have 
been particularly concerned with proving their credibility. As a result, they have been especially 
inclined to reference policy expertise and knowledge, such as ODI. However, as the analysis has 
demonstrated, and in contrast to the German discursive engagement, the goal of this participation 
was not to advocate EU policy norms for the sake of collective EU action. This has been suggested as 
the British governmental ambition to structure public discourse beyond EU circles was much more 
pronounced. This has involved engaging, mobilising and supporting global civil society and their 
networks, such as the ODI and Publish What You Fund. British officials have engaged in different fora 
(e.g., IATI, GPEDC, Nordic plus) to upload domestic preferences to the international level. British 
professionals at higher levels have continued to feel some unease with the EU-level coordination 
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processes, which tend to be reliant on achieving consensus in a coordinative discourse (see chapter 
3). Participation in a wider discursive network meant that British officials shaped competition over 
effectiveness in international development simultaneously at multiple institutional hubs.  
This wider transnational engagement, which contributed over time to the international 
discourse, allowed British development officials to make arguments in the EU that were legitimised 
by the international discourse and strengthened relevant (societal) voices in the discursive network, 
while isolating actors with competing arguments. At the same time, a key component of using the 
EU’s opportunity structure was building up capacity at the EU level in these areas to absorb the 
international discourse and maintain it. This included enhancing the number of seconded experts 
(SNEs), which tended to be comparatively lower than in Germany or France, and strategically placing 
them in key positions across EU institutions. The simultaneous international advocacy and EU 
capacity-building made EU institutional actors, such as the Commission and the European Investment 
Bank (EIB), more susceptible to the international discourse and adaptable to international standards 
(e.g., IATI). The discursive engagement of British development officials, including in the EU, had also 
been a way to deal with domestic contestation. In particular, it helped to absorb pressure from the 
Treasury on safeguarding accountability, as development officials could exploit the ambiguity of 
accountability as both an aid effectiveness and a domestic governance principle. However, this also 
drew criticism from different parts of the national and international development community, and 
further governmental measures in the early/mid-2010s risked weakening support by civil society 
professionals for the ministry’s norm advocacy. 
The contrast to German discursive engagement implies that there are different ways of 
understanding the contribution of professionals to EU norm advocacy and hence collective action in 
international development. It illustrates the value of the outlined approach of discursive networks 
where the participation on professionals is less tied to the institutional boundaries set by the EU. This 
also has implications for Brexit and EU development cooperation (see also Conclusion). While with 
Brexit some of the empirical knowledge that has been presented will be revised as British engagement 
in the EU adjusts, even after Brexit, the approach remains a valid tool to analyse the relationship 








It has been the aim of this research to add to our understanding of collective EU external action. The 
preoccupation with how institutional structures facilitate member state coordination in EU external 
relations has created a blind spot. This blind spot is a gap in our knowledge regarding how norms 
governing collective EU action are advocated. A gap existed because work on policy-making has not 
adequately captured the nature of norm advocacy, which underpins the formulation of common 
policy norms and presupposes collective action. The contribution of this research is to fill this gap. 
This research shifts attention to neglected processes of norm advocacy. The analysis has 
concentrated on the discursive coordination and competition on which norm advocacy is built. In 
these discursive processes multiple actors participate in a transnational space that is not directly 
represented by institutional structures. Instead, the research locates EU, state and non-state actors 
in discursive, transnational networks of policy professionals who engage in, and compete over, norm 
advocacy for common EU policy through their discursive interactions. This research implies a critique 
of how norm advocacy has been studied. It revises existing, dominant views on norm advocacy in EU 
external action. To do so, the analysis links the previously little related concepts of norm advocacy 
and discursive networks to examine the agency and scope of policy professionals in the advocacy of 
EU policy norms; and it provides new empirical insights into the role of these policy professionals for 
collective action between the EU institutions and the member states in development cooperation, 
many of whom have hardly been credited in this way before. 
This research demonstrates how policy professionals contribute towards a common EU policy 
on development cooperation. While the institutional environment provides little incentives for 
coordination, the EU has agreed on norms governing collective development cooperation over time. 
The thesis argues that to understand EU norm advocacy, it is relevant to consider wider processes of 
policy formulation. This goes beyond negotiations between member states, who control decision-
making. Norm negotiations between state representatives are part of larger discursive competition, 
contestation and coordination processes. These processes take place in a more encompassing and 
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complex network around decision-making centres, which is not evidently organised by one set of 
institutional structures. Instead, policy formulation inevitably involves more, and specialised, 
professionals who engage substantively in norm advocacy and across organisational boundaries with 
overlapping institutional demands on actors. The thesis shows how these policy professionals 
contribute to the construction, mediation and advocacy of norms for collective action in the EU. 
Through their discursive action – both coordinative and communicative – institutional, state and non-
state policy professionals presuppose and shape norm negotiations of decision-makers. The research 
thus highlights the importance of paying attention to the multiple, overlapping interdependences of 
advocacy actors. Policy coordination is to a large extent ‘back-seat’ driven in the way that the 
resources and constraints for advocacy actors are determined by the network which they form. 
Policy coordination in the EU’s external action has been generally portrayed as state-centric 
and intergovernmental. It is predominantly central-state governments that formulate, fund and 
execute these policies and, in most cases (except for trade), they hold their own, effectively 
independent competence for doing so, even where they cooperate at the EU level. While these actors 
control decision-making, at the formulation (and re-formulation) stage more professionals are 
engaged. The engagement of those professionals who coordinate policy formulations informally and 
on a more technical basis across organisational boundaries has been hardly credited, partly because 
it is not part of the EU’s institutional design. This includes the role of member state bureaucrats ‘at 
home’ and their national networks, which has been largely marginalised when it comes to 
coordination at the EU level, with some exceptions (Chelotti, 2013; 2016a). Yet it is these professionals 
who organise the norm negotiations of ‘their’ representatives in Brussels. They engage with their 
counterparts in other member states and the EU institutions; they organise the involvement of 
technical professionals, some of whom may even become part of the institutions as in the case of 
seconded national experts; and they manage the engagement with external professionals. An 
important element of norm advocacy in the transnational arena is the provision of suitable 
argumentation, evidence and expertise for a respective discursive context. Thus, the range of relevant 
actors also includes other professionals who play a role in providing expertise, advocacy and 
argumentation at the national, European and global level. While these professionals are often 
regarded in terms of external (advocacy) networks that can be engaged in the policy process (Jordan 
and Schout, 2006; Kingah, et al., 2015), I have shown that they are part of a wider, interdependent 
transnational process of discursive competition and coordination (see Henriksen and Seabrooke, 
2016; Stone, 2013; Stone, 2015; Stone and Ladi, 2015). These professionals are integrated in the 
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discursive formation and coordination, for example, through invitations to hearings and technical 
seminars, they contribute studies and opinions, or they provide training and awareness-raising among 
officials and other professionals. While especially NGOs and think tanks require to be visible and thus 
seek to contribute to the wider communicative discourse formation, consultants have a more 
instrumental function and often become part of the coordinative discourse of bureaucratic politics. 
All these different professionals, who partly have little or no formal role in EU policy 
coordination, become engaged because they have something ‘to offer’ to the discursive formation. 
To make the case for the relevance of these wider processes of norm advocacy, the research has 
demonstrated, both conceptually and empirically, that there is a meaningful contribution of policy 
professionals to norm advocacy, what the nature of this contribution is, and under what condition it 
becomes effective. To show this, the research has moved to a mid-level of analysis between the 
individual-level norm negotiations and macro-structural processes (both institutional and discursive). 
Capturing EU norm advocacy at the meso level of analysis becomes possible by linking processes of 
discourse construction and networks within an institutionalised environment. Chapter 1 established 
this conceptual link by drawing on discursive institutionalism and network approaches in 
institutionalised international relations, which accounts for the potential of norm advocacy of 
professionals through their discursive action in networks. Showing the relevance of this conceptual 
link required creating new knowledge at this level of analysis. The empirical work therefore needed 
to show that there is a link between norm advocacy and discourse construction. Chapters 2 and 3 
responded to the need to establish that competition over policy norms for collective EU action occurs 
within a discourse on (development) effectiveness. Chapter 3 additionally demonstrated how 
professionals at the EU level engage in discursive competition over effectiveness. This responds to the 
need to fill a gap in our knowledge about EU norm advocacy but left open how and under what 
conditions state actors are involved. The chapter identified the need to look at what matters for the 
transnational interactions of national professionals who engage in this competition. Chapters 4 and 5 
then analysed in detail those member state actors who contribute to and contest EU norm advocacy. 
This responds to the need to disaggregate member state engagement in the transnational arena at 
this level of analysis. 
Since the role of policy professionals has been hardly credited, this thesis has generated new 
knowledge regarding their role. This is how the in-depth studies of the EU level, Germany and Britain 
become relevant. Focusing on two central member states allows to gain the necessary in-depth 
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perspective at professionals, who often remain invisible, and the context in which they act, which 
research at the EU level alone cannot do. Thus, by shifting the level of analysis, this research reveals 
and assesses the (collective) agency of actors who have no or little EU institutional role in the 
coordination process and have therefore been neglected by much of the academic EU level literature. 
Finally, the findings are valuable beyond the empirical case study. As the case of EU development 
cooperation suggests, the outlined approach is valuable where collective action norms are negotiated 
between EU institutional actors and member state representatives. This suggests that the research 
can speak beyond the case of development cooperation to the literature on EU external policy-making 
more widely. 
The reminder of this final part of the thesis reflects upon the analysis of the preceding 
chapters and draws overarching conclusions by linking the empirical and conceptual aspects. It 
discusses the empirical findings and analytical contributions but also the limitations of this research. 
First, I briefly summarise the empirical findings regarding the role of policy professionals in negotiation 
common policy norms in EU development cooperation. Second, I link these findings to the conceptual 
framework, which is also integrated more systematically into the wider debate on policy-making in 
EU external action and contrasted to existing approaches. Third, I discuss several limitations and 
outlooks for further enquiry. These two final parts are guided by the following questions: How can we 
make sense of the role of policy professionals for finding agreement on collective action? How is the 
outlined approach different to existing approaches? What lessons can be drawn for other policy areas 
beyond the EU’s development cooperation? And what does it add to the existing understanding of EU 
foreign policy-making? 
 
Valuing policy professionals 
This thesis has demonstrated the relevance of policy professionals in processes of norm advocacy 
beyond the negotiations of member state representatives. To understand this relevance, it has looked 
at the discursive dimension of interactions within networks between development policy 
professionals. 
It was the establishment of collective action in development cooperation in the late 1950s 
that laid the foundation for the engagement of transnational policy professionals, which developed 
independently from the member states. As discussed in chapters 2 and 3, over time, the range of 
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actors who have come to participate, namely bureaucrats, diplomats, implementers, external experts 
and so on, often with competing agendas, has constantly grown, transcending national organisational 
boundaries. While national structures developed largely within their own contexts and along the lines 
of global fora such as the DAC and the World Bank, as illustrated in chapters 4 and 5, the development 
at the European level offered a channel for policy-makers to come together to mediate their interests 
and beliefs. In addition to supranational policy professionals in the Commission, this centre has 
attracted professionals in member states who engage in transnational processes and/or shift their 
affiliation between the national and the supranational. This has created interdependences between 
multiple, different actors at different stages, and any attempt to overcome compartmentalisation, 
institutional variation and so on has fallen victim to the complex, overlapping field of interactions. 
Commission officials have sought to formulate EU policies for the coordination and collective 
action of the Community/EU and its member states. This has formally been the Commission’s task 
since Maastricht, and a shared task with the HR/VP and the EEAS since Lisbon (which has not kept 
Commission officials from promoting such policies at all points). Most prominent are the Commission 
communications as proposals for common policy. This has put Commission officials into a position to 
initiate formulations for common policy norms. They have aimed at promoting stronger measures for 
collective action and coordination of policies between the institutions and the member states. While 
this had already been the case before Maastricht (see Commission of the European Communities, 
1972), it has since intensified based on the extended Treaty provisions. As a result, the Commission 
has also strengthened its own expertise and bureaucratic capacity in the form of dedicated funding, 
officials and organisational units in areas that have been considered relevant to substantiating and 
justifying such formulation. This concerns especially the area of aid/development effectiveness, which 
has long had a focus on policy coordination – at least since the 1970s. Thus, at least since Maastricht, 
there have been Commission officials who have been dedicated to promoting common policy norms 
for collective action in development cooperation. They have enjoyed institutional entrenchment, as 
well as access to funding and Commission level policy formulation. 
Other professionals have sought to shape these policy formulations. Member state reactions 
have been central because it is their national policies which are concerned by these common policy 
norms for collective action. The nature of these policy proposals has meant that ‘agreement’ between 
member states mostly concern ‘endorsements’ and/or qualifications of Commission proposals, or 
more generally, any kinds of concerted reactions (or non-reactions). Finding this formal kind of 
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agreement is, in most cases, left to member state representatives in the Council working groups who 
are based in Brussels, meet regularly and coordinate intensively. They are specialists at ‘finding 
agreement’. Interviewees were very explicit about the central gatekeeping role of this EU working 
group network – which, in fact, stretches across a couple of working groups – even though final 
agreements have legally, and often practically, little effect on the national policies of member states 
(Carbone and Quartapelle, 2016; Krüger and Steingass, 2018). The central role of these officials in the 
institutional decision-making process has however attracted attention to how this close (sub-
)network operates, how they engage with each other, negotiate and advocate policy norms (Elgström, 
2000; 2017). As outlined in chapter 3, they ensure the political ‘fit’ of agreements with national lines, 
but as members of a dedicated Brussels community who are often development specialists, it gives 
them a wider sense of purpose to find ways that improve international development. They are the 
‘gatekeepers’ and the central institutional node of EU norm advocacy. 
Nevertheless, ‘finding agreement’ is not limited to these professionals. Chapters 3 to 5 have 
illustrated tensions between different channels for norm advocacy in the EU, which has repercussions 
for the participation of other professionals. These tensions arise as officials are tightly integrated in 
national structures and networks for policy formulation, prioritisation, coordination etc. Officials in 
the Council working groups connect to both the Commission and their ‘home’ institution. While their 
engagement with each other is their main function, significant capacity goes into communicating 
agreement and disagreement about formulations with Commission officials and managing 
expectations in ‘home’ organisations, especially their ministries. At the same time, officials ‘at home’ 
also contribute to coordination, even more so on technical aspects. This goes as far as direct 
engagement between subject specialists from the member state bureaucracies in EU expert groups, 
as outlined in chapter 5 for the case of transparency, who focus primarily on coordinating technical 
details among each other – rather than wider political appropriateness. This gives them a role in policy 
norm coordination, which they formally do not have. The national coordinative networks of member 
state officials have been relevant because there have been additional, informal interactions at the 
working level between their units, which contribute to common formulations via the coordination of 
more technical elements (‘coordinative discourse’). 
This highly coordinative form of norm advocacy among bureaucratic actors on a technical 
basis has thus been one way for the enhanced role of professionals. It comes with the limited 
involvement of other professionals, especially those who seek more visibility, wider communication 
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and political advocacy. This channel of norm advocacy has been the preferred channel for the 
Commission and Germany when the international and European discursive environment for 
coordination became more challenging. The German preference for and commitment to consensus 
and the coordinative discourse – which are not development policy specific – supported the 
Commission officials’ eagerness to continue advocating common norms for policy coordination. 
Political prioritisation mattered. While in Germany top-level prioritisation meant that there was 
relevant capacity, such as high-level attention and human resources, Commission professionals 
needed the participation of other professionals to allow coordination to remain a political priority. In 
this way, it became possible to advocate joint programming among a like-minded group even despite 
differences on the (political) purpose, especially between France and Germany, as outlined in chapters 
3 and 4. To promote preferences in this coordinative discourse, as chapter 4 has shown, German 
officials, but also other national actors, especially the DIE, were mobilised to promote joint 
programming through bureaucratic politics, including expert promotion, since 2009 when it came to 
the first implementation of this EU policy for the funding period 2014-2020. This included the 
secondment of a national expert to the Commission but also horizontal communication and 
interactions at all levels from the ministerial to the working level. 
This coordinative discourse meant that researchers and civil society actors found it more 
difficult to participate in norm formulation processes. Instead, they have depended on the ‘invitation’ 
by participating bureaucratic professionals. As chapter 3 has demonstrated, to construct and promote 
their ideas, Commission officials interacted with experts and professionals who provided material that 
found its way into the respective communications. To do this, the Commission carefully selected 
knowledge providers who would substantiate and legitimise the Commission’s narrative. While this 
gave some of these actors the chance to shape the narrative at least marginally, their main function 
was fostering agreement by a) providing additional expert authority, and b) coordinating wider 
societal agreement, which transcends the boundaries of the EU’s formal institutional mechanisms, 
e.g., through EU-wide networks, which the Commission strongly encouraged. This reflects the 
traditional approach of the Commission towards creating a transnational European policy 
constituency, which despite little formal role (except for the occasional participation in the 
Commission’s expert group), plays a role in aligning discourse within the EU. This exclusive 
participation stands in contrast to the ambition for wider participation of the mid-2000s, which the 
Commission promoted to communicate a more political case for coordination. Networks of national 
think tanks and of NGOs have sought to coordinate common positions at the EU level and promote 
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common formulations ‘at home’ in member states who also participate in other international fora. 
This also affected the wider international discourse and thus contributed to the image of the 
Commission as a norm-maker (Carbone, 2007). Seeking wider participation changes the relevance of 
professionals who play a role for norm advocacy. Importantly, it extends discursive competition and 
norm advocacy to institutional centres beyond the exclusive bureaucratic coordination and advocacy 
between respective member state and Commission professionals. Thus, societal participation 
potentially affects the wider international discourse in which the coordinative discourse of 
bureaucratic, technical professionals takes places. As a result, this coordination may contrast with the 
international discourse, which may lead to opposition. 
However, on the general question of the value of EU coordination for effectiveness, the range 
of potential external advocacy and knowledge actors has been limited. This has been due to the 
national focus of think tanks and the increasing alienation of NGOs, which found it increasingly difficult 
to engage with the Commission on traditional questions of aid and cooperation. Industry, with the 
exception of few commercial consultancies, had also little to say on this issue. The absence of NGOs 
and parliaments suggests that norm advocacy has largely remained part of a coordinative discourse 
of professionals rather than a more communicative one shaped in front of the eyes of a larger public 
(see Schmidt, 2008). This has provided an advantage for external professionals who relied less on 
visibility, e.g., consultants, and actors who have invested in an explicit focus on the European 
dimension. This includes think tanks such as the German DIE, but most importantly ECDPM, whose 
researchers were closely involved with the relevant Commission officials on advocating joint 
programming. Their general prominence among officials enhanced the Commission’s claims for 
expert authority. This form of direct engagement has partly stood in contrast to Commission officials’ 
insistence on transnational network formation of think tanks. 
British officials have been less oriented towards EU consensus than both German and 
Commission officials. While this meant that, as chapter 5 has shown, they had a harder time within 
the coordinative discourse, they have also used the EU as a channel for norm advocacy of their 
preferred policy norms. At times, British officials found it difficult to engage in EU norm advocacy in 
which they were perceived as ‘awkward’ or ‘reluctant’. Scepticism towards common norms for policy 
coordination, such as joint programming, which was strong within the national context, found its way 
to British representatives for Brussels but did neither halt EU norm advocacy nor led, initially, to more 
effective advocacy of alternative policy norms for effectiveness. Only when cracks appeared in the 
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international discourse on which EU norm advocacy had been based and retreated to a coordinative 
discourse, consistent with its general organisation for wider international engagement, British officials 
mobilised advocacy of non-state professionals in the transnational network of development 
professionals. Chapter 5 has illustrated the institutional support for and public endorsement of the 
‘Publish What You Fund’ advocacy network, which provided additional discursive support to British 
norm promotion. At that point it became difficult for German administrative professionals to engage 
with what they perceived as being contrary to national ‘culture’, and they partly reacted with 
disengagement, which reduced their role in EU norm advocacy. 
The cases of German and British officials have shown that opposition to EU policy norm 
advocacy at these levels has primarily been through disengagement. This has left more room for those 
professionals who have actively sought to construct all-EU policy norms for which the Commission 
has been a central hub. While not all Commission officials actively advocate common policy norms, 
the Commission has tended to join the promotion of common policy norms also because member 
states, as part of their norm advocacy, provide it with relevant capacity, from political support to 
seconded national experts, to pick up their advocacy. As suggested in chapter 3, seconded national 
experts (SNEs) played an important role in this active Commission promotion. SNEs are issue experts, 
i.e., professionals who are seconded to the Commission to promote a certain (nationally favoured) 
norm from within the EU’s transnational hub. In the cases of joint programming and, to some extent, 
transparency/results framework, this was designed to go beyond changing the practice of EU 
institutions to create and promote a policy norm for the entire EU. While these officials become part 
of the EU institution, and partly adjust their tasks to institutional demands, their placement has 
crucially contributed to shifting the narrative that has been promoted from within the Commission 
and served as discursive basis for subsequent negotiations. 
Thus, multiple subject professionals have played a role in policy norm advocacy although they 
hardly have any formal role in the policy coordination process; where they have a formal role, as 
national EU coordination units supporting their representatives in Brussels, their role has often been 
marginalised. Especially ‘imported’ issue experts have played a central role in promoting agreement 
due to their enhanced technical expert authority but in the case of SNEs also because they have been 
part of a wider national promotion strategy by a member state. These experts, which also include 
non-state experts, were both sought after by Commission officials who seek to formulate common 
CONCLUSION 
191 




While policy professionals have become an important subject of study in EU and international 
governance, as well as international development (Henriksen and Seabrooke, 2016; Stone, 2013; 
2015; Stone and Ladi, 2015), in the academic study of EU development cooperation their role has 
been largely neglected. Thus, the outlined observations about the contributions of policy 
professionals add empirical insights into the contestation over collective action in EU development 
cooperation. Yet the presented findings also imply a critique of how norm advocacy for collective EU 
action has been researched in that the contributions of policy professionals to discourse formation, 
which are relevant for understanding norm advocacy, have been overlooked. This suggests that the 
presented findings also have theoretical implications for the study of EU development cooperation 
and external action, more generally. Especially, they add to the persistent questions of obstacles to 
EU collective action and effective policy coordination, which have received persistent attention (e.g., 
Bodenstein, et al., 2017; Dijkstra and Vanhoonacker, 2017; Henökl and Trondal, 2015; Niemann and 
Bretherton, 2013). 
In the area of EU development cooperation, academic contributions have sought to identify 
obstacles to effective collective action and find them in the EU’s institutional complexity, which lacks 
incentives for coordinating agreement on collective action (Bodenstein, et al., 2017; Gänzle, et al., 
2012; Orbie and Carbone, 2016). Thus, these approaches have grown out of, and have been driven 
by, the EU’s institutional ‘design’. What I suggest here shifts the focus to some extent away from the 
institutional structures to the processes of norm advocacy. While it is some way between the 
advocacy of norms for collective action, and collective action/effective coordination, it is the advocacy 
process in which competing views are translated into agreement. Even as such agreement may not 
overcome underlying contestation, as the lack of domestic adjustment suggests (Carbone and 
Quartapelle, 2016; Krüger and Steingass, 2018), understanding what dynamics underpin agreement 
helps identify where challenges to collective action come from. To be able to capture the nature of 
these dynamics, the central contribution of this research is a shift in the level of analysis, away from 
the macro to a more disaggregated level. 
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Most work on EU development cooperation has focused on macro level developments. On 
the macro level, much attention has been dedicated to the EU’s institutional structure. The existence 
of institutions at the EU level has contributed to a potential ‘over-emphasis’ on institutional structures 
whereas in international development institutions play a subtler role (Stone, 2004; 2013; 2015; Stone 
and Maxwell, 2005). The reason is the ambiguous role of formal institutions, high uncertainty and 
limited formal incentives for cooperation whereas normative motivations are much stronger. The 
emphasis on institution in the EU has come with a focus on the limiting role of institutions on actors. 
While these limits may help explain continuity (or the absence of change), this research challenges 
the limiting role of institutions and its restrictions on agency, which leads to path dependence, as 
ingrained in historical institutionalism (Pierson, 1996; 2004). Yet, in contrast to discursive 
institutionalism (Schmidt, 2008; 2010), which highlights agency for change through active, collective 
and discursive agency, this research suggests that collective discursive agency also helps us to 
understand resistance to change. Thus, this research does not understand resistance mainly as a 
structural component of institutionalisation but in terms of collective agency. This also points at a 
limitation. The approach’s value depends on whether one can identify such ‘active’ agency, i.e., 
attempts at promoting a policy norm, even against competing priorities and challenging discourses. 
Disappointed institutional optimism after series of institutional reforms revealed the limits of 
the EU’s institutionalisation to facilitate hierarchical policy-making. Moving to a more disaggregated 
level of analysis shows that interactions between actors occur across organisational/institutional 
boundaries. This level of analysis matters especially where institutionalisation is ambiguous and 
provides competing centres of policy formulation, which are in no evident hierarchical order. While 
EU decision-making is circumscribed by well-defined institutions and therefore a prominent subject 
to institutionalist analysis, the wider transnational policy process evades these clearly defined 
institutions. Formal institutions are less helpful in understanding how actors interact. Institutions do 
not tell us enough about what shapes the interactions of actors because of their competing inter-
agent dependences, structured by power relations, which are not part of the institutions of decision-
making. While such a network forms and operates around decision-making nodal points, constituted 
by the institutional structure, in contrast, this research highlights the transcending of organisational 
boundaries at the level of professionals (see also Henriksen and Seabrooke, 2016; Wolff, 2015). 
How do these professionals contribute to advocating policy norms when they are not part of 
the institutional decision-making? The network of policy professionals at the heart of this study has 
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no formal power to make decisions in the EU. And yet their decision and actions matter to coordinate 
policy and advocate agreement between the EU and its member states. To capture this role, this 
research has drawn on concepts of coordinative and communicative discourse formation processes 
(see Schmidt, 2008; 2010; Stone, 2015). To conceptualise the contribution of policy professionals to 
norm advocacy in the EU, this research has examined their contribution to discourse formation 
through their interactions with each other and in the public sphere. When looking beyond a single 
instance of negotiation, the matter becomes less static and more dynamic. It is about formulations 
that become the foundation for eventual agreements on policy norms. These policy norms are in 
constant flux and are challenged by competing policy norms, which are promoted by a variety of 
actors and through multiple, interconnected channels. Thus, it seems that the contributions of the 
discussed policy professionals can be largely seen as discursive, through a form of collective agency, 
even though they do not set the overall priorities and agenda. Instead, they argue, formulate, justify, 
advocate, look for evidence, reach out, seek contributions etc., which collectively affects the 
discursive context for EU norm advocacy. 
This approach captures the highly heterogenous nature of the group of policy professionals, 
ranging from influential member state representatives in the Council working groups to policy analysts 
in the European Parliament secretariat and think tanks. A variety of multiple actors beyond those 
empowered by the institutional structure participate by seeking to shape narratives through their 
engagements. This is not to say power, especially institutional power, does not matter for discursive 
networks. ‘Being at the table’ is important and so is having more channels to promote a narrative. 
While some professionals, such as member state representatives or Commission officials, are ‘at the 
table’ by institutional design, other actors, such as think tankers or officials in the European 
Parliament must engage actively to be heard. Yet these actors are also engaged actively by those ‘in 
power’. There is an interdependence between these actors, which means that power in discursive 
networks is a function not only of actors’ relative position but also their interdependences when it 
comes to being able to contribute to or facilitate norm advocacy. Thus, these professionals are subject 
to multiple and overlapping interdependences. When seeking to understand how they achieve this 
discursive contribution, it makes sense to look at their multiple interactions. These interactions can 
be understood in terms of networks, which form where power is concentrated and decisions are 
made. 
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In contrast to micro-level approaches of EU policy-making, including studies on bargaining, 
negotiations, persuasion etc. discursive networks are less concerned with individual practice of actors 
in their every-day engagement (e.g., how they act to convince another actor). Meso- and micro level 
analyses of policy professionals, diplomats, bureaucrats etc. exist in and across different EU policy 
areas and seem particularly promising in external relations and foreign policy (Bicchi and Bremberg, 
2018; Chelotti, 2016a; Elgström, 2017; Kuus, 2014). These accounts are generally concerned with 
practices of how individuals arrive at decisions. Thus, while they focus on organisational sub-sets (such 
as member state representatives in the Council), the level of analysis remains restricted to a specific 
arena of interaction or group. The advantage is that practices among similar actors, who engage 
intensively, can be studied more easily and yield potentially transferable conclusions. However, this 
micro-level perspective also comes with strict assumptions on participating actors and clear 
limitations of networks/communities, for example in the case of epistemic communities, which have 
been difficult to identify in practice. Most importantly, as this research suggests, isolating interactions 
at this micro level may help to study practice, but it is insufficient to understand the wider process of 
norm advocacy as it depends on the simultaneous advocacy and discursive action around multiple 
centres, which are interdependent. 
These transnational interdependences point at another important insight of this research. 
This research offers an account of the limits of member states in their engagement at the EU level 
despite their formal power. National and transnational networks are important to support the 
promotion of norms. National networks behind member state representatives pursue norms 
simultaneously through different channels and provide substantiation and legitimation to claims. 
Transnational networks help to establish a discourse more widely and assure that it is reproduced in 
other fora, which may affect the wider discursive environment. In contrast, challenging an EU 
collective action norm seems more effective when promoting an alternative rather than trying to 
prevent it. While member state representatives can raise concerns against norms, their (discursive) 
disengagement has meant that these policy norms have nevertheless been advocated because of the 
advocacy through a transnational network of policy professionals. The EU institutions’ bureaucratic 
authority over discourses is empowered by the engagement as part of wider transnational networks 
(see Wolff, 2015). This also adds to discussions about how the Commission can shape policies where 
member states dominate (Metz, 2015; Riddervold, 2016). As a result, countering norm promotion by 
proposing an alternative norm for collective action has been more effective. 
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To summarise, this research accounts for how professionals develop an entrepreneurial role 
for the construction and advocacy of common policy norms. While the entrepreneurial agency of EU 
officials in development cooperation has been highlighted before (Carbone, 2007; Wolff, 2015), this 
approach helps to understand their agency as a component of wider collective agency. More 
generally, the findings help understand what constitutes the entrepreneurial agency of different 
actors, including those who are less evident in the policy process. This includes a closer look at 
member states’ agency in the EU to understand how they promote policy norms by disaggregating 
the state as an organisational unit into its component actors. First, this approach localises 
entrepreneurial agency in the transnational space. Issue experts play a central role in arriving at 
agreement due to their formulations on specific ideas and their expert authority helps substantiate 
and legitimise these formulations. Second, beyond individual agency, this approach understands 
norm advocacy in terms of collective agency through networks where agency is exerted 
simultaneously in several centres. 
 
Where from here? 
The theoretical implications of this research have repercussions for the study of collective EU external 
action. A consequence of the gap in our knowledge regarding norm advocacy of collective EU action 
has been that much hope for improving collective action has been put into institutional reforms of 
the EU’s external governance. The study of EU policy-making in external relations has been 
burgeoning, especially following the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 (see Dijkstra and Vanhoonacker, 2017; 
Keuleers, et al., 2016). The increasing commitment to collective action has contributed to the growing 
expectations in academic and public discourse of the EU’s international clout. 
Most attention has thereby been dedicated to the reformed institutional structures of foreign 
policy-making. Comparatively little attention has been given to the wider external action of the EU, 
which has become increasingly expected to be integrated as part of a coherent EU foreign policy. Yet, 
as suggested here, external policy processes come with a host of institutional and non-state actors 
who are involved at multiple stages and in different ways. This also applies to other policy areas from 
trade with its exclusive EU competence (Dür and De Bièvre, 2007) all the way to defence policy 
(Wilkinson, et al., 2017). The involvement of these different actors cuts across the neat organisational 
boundaries of EU institutions and member states. Thus, despite the burgeoning research on EU 
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foreign policy and external action, which looks at the lack of success of institutional reforms, there is 
a need for research that helps to make sense of this lack. The presented conclusions contribute to this 
need. 
There are some caveats, which opens avenues for further enquiry. Discursive networks of 
policy professionals may be less relevant in EU foreign policy-making when there is stricter 
institutional organisation or issue control by governments. Where norm advocacy takes place in ad 
hoc negotiations between top-level executives in front of the eyes of national electorates, the 
transnational role of policy specialists runs the risk of becoming less prominent. Norm negotiations 
on the issue of external action on migration control since late 2015 have illustrated this issue. Yet 
these situations are exceptions and ‘extremes’ in processes which are continuously carried on the 
backs of professionals, at least where there is some degree of institutionalisation of international 
cooperation. This study has looked at a case of transnational policy-making where supranational and 
national bureaucracies together with non-state actors construct, coordinate and advocate common 
policy norms. The adjustment of the analytical perspective on EU policy processes draws on 
conceptual debates about the role of networks of diverse types of actors in increasingly 
institutionalised international relations (Henriksen and Seabrooke, 2016; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; 
Slaughter, 2004; Stone, 2013; Stone and Ladi, 2015). This means that the approach in order to be 
helpful requires a degree of institutionalisation, which identifies centres of decision-making; sufficient 
institutional ambiguity, which allows a variety of actors to seek access to this centre and promotes 
interdependences among them; transnational institutions and bureaucracies to serve as hubs for 
discursive networks and have independent policy professionals; finally, agreement is coordinated at 
the working level of policy professionals rather than at the political top. 
This is largely the case for EU development cooperation. EU development policy-making is 
special in many ways, which makes it a relatively ‘easy case’ for the outlined approach (low politics, 
focused issue professionals, etc.). While it has not been the aim to generalise the findings from one 
case in a theoretical way in order to conceptualise – or even explain – all EU foreign policy-making, 
we see these characteristics in other areas of EU external action and foreign policy. This suggests that 
the outlined analytical lens can be applied there. Given the changes in the EU’s foreign policy, 
especially since Lisbon, the approach holds potential to add to wider debates about the effectiveness 
of the EU’s external policy-making. Overcoming problems of collective action led to the creation of 
the HR/VP and the EEAS, which have developed as a transnational network hub, and have become an 
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intensely researched institutional advancement (Amadio Viceré, 2018; Merket, 2016; Morgenstern-
Pomorski, 2018). Yet research in this area has also concentrated more on the working level (Chelotti, 
2016a; 2016b) and the role of non-state actors (Voltolini, 2016). In addition, since Lisbon, one can also 
observe the integration of external relations into the EU’s foreign policy more generally, especially 
regarding the HR/VP’s ‘comprehensive/integrated approach’ and the debate on the post-2020 
financial framework. This integration means that more actors with competing agendas contest 
narratives across subfields more openly. While this integration has been welcomed with regard to 
existing levels of incoherence, the process involves that the nature of foreign policy-making will 
remain ‘messy’ and institutionally complex despite attempts at institutional reform and ‘streamlining’. 
Second, what comes out of this wider process in EU foreign policy also changes the rules of 
the game for development cooperation, especially for the time of the Multiannual Financial 
Framework (MFF) after 2020 when budget lines are restructured, potentially in the form of a single 
external funding instrument (European Commission, 2018). The role and relevance of development 
cooperation in general but also in the EU has significantly shifted since the beginning of the 2010s and 
continues to do so. The EU’s enlargements and security concerns ‘at home’ in member states have 
pushed the policy area further to the edge and at the disposal of European security interests (e.g., 
Bergmann, 2018), and global paradigm shifts have challenged the foundation of development 
cooperation despite continued reassurances (e.g., BMZ, 2017b; European Commission, 2016a; UN, 
2015). As the negotiations of the MFF indicate, there is a move towards ‘root causes of migration’ and 
Europe’s security, more generally, which will affect the participation of certain actors in the identified 
discursive networks. This is already foreshadowed by the retreat of NGO networks regarding 
questions of EU development policy. With the advent of a more assertive EU foreign service and a 
clear internal agenda driven by ambitious institutions, on the one hand, and suspicious governments, 
which are pushed by sceptics and populists all over Europe, on the other hand, international 
development is at risk of being subsumed by these interests in the EU. 
At the same time, development cooperation is going through a transformation, potentially its 
most significant one since the Second World War, which has implications for the EU’s external action. 
Aid and traditional cooperation policies that aim at poverty eradication by offering (limited) external 
interventions on which EU development cooperation coordination of the 2000s had been built 
become less relevant. This potential decline of development cooperation was made more likely by 
other international shifts and global discourses, such as the agreement on the UN Sustainable 
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Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015. This does not need to be bad news for international development, 
given the continuous critique of aid and development cooperation (see Moyo, 2009; Riddell, 2007; 
Sumner and Kirk, 2014). While at the beginning of the 2000s, international aid discourses were 
dominated by donor governments, including the EU, their retreat and the emergence of new actors, 
from individual philanthropists to emerging economies, on the global scene and on the ground had 
changed cooperation for international development significantly. This has been both bemoaned and 
welcomed in international development circles. 
While these shifts have the potential for enormous benefits for international development 
and the departure from at least seven decades of post-colonial orientalism, it also heralds a 
disengagement of financially potent and influential international actors whose domestic and 
international policies still hold great challenges for international development. Cooperation policies 
for international development thus remain relevant, including coordinating international funding or 
aid. Also, the question of whether Europe is going towards a common cooperation policy for 
international development remains relevant and how such a common policy looks like. Trends of 
seeing international cooperation in the service of managing migration to Europe and the 
‘securitisation’ of EU development cooperation efforts (e.g., Bergmann, 2018) may potentially 
jeopardise the EU’s contribution to international development through its external action because 
these trends weaken the discursive contributions of those actors who seek to safeguard development 
objectives. This research suggests that contestation over international cooperation policies takes 
place at the level of professionals, but the stronger role of the more political discourses around 
migration and securitisation strengthen the communicative discourse in the advocacy process for 
collective action norms. This means that norm advocacy based on technical discourses, a central driver 
for advocacy through transnational networks, becomes more challenging. 
Finally, European integration is in flux. On 23 June 2016, a majority of the electorate in the 
United Kingdom voted in a referendum to leave the EU. This referendum, especially its outcome, 
provoked multiple reflections on Britain’s EU membership (e.g., Smith, 2017) and its relationship in 
various policy areas, including development cooperation (Green, 2016; Lightfoot, et al., 2017; Olivié 
and Pérez, 2017; Watkins, 2016). In contrast, Britain’s development administration in the Department 
for International Development (DFID) remained silent around the time of the referendum and its 
immediate aftermath. After it had postponed the publication of a large-scale assessment of its 
engagement with multilateral organisations because of the EU referendum, when finally published, 
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the document (DFID, 2016c) largely ignored the EU, one of the primary multilateral channels for British 
development cooperation together with the World Bank. This reflects the dilemma in which its 
officials were put who participated actively in coordination and contestation of EU collective norms. 
There are further changes as British actors leave the institutional framework of EU development 
cooperation following Brexit. At the time of writing, the wider implication of Britain’s withdrawal from 
the EU are still to be determined, which also affected development cooperation:  
The UK’s decision to leave the EU will have implications for DFID’s future partnerships with the EU 
bodies included in this Review. In the meantime, the UK continues to work with the EU, meeting our 
obligations, including funding to the European Development Fund (EDF) to support the poorest 
countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, and humanitarian work via the Directorate General 
Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO). (DFID, 2016c, p. 40) 
DFID’s multilateral development review of December 2016 mostly avoided mentioning the EU, 
reflecting a sense of prolonged uncertainty. Brexit will likely affect Britain’s international engagement 
in development as it has also benefited from its EU networks. 
Thus, the discussed observations are snapshots of a moving target. Especially against the 
background of Brexit, one question is how the presented discussion remains relevant. Brexit offers 
opportunities for the outlined approach. As a reminder, the key benefit of this research is that it allows 
to look beyond shifting institutional structures to the professionals who engage in norm advocacy, 
even as they are not directly part of decision processes. Interactions at the professional level, while 
facilitated through institutions, are not determined by them. In contrast, they may even contribute to 
constructing them. Thus, while Britain leaves the EU’s institutional structures, including the Council 
with its working groups (and Commission SNEs), which reduces interactions, exchanges at all levels 
may well continue in practice and lead to new arrangements (Steingass, 2018). Research in this 
direction may further advance the presented argument and, despite all the consequences, these 
developments constitute an important avenue for further research, which can provide some optimism 
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